Detection rules › Kusto

Attempt to bypass conditional access rule in Microsoft Entra ID

Status
available
Severity
low
Time window
1d
Source
github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'Identifies an attempt to Bypass conditional access rule(s) in Microsoft Entra ID. The ConditionalAccessStatus column value details if there was an attempt to bypass Conditional Access or if the Conditional access rule was not satisfied (ConditionalAccessStatus == 1). References: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/overview https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/concept-sign-ins https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-sign-ins-error-codes ConditionalAccessStatus == 0 // Success ConditionalAccessStatus == 1 // Failure ConditionalAccessStatus == 2 // Not Applied ConditionalAccessStatus == 3 // unknown Note: This analytic rule is designed to identify potential attempts to bypass Conditional Access policies. Depending on your organization's configuration, some Conditional Access failures may be legitimate and expected. It is recommended to review alerts generated by this rule in the context of your organization's Conditional Access policies and adjust the detection threshold as needed to reduce false positives. This rule includes an optional filter that leverages a watchlist (ConditionalAccessBenignStatusCodes) to exclude known benign status codes. You can customize this watchlist with status codes that are expected in your environment and do not indicate malicious activity. By default, the watchlist-based filtering is commented out to provide full visibility into all relevant events. You may choose to enable this filter by uncommenting the corresponding line in the query to reduce noise from known benign scenarios.'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

id: 3af9285d-bb98-4a35-ad29-5ea39ba0c628
name: Attempt to bypass conditional access rule in Microsoft Entra ID
description: |
  'Identifies an attempt to Bypass conditional access rule(s) in Microsoft Entra ID.
  The ConditionalAccessStatus column value details if there was an attempt to bypass Conditional Access or if the Conditional access rule was not satisfied (ConditionalAccessStatus == 1).
  References:
  https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/conditional-access/overview
  https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/concept-sign-ins
  https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/reference-sign-ins-error-codes
  ConditionalAccessStatus == 0 // Success
  ConditionalAccessStatus == 1 // Failure
  ConditionalAccessStatus == 2 // Not Applied
  ConditionalAccessStatus == 3 // unknown
  Note:
  This analytic rule is designed to identify potential attempts to bypass Conditional Access policies. Depending on your organization's configuration, some Conditional Access failures may be legitimate and expected.
  It is recommended to review alerts generated by this rule in the context of your organization's Conditional Access policies and adjust the detection threshold as needed to reduce false positives.
  This rule includes an optional filter that leverages a watchlist (ConditionalAccessBenignStatusCodes) to exclude known benign status codes. You can customize this watchlist with status codes that are expected in your environment and do not indicate malicious activity.
  By default, the watchlist-based filtering is commented out to provide full visibility into all relevant events. You may choose to enable this filter by uncommenting the corresponding line in the query to reduce noise from known benign scenarios.'
severity: Low
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
      - SigninLogs
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
      - AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
status: Available
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
  - Persistence
relevantTechniques:
  - T1078
  - T1098
query: |
  let threshold = 1; // Modify this threshold value to reduce false positives based on your environment
  let aadFunc = (tableName:string){
  table(tableName)
  | where ConditionalAccessStatus == 1 or ConditionalAccessStatus =~ "failure"
  | mv-apply CAP = parse_json(ConditionalAccessPolicies) on (
    project ConditionalAccessPoliciesName = CAP.displayName, result = CAP.result
    | where result =~ "failure"
  )
  | extend DeviceDetail = todynamic(DeviceDetail), Status = todynamic(Status), LocationDetails = todynamic(LocationDetails)
  | extend OS = DeviceDetail.operatingSystem, Browser = DeviceDetail.browser
  | extend State = tostring(LocationDetails.state), City = tostring(LocationDetails.city), Region = tostring(LocationDetails.countryOrRegion)
  | extend StatusCode = tostring(Status.errorCode), StatusDetails = tostring(Status.additionalDetails)
  // Filter out status codes using watchlist
  // uncomment the following line to enable watchlist filtering
  // | join kind=leftanti (_GetWatchlist("ConditionalAccessBenignStatusCodes") | project StatusCode) on StatusCode
  | extend Status = strcat(StatusCode, ": ", ResultDescription)
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated), Status = make_list(Status,10), StatusDetails = make_list(StatusDetails,50), IPAddresses = make_list(IPAddress,100), IPAddressCount = dcount(IPAddress), CorrelationIds = make_list(CorrelationId,100), ConditionalAccessPoliciesName = make_list(ConditionalAccessPoliciesName,100)
  by UserPrincipalName, UserId, AppDisplayName, tostring(Browser), tostring(OS), City, State, Region, Type
  | where IPAddressCount > threshold and StatusDetails !has "MFA successfully completed"
  | mv-expand IPAddresses, Status, StatusDetails, CorrelationIds
  | extend Status = strcat(Status, " ", StatusDetails)
  | summarize IPAddresses = make_set(IPAddresses,100), Status = make_set(Status,10), CorrelationIds = make_set(CorrelationIds,100), ConditionalAccessPoliciesName = make_set(ConditionalAccessPoliciesName,100)
  by StartTime, EndTime, UserPrincipalName, UserId, AppDisplayName, tostring(Browser), tostring(OS), City, State, Region, IPAddressCount, Type
  | extend IPAddressFirst = tostring(IPAddresses[0]), Name = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
  };
  let aadSignin = aadFunc("SigninLogs");
  let aadNonInt = aadFunc("AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs");
  union isfuzzy=true aadSignin, aadNonInt
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: UserPrincipalName
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Name
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: UPNSuffix
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: AadUserId
        columnName: UserId
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: IPAddressFirst
version: 1.0.8
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let threshold = 1;
let aadSignin = aadFunc("SigninLogs");
let aadNonInt = aadFunc("AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs");

Let binding: aadFunc

let aadFunc = (tableName:string){
table(tableName)
| where ConditionalAccessStatus == 1 or ConditionalAccessStatus =~ "failure"
| mv-apply CAP = parse_json(ConditionalAccessPolicies) on (
  project ConditionalAccessPoliciesName = CAP.displayName, result = CAP.result
  | where result =~ "failure"
)
| extend DeviceDetail = todynamic(DeviceDetail), Status = todynamic(Status), LocationDetails = todynamic(LocationDetails)
| extend OS = DeviceDetail.operatingSystem, Browser = DeviceDetail.browser
| extend State = tostring(LocationDetails.state), City = tostring(LocationDetails.city), Region = tostring(LocationDetails.countryOrRegion)
| extend StatusCode = tostring(Status.errorCode), StatusDetails = tostring(Status.additionalDetails)
| extend Status = strcat(StatusCode, ": ", ResultDescription)
| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated), Status = make_list(Status,10), StatusDetails = make_list(StatusDetails,50), IPAddresses = make_list(IPAddress,100), IPAddressCount = dcount(IPAddress), CorrelationIds = make_list(CorrelationId,100), ConditionalAccessPoliciesName = make_list(ConditionalAccessPoliciesName,100)
by UserPrincipalName, UserId, AppDisplayName, tostring(Browser), tostring(OS), City, State, Region, Type
| where IPAddressCount > threshold and StatusDetails !has "MFA successfully completed"
| mv-expand IPAddresses, Status, StatusDetails, CorrelationIds
| extend Status = strcat(Status, " ", StatusDetails)
| summarize IPAddresses = make_set(IPAddresses,100), Status = make_set(Status,10), CorrelationIds = make_set(CorrelationIds,100), ConditionalAccessPoliciesName = make_set(ConditionalAccessPoliciesName,100)
by StartTime, EndTime, UserPrincipalName, UserId, AppDisplayName, tostring(Browser), tostring(OS), City, State, Region, IPAddressCount, Type
| extend IPAddressFirst = tostring(IPAddresses[0]), Name = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
};

Derived from threshold.

union isfuzzy=true (2 sources)

Each leg below queries one source; the rule matches if any leg does. Sources: aadSignin, aadNonInt

Leg 1: aadSignin

Leg 2: aadNonInt