Access Token Manipulation - Create Process with Token

Status: available
Severity: medium
Time window: 1h
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

This query detects the use of the 'runas' command and checks whether the account used to elevate privileges isn't the user's own admin account. Additionally, it will match this event to the logon events - to check whether it has been successful as well as augment the event with the new SID.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Privilege Escalation	`T1134.002` Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token
Stealth	`T1134.002` Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token

Event coverage

Provider	Event/ActionType	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.
Defender-DeviceProcessEvents	any	Process activity (any)

Rule body kusto

id: 8df80270-b4fa-4a7a-931e-8d17c0b321ae
name: Access Token Manipulation - Create Process with Token
description: |
  This query detects the use of the 'runas' command and checks whether the account used to elevate privileges isn't the user's own admin account. 
  Additionally, it will match this event to the logon events - to check whether it has been successful as well as augment the event with the new SID.
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - DeviceProcessEvents
      - DeviceLogonEvents
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - PrivilegeEscalation
  - DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
  - T1134.002
query: |
  let RunAsProcess=DeviceProcessEvents
      | where FileName =~ "runas.exe" 
      // You can choose to filter out the local admin account. This is based on convention. Here, we assume that localadmin accounts
      // end with _ladmin (RID 500 / LAPS).
      | where not(AccountName has_any("_ladmin"))
      // De-obfuscate the commandline used. 
      | extend CleanProcessCommandLine=parse_command_line(tostring(ProcessCommandLine), "windows")
      // Exclude a user running something on their system through their admin account.
      | where CleanProcessCommandLine !contains strcat(AccountName, "_adm") // Replace this with your admin account naming convention.
      // Exclude local admin account activities by, for instance, the servicedesk that uses the LAPS provisioned account. This is optional. 
      // Disable the line below if the number of false positives is acceptable. 
      | where not(CleanProcessCommandLine has_any (":_ladmin")) // Replace this with your local RID500/LAPS account.
      // Extract the username for the elevation action.
      | extend ElevatedAccountName=extract("user:([a-zA-Z0-9\\\\]+)",1,tostring(CleanProcessCommandLine))
      // Strip the domain suffix.
      | extend CleanElevatedAccountName= trim("(.*\\\\)",ElevatedAccountName);
  RunAsProcess
  | join kind=leftouter ( 
      DeviceLogonEvents
      | project-rename CleanElevatedAccountName = AccountName
      ) on CleanElevatedAccountName,DeviceId
  | project-rename ElevatedActionType=ActionType1,ElevatedAccountSid=AccountSid1
  | project TimeGenerated,DeviceId,DeviceName,FileName,FolderPath,ProcessCommandLine,SHA256,ProcessIntegrityLevel,AccountDomain,AccountName,AccountSid, LogonId, InitiatingProcessFileName,InitiatingProcessFolderPath,InitiatingProcessCommandLine,CleanProcessCommandLine,ElevatedAccountName,CleanElevatedAccountName,ElevatedActionType,LogonType,ElevatedAccountSid
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: DeviceName
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Sid
        columnName: AccountSid 
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: AccountDomain
  - entityType: Process
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: CommandLine
        columnName: ProcessCommandLine
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `let`

let RunAsProcess = DeviceProcessEvents <inlined as stages below>;

The stages below define let RunAsProcess (the rule's main pipeline source).

Stage 1: `source`

DeviceProcessEvents

Stage 2: `where`

| where FileName =~ "runas.exe"

Stage 3: `where`

| where not(AccountName has_any("_ladmin"))

Stage 4: `extend`

| extend CleanProcessCommandLine=parse_command_line(tostring(ProcessCommandLine), "windows")

Stage 5: `where`

| where CleanProcessCommandLine !contains strcat(AccountName, "_adm")

Stage 6: `where`

| where not(CleanProcessCommandLine has_any (":_ladmin"))

Stage 7: `extend`

| extend ElevatedAccountName=extract("user:([a-zA-Z0-9\\\\]+)",1,tostring(CleanProcessCommandLine))

Stage 8: `extend`

| extend CleanElevatedAccountName= trim("(.*\\\\)",ElevatedAccountName)

The stages below run on RunAsProcess (the outer pipeline).

Stage 9: `join`

RunAsProcess
| join kind=leftouter ( 
    DeviceLogonEvents
    | project-rename CleanElevatedAccountName = AccountName
    ) on CleanElevatedAccountName,DeviceId

Stage 10: `project-rename`

| project-rename ElevatedActionType=ActionType1,ElevatedAccountSid=AccountSid1

Stage 11: `project`

| project TimeGenerated,DeviceId,DeviceName,FileName,FolderPath,ProcessCommandLine,SHA256,ProcessIntegrityLevel,AccountDomain,AccountName,AccountSid, LogonId, InitiatingProcessFileName,InitiatingProcessFolderPath,InitiatingProcessCommandLine,CleanProcessCommandLine,ElevatedAccountName,CleanElevatedAccountName,ElevatedActionType,LogonType,ElevatedAccountSid

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`AccountName`	match	`_ladmin`
`CleanProcessCommandLine`	match	`:_ladmin`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CleanProcessCommandLine`	cross_field_compare	`AccountName` transforms: `op:not_contains`, `rhs:strcat_suffix:_adm`
`FileName`	eq	`runas.exe`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`AccountDomain`	`project`
`AccountName`	`project`
`AccountSid`	`project`
`CleanElevatedAccountName`	`project`
`CleanProcessCommandLine`	`project`
`DeviceId`	`project`
`DeviceName`	`project`
`ElevatedAccountName`	`project`
`ElevatedAccountSid`	`project`
`ElevatedActionType`	`project`
`FileName`	`project`
`FolderPath`	`project`
`InitiatingProcessCommandLine`	`project`
`InitiatingProcessFileName`	`project`
`InitiatingProcessFolderPath`	`project`
`LogonId`	`project`
`LogonType`	`project`
`ProcessCommandLine`	`project`
`ProcessIntegrityLevel`	`project`
`SHA256`	`project`
`TimeGenerated`	`project`

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`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
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`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Access Token Manipulation - Create Process with Token

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: `let`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `extend`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `where`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `extend`

Stage 9: `join`

Stage 10: `project-rename`

Stage 11: `project`

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Access Token Manipulation - Create Process with Token

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 0: let

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: extend

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: where

Stage 7: extend

Stage 8: extend

Stage 9: join

Stage 10: project-rename

Stage 11: project

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 0: `let`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `extend`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `where`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `extend`

Stage 9: `join`

Stage 10: `project-rename`

Stage 11: `project`