Dataverse - New sign-in from an unauthorized domain

Status: available
Severity: medium
Time window: 14d
Group by: ClientIp, InstanceUrl, UserId
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Identifies Dataverse sign-in activity originating from users with UPN suffixes that have not been seen previously in the last 14 days and are not present on a predefined list of authorized domains. Common internal Power Platform system users are excluded by default.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Initial Access	`T1078` Valid Accounts, `T1133` External Remote Services, `T1190` Exploit Public-Facing Application

Rule body kusto

id: 4c1c9aee-8e44-4bb9-bd53-f3e7d6761282
kind: Scheduled
name: Dataverse - New sign-in from an unauthorized domain
description: Identifies Dataverse sign-in activity originating from users with UPN
  suffixes that have not been seen previously in the last 14 days and are not present
  on a predefined list of authorized domains. Common internal Power Platform system
  users are excluded by default.
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: Dataverse
    dataTypes:
      - DataverseActivity
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 14d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1078
  - T1190
  - T1133
query: |
  // Allow list of UPN suffixes allowed by the organization.
  let allowed_domains = dynamic([
      'onmicrosoft.com',
      'microsoft.com'
      ]);
  // All list of users allowed by the organization
  let allowed_users = dynamic([
      'user1@mydomain.com',
      'user2@mydomain.com'
      ]);
  let query_frequency = 1h;
  let query_lookback = 14d;
  let historical_users = DataverseActivity
      | where TimeGenerated between(ago(query_lookback) .. ago(query_frequency))
      | where Message == 'UserSignIn'
      | summarize by UserId;
  DataverseActivity
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago (query_frequency)
  | where Message == 'UserSignIn'
  | join kind=leftanti (historical_users) on UserId
  | summarize FirstEvent = min(TimeGenerated), LastEvent = max(TimeGenerated) by UserId, ClientIp, InstanceUrl
  | where isnotempty(ClientIp)
  | extend CloudAppId = int(32780)
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(UserId, '@')[0])
  | extend UPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserId, '@')[1])
  | where UPNSuffix !in (allowed_domains) and UserId !in (allowed_users)
  | project
      FirstEvent,
      LastEvent,
      UserId,
      ClientIp,
      InstanceUrl,
      AccountName,
      UPNSuffix,
      CloudAppId
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: SingleAlert
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: UPNSuffix
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: ClientIp
  - entityType: CloudApplication
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: AppId
        columnName: CloudAppId
      - identifier: InstanceName
        columnName: InstanceUrl
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: Dataverse - Unauthorized sign-in activity
  alertDescriptionFormat: New user sign-in activity was detected in {{InstanceUrl}}
    originating from user {{UserId}}. This user's UPN suffix is not on the authorized
    list of domains.
version: 3.2.0

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let query_frequency = 1h;
let query_lookback = 14d;

Let binding: `allowed_domains`

let allowed_domains = dynamic([
    'onmicrosoft.com',
    'microsoft.com'
    ]);

Let binding: `allowed_users`

let allowed_users = dynamic([
    'user1@mydomain.com',
    'user2@mydomain.com'
    ]);

Let binding: `historical_users`

let historical_users = DataverseActivity
    | where TimeGenerated between(ago(query_lookback) .. ago(query_frequency))
    | where Message == 'UserSignIn'
    | summarize by UserId;

Derived from query_frequency, query_lookback.

Stage 1: `source`

DataverseActivity

Stage 2: `where`

| where TimeGenerated >= ago (query_frequency)

Stage 3: `where`

| where Message == 'UserSignIn'

Stage 4: `join` (negated)

| join kind=leftanti (historical_users) on UserId

Stage 5: `summarize`

| summarize FirstEvent = min(TimeGenerated), LastEvent = max(TimeGenerated) by UserId, ClientIp, InstanceUrl

Stage 6: `where`

| where isnotempty(ClientIp)

Stage 7: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

| extend CloudAppId = int(32780)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(UserId, '@')[0])
| extend UPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserId, '@')[1])

Stage 8: `where`

| where UPNSuffix !in (allowed_domains) and UserId !in (allowed_users)

References allowed_domains, allowed_users (defined above).

Stage 9: `project`

| project
    FirstEvent,
    LastEvent,
    UserId,
    ClientIp,
    InstanceUrl,
    AccountName,
    UPNSuffix,
    CloudAppId

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`Message`	eq	`UserSignIn`
`UPNSuffix`	in	`microsoft.com`, `onmicrosoft.com`
`UserId`	in	`user1@mydomain.com`, `user2@mydomain.com`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ClientIp`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`Message`	eq	`UserSignIn` transforms: `cased` corpus 6 (kusto 6)

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`AccountName`	`project`
`ClientIp`	`project`
`CloudAppId`	`project`
`FirstEvent`	`project`
`InstanceUrl`	`project`
`LastEvent`	`project`
`UPNSuffix`	`project`
`UserId`	`project`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Dataverse - New sign-in from an unauthorized domain

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: `allowed_domains`

Let binding: `allowed_users`

Let binding: `historical_users`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `join` (negated)

Stage 5: `summarize`

Stage 6: `where`

Stage 7: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 8: `where`

Stage 9: `project`

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Dataverse - New sign-in from an unauthorized domain

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: allowed_domains

Let binding: allowed_users

Let binding: historical_users

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: join (negated)

Stage 5: summarize

Stage 6: where

Stage 7: extend (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 8: where

Stage 9: project

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `allowed_domains`

Let binding: `allowed_users`

Let binding: `historical_users`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `join` (negated)

Stage 5: `summarize`

Stage 6: `where`

Stage 7: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 8: `where`

Stage 9: `project`