Detect Unknown process launched via WinRM

Author: Robbe Van den Daele
Source: github.com/HybridBrothers/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules

When an unknown process is being launched from the WinRM service on a server, this might indicate a malicious actor spreading malware on various servers via the WinRM protocol.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Lateral Movement	`T1021.006` Remote Services: Windows Remote Management

References

https://thecollective.eu/

Event coverage

Provider	Event/ActionType	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.
Defender-DeviceProcessEvents	any	Process activity (any)

Rule body yaml

DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName contains "wsmprovhost.exe"
| invoke FileProfile(SHA1)
| where GlobalPrevalence < 1000
| join kind=leftouter (
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where ActionType == "InboundConnectionAccepted"
    | where LocalPort in ("5985", "5986")
    | distinct RemoteIP, DeviceId
) on DeviceId
| project-away DeviceId1

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

DeviceProcessEvents

Stage 2: `where`

| where InitiatingProcessFileName contains "wsmprovhost.exe"

Stage 3: `invoke`

| invoke FileProfile(SHA1)

Stage 4: `where`

| where GlobalPrevalence < 1000

Stage 5: `join`

| join kind=leftouter (
    DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where ActionType == "InboundConnectionAccepted"
    | where LocalPort in ("5985", "5986")
    | distinct RemoteIP, DeviceId
) on DeviceId

Stage 6: `project-away`

| project-away DeviceId1

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ActionType`	eq	`InboundConnectionAccepted` transforms: `cased` corpus 3 (kusto 3)
`GlobalPrevalence`	lt	`1000` transforms: `cased` corpus 4 (kusto 4)
`InitiatingProcessFileName`	contains	`wsmprovhost.exe`
`LocalPort`	in	`5985` transforms: `cased` `5986` transforms: `cased`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Detect Unknown process launched via WinRM

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `invoke`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `join`

Stage 6: `project-away`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Detect Unknown process launched via WinRM

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: invoke

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: join

Stage 6: project-away

Indicators

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `invoke`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `join`

Stage 6: `project-away`