Detect suspicious foci token logins

// TimeDiff threshold in minutes. Needed for some environments with a lot of BP hits on long time frames. Used in scenario where you expect adversary to quickly request new tokens after first token request.
let maxTimeDiff = 90;
// External lookup to get list of FOCI applications
let FociClientApplications = toscalar(externaldata(client_id: string)
    [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/secureworks/family-of-client-ids-research/refs/heads/main/known-foci-clients.csv"] with (format="csv", ignoreFirstRecord=true)
    //| project-rename FociClientId = client_id
    | summarize FociClientId = make_list(client_id)
    );
// Get all token requests for Foci clients
let FociTokenRequest = materialize (
    AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(6h)
    // Filter for sign-ins to home tenant only
    | where HomeTenantId == ResourceTenantId
    // Lookup for FOCI client
    | where AppId in (FociClientApplications)
    );
FociTokenRequest
// First get all initial logins without refresh tokens as incomming token type
| where IncomingTokenType == "none"
// Then get logins with refresh tokens for same session
| join kind=inner (
    FociTokenRequest
    | where IncomingTokenType != "none"
    | project-rename
        SecondAppDisplayName = AppDisplayName,
        SecondRequestTimeGenerated = TimeGenerated,
        SecondAppId = AppId
    )
    on SessionId, UserPrincipalName
// Exclude when First App ID and Second are the same
| where AppDisplayName != SecondAppDisplayName
// Only get requests where refresh token was used after first sign-in
| extend TimeDiff = datetime_diff('minute', SecondRequestTimeGenerated, TimeGenerated)
| where TimeDiff >= 0 //and TimeDiff <= maxTimeDiff // Remove from comment you want to apply time difference restriction
// Only project needed columns
| project
    FirstRequestTimeGenerated = TimeGenerated,
    FirstResult = ResultType,
    FirstResultDescription = ResultDescription,
    Identity,
    Location,
    FirstAppDisplayName = AppDisplayName,
    FirstAppId = AppId,
    ClientAppUsed,
    DeviceDetail,
    SecondDeviceDetail = DeviceDetail1,
    IPAddress,
    LocationDetails,
    UserAgent,
    SecondRequestTimeGenerated,
    SecondResult = ResultType,
    SecondResultDescription = ResultDescription1,
    SecondAppDisplayName,
    SecondAppId,
    SeconIncomingTokenType = IncomingTokenType1,
    SessionId,
    TimeDiff,
    AuthenticationProcessingDetails,
    SecondAuthenticationProcessingDetails = AuthenticationProcessingDetails1
// Flag logins to the following applications as second login (since they are very popular for attackers and we rather not see logins to these via foci tokens)
| where SecondAppDisplayName in ("Microsoft Azure CLI", "Microsoft Azure PowerShell", "Office 365 Management")
// ENVIRONMENT SPECIFIC FINETUNING - BEGIN
// Most BP triggers are mainly on Microsoft Azure CLI, so we provide two ways of handling these BP detections (strongly depends on environment)
// OPTION 1 - Flag login to Azure CLI using 'Global Administrator' ID in token scope
//| where (SecondAppDisplayName in ("Microsoft Azure PowerShell", "Office 365 Management") or (SecondAppDisplayName == "Microsoft Azure CLI" and SecondAuthenticationProcessingDetails contains "62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10"))
// OPTION 2 - Flag login to Azure CLI using 'Global Administrator' ID in token scope from non compliant device
//| where (SecondAppDisplayName in ("Microsoft Azure PowerShell", "Office 365 Management") or (SecondAppDisplayName == "Microsoft Azure CLI" and SecondAuthenticationProcessingDetails contains "62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10" and todynamic(SecondDeviceDetail).isCompliant != "true"))
// ENVIRONMENT SPECIFIC FINETUNING - END