Detect Unknown process using SMB or WinRM

Author: Robbe Van den Daele
Source: github.com/HybridBrothers/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules

WinRM and SMB are popular network protocols to perform lateral movement by adversaries (while there are some others as well). When an unknown process is performing SMB or WinRM network connections, this might indicate that a malware process is trying to move laterally to other devices in your network. > [!WARNING] > This detection rule is the base for the detection. You will need to add environment specific finetuning in order to limit the BP detections on legitimate processes

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Lateral Movement	`T1021.002` Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares, `T1021.006` Remote Services: Windows Remote Management

References

https://thecollective.eu/

Event coverage

Provider	Event/ActionType	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 3	Network connection
Security-Auditing	Event ID 5156	The Windows Filtering Platform has permitted a connection.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 5157	The Windows Filtering Platform has blocked a connection.
Defender-DeviceNetworkEvents	ConnectionSuccess	Connection succeeded

Rule body yaml

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1h)
| where RemotePort in ("5985", "5986", "445")
| where ActionType in~ ("ConnectionSuccess", "ConnectionAttempt",
"ConnectionFailed", "ConnectionRequest")
| where isnotempty(InitiatingProcessSHA256)
| invoke FileProfile(InitiatingProcessSHA256)
| where isnotempty(GlobalPrevalence) and GlobalPrevalence < 1000

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

DeviceNetworkEvents

Stage 2: `where`

| where TimeGenerated > ago(1h)

Stage 3: `where`

| where RemotePort in ("5985", "5986", "445")

Stage 4: `where`

| where ActionType in~ ("ConnectionSuccess", "ConnectionAttempt",
"ConnectionFailed", "ConnectionRequest")

Stage 5: `where`

| where isnotempty(InitiatingProcessSHA256)

Stage 6: `invoke`

| invoke FileProfile(InitiatingProcessSHA256)

Stage 7: `where`

| where isnotempty(GlobalPrevalence) and GlobalPrevalence < 1000

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ActionType`	in	`ConnectionAttempt` `ConnectionFailed` `ConnectionRequest` `ConnectionSuccess` corpus 9 (kusto 9)
`GlobalPrevalence`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`GlobalPrevalence`	lt	`1000` transforms: `cased` corpus 4 (kusto 4)
`InitiatingProcessSHA256`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`RemotePort`	in	`445` transforms: `cased` corpus 8 (elastic 5, splunk 2, sigma 1) `5985` transforms: `cased` corpus 3 (sigma 2, chronicle 1) `5986` transforms: `cased` corpus 3 (sigma 2, chronicle 1)

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Detect Unknown process using SMB or WinRM

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `invoke`

Stage 7: `where`

Indicators

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Detect Unknown process using SMB or WinRM

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Event coverage

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: invoke

Stage 7: where

Indicators

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `invoke`

Stage 7: `where`