Credential Dumping Tools - File Artifacts

Status: available
Severity: high
Time window: 1h
Group by: Computer, EventID, Image, ProcessGuid, TargetFilename
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

This query detects the creation of credential dumping tools files. Several credential dumping tools export files with hardcoded file names. Ref: https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Credential Access	`T1003.001` OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 11	FileCreate

Rule body kusto

id: 32ffb19e-8ed8-40ed-87a0-1adb4746b7c4
name: Credential Dumping Tools - File Artifacts
description: |
   'This query detects the creation of credential dumping tools files. Several credential dumping tools export files with hardcoded file names.
   Ref: https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/'
severity: High
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - Event
  - connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - Event
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - CredentialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1003.001
query: |
  // Enter a reference list of malicious file artifacts
  let MaliciousFileArtifacts = dynamic (["lsass.dmp","test.pwd","lsremora.dll","lsremora64.dll","fgexec.exe","pwdump","kirbi","wce_ccache","wce_krbtkts","wceaux.dll","PwHashes","SAM.out","SECURITY.out","SYSTEM.out","NTDS.out" "DumpExt.dll","DumpSvc.exe","cachedump64.exe","cachedump.exe","pstgdump.exe","servpw64.exe","servpw.exe","pwdump.exe","fgdump-log"]);
  Event
  | where EventLog == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" and EventID==11
  | parse EventData with * 'TargetFilename">' TargetFilename "<" *
  | where TargetFilename has_any (MaliciousFileArtifacts)
  | parse EventData with * 'ProcessGuid">' ProcessGuid "<" * 'Image">' Image "<" *
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, Image, ProcessGuid, TargetFilename
  | extend HostName = split(Computer, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.')
entityMappings:
- entityType: File
  fieldMappings:
    - identifier: Name
      columnName: TargetFilename
- entityType: Host
  fieldMappings:
    - identifier: HostName
      columnName: HostName
    - identifier: DnsDomain
      columnName: DnsDomain
- entityType: Process
  fieldMappings:
    - identifier: CommandLine
      columnName: Image
version: 1.0.3
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `MaliciousFileArtifacts`

let MaliciousFileArtifacts = dynamic (["lsass.dmp","test.pwd","lsremora.dll","lsremora64.dll","fgexec.exe","pwdump","kirbi","wce_ccache","wce_krbtkts","wceaux.dll","PwHashes","SAM.out","SECURITY.out","SYSTEM.out","NTDS.out" "DumpExt.dll","DumpSvc.exe","cachedump64.exe","cachedump.exe","pstgdump.exe","servpw64.exe","servpw.exe","pwdump.exe","fgdump-log"]);

Stage 1: `source`

Event

Stage 2: `where`

| where EventLog == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" and EventID==11

Stage 3: `parse`

| parse EventData with * 'TargetFilename">' TargetFilename "<" *

Stage 4: `where`

| where TargetFilename has_any (MaliciousFileArtifacts)

References MaliciousFileArtifacts (defined above).

Stage 5: `parse`

| parse EventData with * 'ProcessGuid">' ProcessGuid "<" * 'Image">' Image "<" *

Stage 6: `summarize`

| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, Image, ProcessGuid, TargetFilename

Stage 7: `extend`

| extend HostName = split(Computer, '.', 0)[0], DnsDomain = strcat_array(array_slice(split(Computer, '.'), 1, -1), '.')

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`EventID`	eq	`11` transforms: `cased` corpus 23 (splunk 21, kusto 2)
`EventLog`	eq	`Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational` transforms: `cased` corpus 10 (kusto 10)
`TargetFilename`	match	`DumpExt.dll` `DumpSvc.exe` `NTDS.out` `PwHashes` `SAM.out` `SECURITY.out` `SYSTEM.out` `cachedump.exe` `cachedump64.exe` `fgdump-log` `fgexec.exe` `kirbi` `lsass.dmp` `lsremora.dll` `lsremora64.dll` `pstgdump.exe` `pwdump` `pwdump.exe` `servpw.exe` `servpw64.exe` `test.pwd` `wce_ccache` `wce_krbtkts` `wceaux.dll`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`Computer`	`summarize`
`EndTime`	`summarize`
`EventID`	`summarize`
`Image`	`summarize`
`ProcessGuid`	`summarize`
`StartTime`	`summarize`
`TargetFilename`	`summarize`
`DnsDomain`	`extend`
`HostName`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Credential Dumping Tools - File Artifacts

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `MaliciousFileArtifacts`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `parse`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `parse`

Stage 6: `summarize`

Stage 7: `extend`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Credential Dumping Tools - File Artifacts

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: MaliciousFileArtifacts

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: parse

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: parse

Stage 6: summarize

Stage 7: extend

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `MaliciousFileArtifacts`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `parse`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `parse`

Stage 6: `summarize`

Stage 7: `extend`