DSRM Account Abuse

Severity: high
Time window: 1h
Group by: Computer, Details, EventID, Image, ProcessId, TargetObject, User, _ResourceId
Author: Vasileios Paschalidis
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

This query detects an abuse of the DSRM account in order to maintain persistence and access to the organization's Active Directory. Ref: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1785

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1098` Account Manipulation

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 13	RegistryEvent (Value Set)

Rule body kusto

id: 979c42dd-533e-4ede-b18b-31a84ba8b3d6
name: DSRM Account Abuse
description: | 
  'This query detects an abuse of the DSRM account in order to maintain persistence and access to the organization's Active Directory.
  Ref: https://adsecurity.org/?p=1785'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Persistence
relevantTechniques:
  - T1098
query: |
  Event
  | where EventLog == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" and EventID in (13)
  | parse EventData with * 'ProcessId">' ProcessId "<"* 'Image">' Image "<" * 'TargetObject">' TargetObject "<" * 'Details">' Details "<" * 'User">' User "<" * 
  | where TargetObject has ("HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior") and Details == "DWORD (0x00000002)"
  | summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, User, ProcessId, Image, TargetObject, Details, _ResourceId
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(User, "\\")[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(User, "\\")[0])
  | extend ImageFileName = tostring(split(Image, "\\")[-1])
  | extend ImageDirectory = replace_string(Image, ImageFileName, "")
  | project-away DomainIndex
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Computer
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: User
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: AccountNTDomain
  - entityType: Process
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: ProcessId
        columnName: ProcessId
  - entityType: File
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: ImageFileName
      - identifier: Directory
        columnName: ImageDirectory
  - entityType: RegistryKey
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Key
        columnName: TargetObject
version: 1.0.3
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Vasileios Paschalidis
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Others" ]

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Event

Stage 2: `where`

| where EventLog == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" and EventID in (13)

Stage 3: `parse`

| parse EventData with * 'ProcessId">' ProcessId "<"* 'Image">' Image "<" * 'TargetObject">' TargetObject "<" * 'Details">' Details "<" * 'User">' User "<" *

Stage 4: `where`

| where TargetObject has ("HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior") and Details == "DWORD (0x00000002)"

Stage 5: `summarize`

| summarize StartTime = min(TimeGenerated), EndTime = max(TimeGenerated) by EventID, Computer, User, ProcessId, Image, TargetObject, Details, _ResourceId

Stage 6: `extend` (5 consecutive steps)

| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(User, "\\")[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(User, "\\")[0])
| extend ImageFileName = tostring(split(Image, "\\")[-1])
| extend ImageDirectory = replace_string(Image, ImageFileName, "")

Stage 7: `project-away`

| project-away DomainIndex

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Details`	eq	`DWORD (0x00000002)` transforms: `cased` corpus 11 (sigma 9, chronicle 1, kusto 1)
`EventID`	in	`13` transforms: `cased` corpus 22 (splunk 18, kusto 4)
`EventLog`	eq	`Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational` transforms: `cased` corpus 10 (kusto 10)
`TargetObject`	match	`HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior` transforms: `term`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`Computer`	`summarize`
`Details`	`summarize`
`EndTime`	`summarize`
`EventID`	`summarize`
`Image`	`summarize`
`ProcessId`	`summarize`
`StartTime`	`summarize`
`TargetObject`	`summarize`
`User`	`summarize`
`_ResourceId`	`summarize`
`HostName`	`extend`
`HostNameDomain`	`extend`
`AccountNTDomain`	`extend`
`AccountName`	`extend`
`ImageFileName`	`extend`
`ImageDirectory`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

DSRM Account Abuse

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `parse`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `summarize`

Stage 6: `extend` (5 consecutive steps)

Stage 7: `project-away`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

DSRM Account Abuse

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: parse

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: summarize

Stage 6: extend (5 consecutive steps)

Stage 7: project-away

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `parse`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `summarize`

Stage 6: `extend` (5 consecutive steps)

Stage 7: `project-away`