Detect non-admin requesting token for admin applications

Group by: AccountObjectId, AppDisplayName, IPAddress, ResultType, UserId, UserPrincipalName
Author: Robbe Van den Daele
Source: github.com/HybridBrothers/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules

This rule detects sign-in attempts from non-admin users to admin applications in Entra ID.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	`T1651` Cloud Administration Command

References

https://hybridbrothers.com/device-to-entraid/

Rules detecting the same action

Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.

Anomalous sign-in location by user account and authenticating application (Kusto)
Anomalous Single Factor Signin (Kusto)
Authentications of Privileged Accounts Outside of Expected Controls (Kusto)
Azure Many Failed SignIns (Panther)
Azure Portal sign in from another Azure Tenant (Kusto)
Azure Service Principal Sign-In Followed by Arc Cluster Credential Access (Elastic)
Azure SignIn via Legacy Authentication Protocol (Panther)
Discovery Using AzureHound (Sigma)

Rule body yaml

let ITAccounts=(_GetWatchlist('ITAccounts') | summarize make_set(ITAccounts));
// Materialize Dataset
let DataSetMat= materialize (SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1h)
| where AppDisplayName has_any ("PowerShell", "CLI", "Command Line", "Management Shell")
// Get successful and failed due to no assignment logins
| where ResultType in ("0", "50105")
| summarize max(TimeGenerated) by UserPrincipalName, AppDisplayName, IPAddress, UserId, ResultType
// join IdentityInfo to get more information
| join kind=leftouter (IdentityInfo | where TimeGenerated > ago(14d) | summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountObjectId ) on $left.UserId == $right.AccountObjectId
// exclude Accounts with Assigned Roles
| where array_length(AssignedRoles) == 0
// exclude known IT personnel Departments
| where Department !has "it" and Department !has "ict" and Department !has "operations"
// exclude service accounts
| where JobTitle != "Service Account");
// exclude IT accounts
let FIL= (DataSetMat
| extend ITAccounts= toscalar(ITAccounts)
| mv-expand ITAccounts
| where AccountUPN contains ITAccounts or AccountDisplayName contains ITAccounts);
DataSetMat
// exclude service accounts
| join kind=leftanti FIL on AccountUPN
| distinct  max_TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, AppDisplayName, IPAddress, JobTitle, Department, UserId, ResultType

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `ITAccounts`

let ITAccounts = (_GetWatchlist('ITAccounts') | summarize make_set(ITAccounts));

Let binding: `FIL`

let FIL = (DataSetMat
| extend ITAccounts= toscalar(ITAccounts)
| mv-expand ITAccounts
| where AccountUPN contains ITAccounts or AccountDisplayName contains ITAccounts);

Derived from ITAccounts, DataSetMat.

The stages below define let DataSetMat (the rule's main pipeline source).

Stage 1: `source`

SigninLogs

Stage 2: `where`

| where TimeGenerated > ago(1h)

Stage 3: `where`

| where AppDisplayName has_any ("PowerShell", "CLI", "Command Line", "Management Shell")

Stage 4: `where`

| where ResultType in ("0", "50105")

Stage 5: `summarize`

| summarize max(TimeGenerated) by UserPrincipalName, AppDisplayName, IPAddress, UserId, ResultType

Stage 6: `join`

| join kind=leftouter (IdentityInfo | where TimeGenerated > ago(14d) | summarize arg_max(TimeGenerated, *) by AccountObjectId ) on $left.UserId == $right.AccountObjectId

Stage 7: `where`

| where array_length(AssignedRoles) == 0

Stage 8: `where`

| where Department !has "it" and Department !has "ict" and Department !has "operations"

Stage 9: `where`

| where JobTitle != "Service Account"

The stages below run on DataSetMat (the outer pipeline).

Stage 10: `join` (negated)

DataSetMat
| join kind=leftanti FIL on AccountUPN

Stage 11: `distinct`

| distinct  max_TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, AppDisplayName, IPAddress, JobTitle, Department, UserId, ResultType

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`Department`	match	`ict`
`Department`	match	`it`
`Department`	match	`operations`
`AccountDisplayName`	contains	`ITAccounts`
`AccountUPN`	contains	`ITAccounts`
`AppDisplayName`	match	`PowerShell`, `CLI`, `Command Line`, `Management Shell`
`AssignedRoles`	eq	`0`
`JobTitle`	ne	`Service Account`
`ResultType`	in	`0`, `50105`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`AppDisplayName`	match	`CLI` `Command Line` `Management Shell` `PowerShell`
`AssignedRoles`	eq	`0` transforms: `array_length`
`Department`	match	`ict` transforms: `term` `it` transforms: `term` `operations` transforms: `term`
`JobTitle`	ne	`Service Account` transforms: `cased`
`ResultType`	in	`0` transforms: `cased` `50105` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`AppDisplayName`	`summarize`
`IPAddress`	`summarize`
`ResultType`	`summarize`
`UserId`	`summarize`
`UserPrincipalName`	`summarize`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Detect non-admin requesting token for admin applications

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `ITAccounts`

Let binding: `FIL`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `summarize`

Stage 6: `join`

Stage 7: `where`

Stage 8: `where`

Stage 9: `where`

Stage 10: `join` (negated)

Stage 11: `distinct`

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Detect non-admin requesting token for admin applications

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: ITAccounts

Let binding: FIL

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: summarize

Stage 6: join

Stage 7: where

Stage 8: where

Stage 9: where

Stage 10: join (negated)

Stage 11: distinct

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `ITAccounts`

Let binding: `FIL`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `summarize`

Stage 6: `join`

Stage 7: `where`

Stage 8: `where`

Stage 9: `where`

Stage 10: `join` (negated)

Stage 11: `distinct`