Detection rules › Kusto
Doppelpaymer Stop Services
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Doppelpaymer: More human-operated ransomware. There is also a related blog. DoppelPaymer is ransomware that is spread manually by human operators. These operators have exhibited extensive knowledge of system administration and common network security misconfigurations. They often use stolen credentials from over-privileged service accounts to turn off security software, run malicious commands, and spread malware throughout an organization. The following query detects attempts to stop security services. The See also section below lists links to other queries associated with DoppelPaymer. References: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/11/20/customer-guidance-for-the-dopplepaymer-ransomware/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/DoppelPaymer.KM!MTB
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter |
| Stealth | T1562 Impair Defenses |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event/ActionType | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
| Defender-DeviceProcessEvents | any | Process activity (any) |
Rule body kusto
id: 5bdc1504-880c-4b30-a39c-7c746535928d
name: Doppelpaymer Stop Services
description: |
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Doppelpaymer: More human-operated ransomware. There is also a related blog.
DoppelPaymer is ransomware that is spread manually by human operators. These operators have exhibited extensive knowledge of system administration and common network security misconfigurations. They often use stolen credentials from over-privileged service accounts to turn off security software, run malicious commands, and spread malware throughout an organization.
The following query detects attempts to stop security services.
The See also section below lists links to other queries associated with DoppelPaymer.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2019/11/20/customer-guidance-for-the-dopplepaymer-ransomware/
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Ransom:Win32/DoppelPaymer.KM!MTB
severity: High
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
dataTypes:
- DeviceProcessEvents
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- Execution
- DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
- T1059
- T1562
tags:
- DoppelPaymer
- Ransomware
query: |
// Attempts to stop services and allow ransomware execution
DeviceProcessEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName startswith "psexe" and FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and
ProcessCommandLine has "stop-service" and ProcessCommandLine has "sql" and ProcessCommandLine has "msexchange"
| extend HostName = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, 0, indexof(DeviceName, '.')), DeviceName)
| extend DnsDomain = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, indexof(DeviceName, '.') + 1), "")
entityMappings:
- entityType: Host
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: DeviceName
- identifier: HostName
columnName: HostName
- identifier: DnsDomain
columnName: DnsDomain
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: source
DeviceProcessEvents
Stage 2: where
| where InitiatingProcessFileName startswith "psexe" and FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and
ProcessCommandLine has "stop-service" and ProcessCommandLine has "sql" and ProcessCommandLine has "msexchange"
Stage 3: extend
| extend HostName = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, 0, indexof(DeviceName, '.')), DeviceName)
HostName =DeviceName has "."substring(DeviceName, 0, indexof(DeviceName, '.'))DeviceNameStage 4: extend
| extend DnsDomain = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, indexof(DeviceName, '.') + 1), "")
DnsDomain =DeviceName has "."substring(DeviceName, (indexof(DeviceName, '.') + 1))""Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
FileName | eq |
|
InitiatingProcessFileName | starts_with |
|
ProcessCommandLine | match |
|
Output fields
Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
HostName | extend |
DnsDomain | extend |