Detection rules › Kusto

Contrast ADR - EDR Alert Correlation

This is a third-party alert feed, not a detection over modeled telemetry. The vendor product raised the finding; this rule forwards it into the SIEM. It is searchable for reference but is excluded from the detection-rule browse and the ATT&CK coverage matrix.

Status: available
Severity: medium
Time window: 5m
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'Correlates Contrast ADR incidents with specific high-risk attack patterns including command injection, deserialization attacks, and file upload vulnerabilities. This rule identifies confirmed security events that require immediate attention from security teams.'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Initial Access	`T1190` Exploit Public-Facing Application
Execution	`T1059` Command and Scripting Interpreter
Stealth	`T1055` Process Injection
Command & Control	`T1008` Fallback Channels

Rule body kusto

id: c1c6ba64-134e-403b-b9a6-1bebc90809a4
name: Contrast ADR - EDR Alert Correlation
description: |
  'Correlates Contrast ADR incidents with specific high-risk attack patterns including command injection, deserialization attacks, and file upload vulnerabilities. This rule identifies confirmed security events that require immediate attention from security teams.'
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: ContrastADRCCF
    dataTypes:
      - ContrastADRIncidents_CL
      - ContrastADRAttackEvents_CL
queryFrequency: 5m
queryPeriod: 5m
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Execution
  - DefenseEvasion
  - InitialAccess
  - CommandAndControl
relevantTechniques:
  - T1059
  - T1055
  - T1190
  - T1008
query: |
  ContrastADRIncidents_CL
  | join kind=inner (ContrastADRAttackEvents_CL | where rule in~("class-loader-manipulation", "cmd-injection-semantic-chained-commands", "cmd-injection-semantic-dangerous-paths", "cmd-injection-command-backdoors", "cmd-injection-process-hardening", "cmd-injection", "expression-language-injection", "jndi-injection", "ssjs-injection", "unsafe-file-upload", "untrusted-deserialization","xxe") | project-rename hostname = host_hostname) on incidentId
  //Please add your EDR table name in place of ContrastWAFLogs_CL and hostname's column name in place of hostname below and uncomment the queries below
  //| join kind = inner ( ContrastWAFLogs_CL
  //| where TimeGenerated >= ago(5m)) on hostname
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: hostname
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: 'EDR Alert Confirmed {{result}} by Contrast ADR on {{application_name}}'
  alertDescriptionFormat: 'EDR Alert Confirmed {{result}} by Contrast ADR on {{application_name}}'
incidentConfiguration:
  createIncident: true
  groupingConfiguration:
    enabled: true
    reopenClosedIncident: false
    lookbackDuration: PT1H
    matchingMethod: Selected
    groupByEntities:
      - Host
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
kind: Scheduled
version: 1.0.2

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

ContrastADRIncidents_CL

Stage 2: `join`

| join kind=inner (ContrastADRAttackEvents_CL | where rule in~("class-loader-manipulation", "cmd-injection-semantic-chained-commands", "cmd-injection-semantic-dangerous-paths", "cmd-injection-command-backdoors", "cmd-injection-process-hardening", "cmd-injection", "expression-language-injection", "jndi-injection", "ssjs-injection", "unsafe-file-upload", "untrusted-deserialization","xxe") | project-rename hostname = host_hostname) on incidentId

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`rule`	in	`class-loader-manipulation` `cmd-injection` `cmd-injection-command-backdoors` `cmd-injection-process-hardening` `cmd-injection-semantic-chained-commands` `cmd-injection-semantic-dangerous-paths` `expression-language-injection` `jndi-injection` `ssjs-injection` `unsafe-file-upload` `untrusted-deserialization` `xxe`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Contrast ADR - EDR Alert Correlation

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `join`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Contrast ADR - EDR Alert Correlation

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: join

Indicators

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `join`