Detection rules › Kusto
CreepyDrive URLs
'CreepyDrive uses OneDrive for command and control. This detection identifies URLs specific to CreepyDrive.'
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Command & Control | T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication |
| Exfiltration | T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
Rule body kusto
id: b6d03b88-4d27-49a2-9c1c-29f1ad2842dc
name: CreepyDrive URLs
description: |
'CreepyDrive uses OneDrive for command and control. This detection identifies URLs specific to CreepyDrive.'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: Zscaler
dataTypes:
- CommonSecurityLog
- connectorId: Fortinet
dataTypes:
- CommonSecurityLog
- connectorId: CheckPoint
dataTypes:
- CommonSecurityLog
- connectorId: PaloAltoNetworks
dataTypes:
- CommonSecurityLog
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- Exfiltration
- CommandAndControl
relevantTechniques:
- T1567.002
- T1102.002
tags:
- POLONIUM
query: |
let oneDriveCalls = dynamic(['graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root:/Documents/data.txt:/content','graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root:/Documents/response.json:/content']);
let oneDriveCallsRegex = dynamic([@'graph\.microsoft\.com\/v1\.0\/me\/drive\/root\:\/Uploaded\/.*\:\/content',@'graph\.microsoft\.com\/v1\.0\/me\/drive\/root\:\/Downloaded\/.*\:\/content']);
CommonSecurityLog
| where RequestURL has_any (oneDriveCalls) or RequestURL matches regex tostring(oneDriveCallsRegex[0]) or RequestURL matches regex tostring(oneDriveCallsRegex[1])
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceVendor, DeviceProduct, DeviceAction, DestinationDnsDomain, DestinationIP, RequestURL, SourceIP, SourceHostName, RequestClientApplication
entityMappings:
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: SourceIP
- entityType: Host
fieldMappings:
- identifier: HostName
columnName: SourceHostName
version: 1.0.1
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
source:
kind: Community
author:
name: Thomas McElroy
support:
tier: Community
categories:
domains: [ "Security - Others" ]
Stages and Predicates
Let binding: oneDriveCalls
let oneDriveCalls = dynamic(['graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root:/Documents/data.txt:/content','graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me/drive/root:/Documents/response.json:/content']);
Let binding: oneDriveCallsRegex
let oneDriveCallsRegex = dynamic([@'graph\.microsoft\.com\/v1\.0\/me\/drive\/root\:\/Uploaded\/.*\:\/content',@'graph\.microsoft\.com\/v1\.0\/me\/drive\/root\:\/Downloaded\/.*\:\/content']);
Stage 1: source
CommonSecurityLog
Stage 2: where
| where RequestURL has_any (oneDriveCalls) or RequestURL matches regex tostring(oneDriveCallsRegex[0]) or RequestURL matches regex tostring(oneDriveCallsRegex[1])
References oneDriveCalls, oneDriveCallsRegex (defined above).
Stage 3: project
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceVendor, DeviceProduct, DeviceAction, DestinationDnsDomain, DestinationIP, RequestURL, SourceIP, SourceHostName, RequestClientApplication
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
RequestURL | match |
|
Output fields
Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
DestinationDnsDomain | project |
DestinationIP | project |
DeviceAction | project |
DeviceProduct | project |
DeviceVendor | project |
RequestClientApplication | project |
RequestURL | project |
SourceHostName | project |
SourceIP | project |
TimeGenerated | project |