Detect Suspicious ncrypt.dll usage on admin device with RDP connections to non TPM protected device

Group by: DeviceId
Author: Robbe Van den Daele
Source: github.com/HybridBrothers/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules

This detection rule uses a WDAC audit policy to ingest missing DeviceImageLoad events in MDE, and check for suspicious processes using the ncrypt.dll and admin devices performing RDP connection to unmanaged or non-TPM devices. More information on the attack scenario this is detection is applicable for can be found in the references.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Credential Access	`T1555.004` Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager, `T1606` Forge Web Credentials
Lateral Movement	`T1021.001` Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

References

Event coverage

Provider	ActionType	Title
Defender-DeviceEvents	any	Defender event (any)

Rule body yaml

let time_lookback = 30d;
let admin_users = toscalar(
    IdentityInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where CriticalityLevel != "" or AccountDisplayName contains "Admin"
    | summarize make_set(AccountDisplayName)
);
let devices_with_admin_accounts = (
    ExposureGraphEdges
    // Get edges where source is a device and destination is a admin user
    | where SourceNodeLabel == "device" and TargetNodeLabel == "user"
    | where TargetNodeName in (admin_users)
    // Check which devices have the credentials of the admin user
    | make-graph SourceNodeId --> TargetNodeId with ExposureGraphNodes on NodeId
    | graph-match (SourceNode)-[hasCredentialsOf]->(TargetNode)
        project IncomingNodeName = SourceNode.NodeName, OutgoingNodeName = TargetNode.NodeName, CriticalityLevel = TargetNode.NodeProperties.rawData.criticalityLevel.criticalityLevel, CriticalityRuleNames = TargetNode.NodeProperties.rawData.criticalityLevel.ruleNames
    | summarize make_set(IncomingNodeName)
);
let no_tpm_devices = (
    ExposureGraphNodes
    // Get device nodes with their inventory ID
    | where NodeLabel == "device"
    | mv-expand EntityIds
    | where EntityIds.type == "DeviceInventoryId"
    // Get interesting properties
    | extend OnboardingStatus = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["onboardingStatus"]),
        TpmSupported = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["tpmData"]["supported"]),
        TpmEnabled = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["tpmData"]["enabled"]),
        TpmActivated = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["tpmData"]["activated"]),
        DeviceName = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["deviceName"]),
        DeviceId = tostring(EntityIds.id)
    // Search for distinct devices
    | distinct DeviceId, DeviceName, OnboardingStatus, TpmSupported, TpmEnabled, TpmActivated
    // Get Unmanaged devices and device not supporting a TPM
    | where OnboardingStatus != "Onboarded" or (TpmSupported != "true" and TpmActivated != "true" and TpmEnabled != "true")
    | extend TpmSupported = iff(TpmSupported == "", "unknown", TpmSupported),
        TpmActivated = iff(TpmActivated == "", "unknown", TpmActivated),
        TpmEnabled = iff(TpmEnabled == "", "unknown", TpmEnabled)
);
let no_tpm_device_info = (
    DeviceNetworkInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    // Get latest network info for each device ID
    | summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by DeviceId
    | mv-expand todynamic(IPAddresses)
    | extend IPAddress = tostring(IPAddresses.IPAddress)
    // Find no TPM devices and join with their network information
    | join kind=inner no_tpm_devices on DeviceId
    | project DeviceId, DeviceName, MacAddress, IPAddress, OnboardingStatus, TpmActivated, TpmEnabled, TpmSupported
);
let dangerous_rdp_sessions = (
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(time_lookback)
    // Only flag admin devices
    | where DeviceName in (devices_with_admin_accounts)
    // Exclude MDI RDP Connections (known for NNR)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName !~ "microsoft.tri.sensor.exe"
    // Search for RDP connections to non-tpm devices
    | where ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
    | where RemotePort == 3389
    | join kind=inner no_tpm_device_info on $left.RemoteIP == $right.IPAddress
    | project-rename RemoteDeviceId = DeviceId1, 
        RdpRemoteDeviceName = DeviceName1, 
        RdpRemoteMacAddress = MacAddress, 
        RdpRemoteDeviceOnboardingStatus = OnboardingStatus, 
        RdpRemoteDeviceTpmActivated = TpmActivated, 
        RdpRemoteDeviceTpmEnabled = TpmEnabled, 
        RdpRemoteDeviceTpmSupported = TpmSupported,
        RdpTimeGenerated = Timestamp,
        RdpInitiatingProcessFileName = InitiatingProcessFileName
    | project-away IPAddress
);
// Get all possible nonce requests
let nonce_requests = (
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(time_lookback)
    | where ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
    | where RemoteUrl =~ "login.microsoftonline.com"
    | project-rename NonceRequestTimestamp = Timestamp
);
// Get suspicious ncrypt.dll usage via WDAC audit policy
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(time_lookback)
// Only flag admin devices
| where DeviceName in (devices_with_admin_accounts)
| where ActionType startswith "AppControl" and FileName =~ "ncrypt.dll"
// Check if the same initiating process is doing a nonce request
| join kind=inner nonce_requests on InitiatingProcessId, DeviceId
// Only flag when nonce was request 10min before of after ncrypt usage
| where Timestamp between (todatetime(NonceRequestTimestamp - 10m) .. todatetime(NonceRequestTimestamp + 10m))
// Check if the same device is doing RDP Connections
| join kind=inner dangerous_rdp_sessions on DeviceId
// Whitelist known good processes
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in ("backgroundtaskhost.exe","svchost.exe")
// Project interesting columns
| extend WdacPolicyName = parse_json(AdditionalFields)["PolicyName"]
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessFileName, 
    InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, WdacPolicyName, InitiatingProcessRemoteSessionDeviceName, InitiatingProcessRemoteSessionIP,
    NonceRequestTimestamp, RdpTimeGenerated, RdpInitiatingProcessFileName, RdpRemoteDeviceName, RdpRemoteMacAddress, RdpRemoteDeviceOnboardingStatus,
    RdpRemoteDeviceTpmActivated, RdpRemoteDeviceTpmEnabled, RdpRemoteDeviceTpmSupported

let time_lookback = 30d;
let admin_users = toscalar(
    IdentityInfo
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
    | where CriticalityLevel != "" or AccountDisplayName contains "Admin"
    | summarize make_set(AccountDisplayName)
);
let devices_with_admin_accounts = (
    ExposureGraphEdges
    // Get edges where source is a device and destination is a admin user
    | where SourceNodeLabel == "device" and TargetNodeLabel == "user"
    | where TargetNodeName in (admin_users)
    // Check which devices have the credentials of the admin user
    | make-graph SourceNodeId --> TargetNodeId with ExposureGraphNodes on NodeId
    | graph-match (SourceNode)-[hasCredentialsOf]->(TargetNode)
        project IncomingNodeName = SourceNode.NodeName, OutgoingNodeName = TargetNode.NodeName, CriticalityLevel = TargetNode.NodeProperties.rawData.criticalityLevel.criticalityLevel, CriticalityRuleNames = TargetNode.NodeProperties.rawData.criticalityLevel.ruleNames
    | summarize make_set(IncomingNodeName)
);
let no_tpm_devices = (
    ExposureGraphNodes
    // Get device nodes with their inventory ID
    | where NodeLabel == "device"
    | mv-expand EntityIds
    | where EntityIds.type == "DeviceInventoryId"
    // Get interesting properties
    | extend OnboardingStatus = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["onboardingStatus"]),
        TpmSupported = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["tpmData"]["supported"]),
        TpmEnabled = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["tpmData"]["enabled"]),
        TpmActivated = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["tpmData"]["activated"]),
        DeviceName = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["deviceName"]),
        DeviceId = tostring(EntityIds.id)
    // Search for distinct devices
    | distinct DeviceId, DeviceName, OnboardingStatus, TpmSupported, TpmEnabled, TpmActivated
    // Get Unmanaged devices and device not supporting a TPM
    | where OnboardingStatus != "Onboarded" or (TpmSupported != "true" and TpmActivated != "true" and TpmEnabled != "true")
    | extend TpmSupported = iff(TpmSupported == "", "unknown", TpmSupported),
        TpmActivated = iff(TpmActivated == "", "unknown", TpmActivated),
        TpmEnabled = iff(TpmEnabled == "", "unknown", TpmEnabled)
);
let no_tpm_device_info = (
    DeviceNetworkInfo
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(7d)
    // Get latest network info for each device ID
    | summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by DeviceId
    | mv-expand todynamic(IPAddresses)
    | extend IPAddress = tostring(IPAddresses.IPAddress)
    // Find no TPM devices and join with their network information
    | join kind=inner no_tpm_devices on DeviceId
    | project DeviceId, DeviceName, MacAddress, IPAddress, OnboardingStatus, TpmActivated, TpmEnabled, TpmSupported
);
let dangerous_rdp_sessions = (
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(time_lookback)
    // Only flag admin devices
    | where DeviceName in (devices_with_admin_accounts)
    // Exclude MDI RDP Connections (known for NNR)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName !~ "microsoft.tri.sensor.exe"
    // Search for RDP connections to non-tpm devices
    | where ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
    | where RemotePort == 3389
    | join kind=inner no_tpm_device_info on $left.RemoteIP == $right.IPAddress
    | project-rename RemoteDeviceId = DeviceId1, 
        RdpRemoteDeviceName = DeviceName1, 
        RdpRemoteMacAddress = MacAddress, 
        RdpRemoteDeviceOnboardingStatus = OnboardingStatus, 
        RdpRemoteDeviceTpmActivated = TpmActivated, 
        RdpRemoteDeviceTpmEnabled = TpmEnabled, 
        RdpRemoteDeviceTpmSupported = TpmSupported,
        RdpTimeGenerated = Timestamp,
        RdpInitiatingProcessFileName = InitiatingProcessFileName
    | project-away IPAddress
);
// Get all possible nonce requests
let nonce_requests = (
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(time_lookback)
    | where ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
    | where RemoteUrl =~ "login.microsoftonline.com"
    | project-rename NonceRequestTimestamp = TimeGenerated
);
// Get suspicious ncrypt.dll usage via WDAC audit policy
DeviceEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(time_lookback)
// Only flag admin devices
| where DeviceName in (devices_with_admin_accounts)
| where ActionType startswith "AppControl" and FileName =~ "ncrypt.dll"
// Check if the same initiating process is doing a nonce request
| join kind=inner nonce_requests on InitiatingProcessId, DeviceId
// Only flag when nonce was request 10min before of after ncrypt usage
| where TimeGenerated between (todatetime(NonceRequestTimestamp - 10m) .. todatetime(NonceRequestTimestamp + 10m))
// Check if the same device is doing RDP Connections
| join kind=inner dangerous_rdp_sessions on DeviceId
// Whitelist known good processes
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in ("backgroundtaskhost.exe","svchost.exe")
// Project interesting columns
| extend WdacPolicyName = parse_json(AdditionalFields)["PolicyName"]
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessFileName, 
    InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, WdacPolicyName, InitiatingProcessRemoteSessionDeviceName, InitiatingProcessRemoteSessionIP,
    NonceRequestTimestamp, RdpTimeGenerated, RdpInitiatingProcessFileName, RdpRemoteDeviceName, RdpRemoteMacAddress, RdpRemoteDeviceOnboardingStatus,
    RdpRemoteDeviceTpmActivated, RdpRemoteDeviceTpmEnabled, RdpRemoteDeviceTpmSupported

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let time_lookback = 30d;

Let binding: `admin_users`

let admin_users = toscalar(
    IdentityInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where CriticalityLevel != "" or AccountDisplayName contains "Admin"
    | summarize make_set(AccountDisplayName)
);

Let binding: `devices_with_admin_accounts`

let devices_with_admin_accounts = (
    ExposureGraphEdges
    | where SourceNodeLabel == "device" and TargetNodeLabel == "user"
    | where TargetNodeName in (admin_users)
    | make-graph SourceNodeId --> TargetNodeId with ExposureGraphNodes on NodeId
    | graph-match (SourceNode)-[hasCredentialsOf]->(TargetNode)
        project IncomingNodeName = SourceNode.NodeName, OutgoingNodeName = TargetNode.NodeName, CriticalityLevel = TargetNode.NodeProperties.rawData.criticalityLevel.criticalityLevel, CriticalityRuleNames = TargetNode.NodeProperties.rawData.criticalityLevel.ruleNames
    | summarize make_set(IncomingNodeName)
);

Derived from admin_users.

Let binding: `no_tpm_devices`

let no_tpm_devices = (
    ExposureGraphNodes
    | where NodeLabel == "device"
    | mv-expand EntityIds
    | where EntityIds.type == "DeviceInventoryId"
    | extend OnboardingStatus = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["onboardingStatus"]),
        TpmSupported = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["tpmData"]["supported"]),
        TpmEnabled = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["tpmData"]["enabled"]),
        TpmActivated = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["tpmData"]["activated"]),
        DeviceName = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["deviceName"]),
        DeviceId = tostring(EntityIds.id)
    | distinct DeviceId, DeviceName, OnboardingStatus, TpmSupported, TpmEnabled, TpmActivated
    | where OnboardingStatus != "Onboarded" or (TpmSupported != "true" and TpmActivated != "true" and TpmEnabled != "true")
    | extend TpmSupported = iff(TpmSupported == "", "unknown", TpmSupported),
        TpmActivated = iff(TpmActivated == "", "unknown", TpmActivated),
        TpmEnabled = iff(TpmEnabled == "", "unknown", TpmEnabled)
);

Let binding: `no_tpm_device_info`

let no_tpm_device_info = (
    DeviceNetworkInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by DeviceId
    | mv-expand todynamic(IPAddresses)
    | extend IPAddress = tostring(IPAddresses.IPAddress)
    | join kind=inner no_tpm_devices on DeviceId
    | project DeviceId, DeviceName, MacAddress, IPAddress, OnboardingStatus, TpmActivated, TpmEnabled, TpmSupported
);

Derived from no_tpm_devices.

Let binding: `dangerous_rdp_sessions`

let dangerous_rdp_sessions = (
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(time_lookback)
    | where DeviceName in (devices_with_admin_accounts)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName !~ "microsoft.tri.sensor.exe"
    | where ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
    | where RemotePort == 3389
    | join kind=inner no_tpm_device_info on $left.RemoteIP == $right.IPAddress
    | project-rename RemoteDeviceId = DeviceId1, 
        RdpRemoteDeviceName = DeviceName1, 
        RdpRemoteMacAddress = MacAddress, 
        RdpRemoteDeviceOnboardingStatus = OnboardingStatus, 
        RdpRemoteDeviceTpmActivated = TpmActivated, 
        RdpRemoteDeviceTpmEnabled = TpmEnabled, 
        RdpRemoteDeviceTpmSupported = TpmSupported,
        RdpTimeGenerated = Timestamp,
        RdpInitiatingProcessFileName = InitiatingProcessFileName
    | project-away IPAddress
);

Derived from time_lookback, devices_with_admin_accounts, no_tpm_device_info.

Let binding: `nonce_requests`

let nonce_requests = (
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(time_lookback)
    | where ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
    | where RemoteUrl =~ "login.microsoftonline.com"
    | project-rename NonceRequestTimestamp = Timestamp
);

Derived from time_lookback.

Stage 1: `source`

DeviceEvents

Stage 2: `where`

| where Timestamp > ago(time_lookback)

Stage 3: `where`

| where DeviceName in (devices_with_admin_accounts)

References devices_with_admin_accounts (defined above).

Stage 4: `where`

| where ActionType startswith "AppControl" and FileName =~ "ncrypt.dll"

Stage 5: `join`

| join kind=inner nonce_requests on InitiatingProcessId, DeviceId

Stage 6: `where`

| where Timestamp between (todatetime(NonceRequestTimestamp - 10m) .. todatetime(NonceRequestTimestamp + 10m))

Stage 7: `join`

| join kind=inner dangerous_rdp_sessions on DeviceId

Stage 8: `where`

| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in ("backgroundtaskhost.exe","svchost.exe")

Stage 9: `extend`

| extend WdacPolicyName = parse_json(AdditionalFields)["PolicyName"]

Stage 10: `project`

| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, InitiatingProcessSHA1, InitiatingProcessFileName, 
    InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, WdacPolicyName, InitiatingProcessRemoteSessionDeviceName, InitiatingProcessRemoteSessionIP,
    NonceRequestTimestamp, RdpTimeGenerated, RdpInitiatingProcessFileName, RdpRemoteDeviceName, RdpRemoteMacAddress, RdpRemoteDeviceOnboardingStatus,
    RdpRemoteDeviceTpmActivated, RdpRemoteDeviceTpmEnabled, RdpRemoteDeviceTpmSupported

Stage 11: `summarize`

summarize by DeviceId

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`InitiatingProcessFileName`	in	`backgroundtaskhost.exe`, `svchost.exe`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ActionType`	eq	`ConnectionSuccess` transforms: `cased` corpus 9 (kusto 9)
`ActionType`	starts_with	`AppControl` corpus 5 (kusto 5)
`DeviceName`	in	`devices_with_admin_accounts` transforms: `cased`
`FileName`	eq	`ncrypt.dll` corpus 4 (kusto 4)
`InitiatingProcessFileName`	ne	`microsoft.tri.sensor.exe` corpus 3 (kusto 3)
`NodeLabel`	eq	`device` transforms: `cased` corpus 3 (kusto 3)
`OnboardingStatus`	ne	`Onboarded` transforms: `cased` corpus 5 (kusto 5)
`RemotePort`	eq	`3389` transforms: `cased` corpus 11 (kusto 4, elastic 3, sigma 2, splunk 2)
`RemoteUrl`	eq	`login.microsoftonline.com` corpus 3 (kusto 3)
`TpmActivated`	ne	`true` transforms: `cased` corpus 4 (kusto 4)
`TpmEnabled`	ne	`true` transforms: `cased` corpus 4 (kusto 4)
`TpmSupported`	ne	`true` transforms: `cased` corpus 4 (kusto 4)
`type`	eq	`DeviceInventoryId` transforms: `cased` corpus 5 (kusto 5)

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`DeviceId`	`summarize`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Detect Suspicious ncrypt.dll usage on admin device with RDP connections to non TPM protected device

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: `admin_users`

Let binding: `devices_with_admin_accounts`

Let binding: `no_tpm_devices`

Let binding: `no_tpm_device_info`

Let binding: `dangerous_rdp_sessions`

Let binding: `nonce_requests`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `join`

Stage 6: `where`

Stage 7: `join`

Stage 8: `where`

Stage 9: `extend`

Stage 10: `project`

Stage 11: `summarize`

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Detect Suspicious ncrypt.dll usage on admin device with RDP connections to non TPM protected device

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: admin_users

Let binding: devices_with_admin_accounts

Let binding: no_tpm_devices

Let binding: no_tpm_device_info

Let binding: dangerous_rdp_sessions

Let binding: nonce_requests

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: join

Stage 6: where

Stage 7: join

Stage 8: where

Stage 9: extend

Stage 10: project

Stage 11: summarize

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `admin_users`

Let binding: `devices_with_admin_accounts`

Let binding: `no_tpm_devices`

Let binding: `no_tpm_device_info`

Let binding: `dangerous_rdp_sessions`

Let binding: `nonce_requests`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `join`

Stage 6: `where`

Stage 7: `join`

Stage 8: `where`

Stage 9: `extend`

Stage 10: `project`

Stage 11: `summarize`