Detect CVE exploits on network for which a device is vulnerable

Author: Robbe Van den Daele
Source: github.com/HybridBrothers/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules

This detection query can be used to find specific CVE exploits passing on the wire for which the device is vulnerable. This query should have a very high TP rate, and can be considered as a 'High severity' query.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	`T1203` Exploitation for Client Execution
Privilege Escalation	`T1068` Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Lateral Movement	`T1210` Exploitation of Remote Services

References

https://hybridbrothers.com/analyzing-mde-network-inspections/

Event coverage

Provider	Event/ActionType	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 3	Network connection
Security-Auditing	Event ID 5156	The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.
Defender-DeviceNetworkEvents	any	Network activity (any)

Rule body yaml

// Get all the TVM data
let tvm_data = DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities
| distinct DeviceName, SoftwareName, SoftwareVendor, SoftwareVersion, CveId, VulnerabilitySeverityLevel;
// Get CVE signatures on the network
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where ActionType contains "NetworkSignatureInspected"
| extend AdditionalFields = todynamic(AdditionalFields)
| extend SignatureName = tostring(AdditionalFields.SignatureName),
    SignatureMatchedContent = tostring(AdditionalFields.SignatureMatchedContent),
    SamplePacketContent = tostring(AdditionalFields.SamplePacketContent)
| where SignatureName contains "CVE"
// Join the TVM data of the related device
| join kind=inner tvm_data on DeviceName
// Check if the server is vulnerable to the detected CVE in network traffic
| where SignatureName == CveId
| project-away DeviceName1

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `tvm_data`

let tvm_data = DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities
| distinct DeviceName, SoftwareName, SoftwareVendor, SoftwareVersion, CveId, VulnerabilitySeverityLevel;

Stage 1: `source`

DeviceNetworkEvents

Stage 2: `where`

| where ActionType contains "NetworkSignatureInspected"

Stage 3: `extend`

| extend AdditionalFields = todynamic(AdditionalFields)

Stage 4: `extend`

| extend SignatureName = tostring(AdditionalFields.SignatureName),
    SignatureMatchedContent = tostring(AdditionalFields.SignatureMatchedContent),
    SamplePacketContent = tostring(AdditionalFields.SamplePacketContent)

Stage 5: `where`

| where SignatureName contains "CVE"

Stage 6: `join`

| join kind=inner tvm_data on DeviceName

Stage 7: `where`

| where SignatureName == CveId

Stage 8: `project-away`

| project-away DeviceName1

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ActionType`	contains	`NetworkSignatureInspected`
`SignatureName`	contains	`CVE`
`SignatureName`	eq	`CveId` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`AdditionalFields`	`extend`
`SamplePacketContent`	`extend`
`SignatureMatchedContent`	`extend`
`SignatureName`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Detect CVE exploits on network for which a device is vulnerable

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `tvm_data`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend`

Stage 4: `extend`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `join`

Stage 7: `where`

Stage 8: `project-away`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Detect CVE exploits on network for which a device is vulnerable

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: tvm_data

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: extend

Stage 4: extend

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: join

Stage 7: where

Stage 8: project-away

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `tvm_data`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend`

Stage 4: `extend`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `join`

Stage 7: `where`

Stage 8: `project-away`