Europium - Hash and IP IOCs - September 2022

Severity: high
Time window: 12h
Author: Microsoft Security Research
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'Identifies a match across various data feeds for hashes and IP IOC related to Europium Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Credential Access	`T1003` OS Credential Dumping
Command & Control	`T1071` Application Layer Protocol

Rule body kusto

id: 9d8b5a18-b7db-4c23-84a6-95febaf7e1e4
name: Europium - Hash and IP IOCs - September 2022
description: | 
  'Identifies a match across various data feeds for  hashes and IP IOC related to Europium
   Reference: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government'
severity: High 
requiredDataConnectors: 
  - connectorId: DNS
    dataTypes:
      - DnsEvents
  - connectorId: AzureMonitor(VMInsights)
    dataTypes:
      - VMConnection
  - connectorId: F5
    dataTypes:
      - CommonSecurityLog
  - connectorId: CiscoASA
    dataTypes: 
      - CommonSecurityLog
  - connectorId: PaloAltoNetworks
    dataTypes: 
      - CommonSecurityLog
  - connectorId: Fortinet
    dataTypes: 
      - CommonSecurityLog
  - connectorId: CheckPoint
    dataTypes: 
      - CommonSecurityLog
  - connectorId: CEF
    dataTypes: 
      - CommonSecurityLog               
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - DeviceNetworkEvents
      - DeviceFileEvents
      - DeviceImageLoadEvents
  - connectorId: Office365
    dataTypes:
      - OfficeActivity
  - connectorId: AzureFirewall
    dataTypes: 
      - AzureDiagnostics
  - connectorId: WindowsFirewall
    dataTypes:
      - WindowsFirewall      
queryFrequency: 12h 
queryPeriod: 12h 
triggerOperator: gt 
triggerThreshold: 0 
tactics: 
  - CommandAndControl
  - CredentialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1071
  - T1003
tags:
  - Europium
  - Schema: ASIMFileEvent
    SchemaVersion: 0.1.0
query:  |  
  let iocs = externaldata(DateAdded:string,IoC:string,Type:string,TLP:string) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/Europium_September2022.csv"] with (format="csv", ignoreFirstRecord=True);
  let sha256Hashes = (iocs | where Type =~ "sha256" | project IoC);
  let IPList = (iocs | where Type =~ "ip"| project IoC);
  let IPRegex = '[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}';
  (union isfuzzy=true
  (CommonSecurityLog
  | where SourceIP in (IPList) or DestinationIP in (IPList) or Message has_any (IPList)
  | parse Message with * '(' DNSName ')' * 
  | project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, Message, SourceUserID, RequestURL, DNSName, Type
  | extend MessageIP = extract(IPRegex, 0, Message), RequestIP = extract(IPRegex, 0, RequestURL)
  | extend IPMatch = case(SourceIP in (IPList), "SourceIP", DestinationIP in (IPList), "DestinationIP", MessageIP in (IPList), "Message",  "NoMatch")
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = case(IPMatch == "SourceIP", SourceIP, IPMatch == "DestinationIP", DestinationIP, IPMatch == "Message", MessageIP, "NoMatch")
  ),
  (DnsEvents
  | where IPAddresses in (IPList)  
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, IPAddresses, Name, ClientIP, Type
  | extend DestinationIPAddress = IPAddresses, DNSName = Name, Computer 
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = DestinationIPAddress, HostEntity = Computer
  ),
  (VMConnection
  | where SourceIp in (IPList) or DestinationIp in (IPList)
  | parse RemoteDnsCanonicalNames with * '["' DNSName '"]' *
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Direction, ProcessName, SourceIp, DestinationIp, DestinationPort, RemoteDnsQuestions, DNSName,BytesSent, BytesReceived, RemoteCountry, Type
  | extend IPMatch = case( SourceIp in (IPList), "SourceIP", DestinationIp in (IPList), "DestinationIP", "None") 
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = case(IPMatch == "SourceIP", SourceIp, IPMatch == "DestinationIP", DestinationIp, "NoMatch"), File = ProcessName, HostEntity = Computer
  ),
  (Event
  | where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
  | where EventID == 3
  | extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)
  | extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data
  | extend SourceIP = tostring(EventDetail.[9].["#text"]), DestinationIP = tostring(EventDetail.[14].["#text"]), Image = tostring(EventDetail.[4].["#text"])
  | where SourceIP in (IPList) or DestinationIP in (IPList)
  | project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, Image, UserName, Computer, Type
  | extend IPMatch = case( SourceIP in (IPList), "SourceIP", DestinationIP in (IPList), "DestinationIP", "None")
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, File = tostring(split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]), IPEntity = case(IPMatch == "SourceIP", SourceIP, IPMatch == "DestinationIP", DestinationIP, "None"), 
  HostEntity = Computer, AccountName = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[1]), AccountDomain = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[0])
  | extend InitiatingProcessAccount = UserName
  ), 
  (OfficeActivity
  | where ClientIP in (IPList) 
  | project TimeGenerated, UserAgent, Operation, RecordType, UserId, ClientIP, Type
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = ClientIP, AccountName = tostring(split(UserId, "@")[0]), AccountDomain = tostring(split(UserId, "@")[1])
  | extend InitiatingProcessAccount = UserId
  ),
  (DeviceNetworkEvents
  | where RemoteIP in (IPList) or InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (sha256Hashes)
  | project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, Computer = DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, 
  InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort, LocalIP, Type
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = RemoteIP, HostEntity = Computer, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain
  | extend InitiatingProcessAccount = strcat(AccountDomain, "\\", AccountName)
  ),
  (WindowsFirewall
  | where SourceIP in (IPList) or DestinationIP in (IPList) 
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, CommunicationDirection, SourceIP, DestinationIP, SourcePort, DestinationPort, Type
  | extend IPMatch = case( SourceIP in (IPList), "SourceIP", DestinationIP in (IPList), "DestinationIP", "None")
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = Computer, IPEntity = case(IPMatch == "SourceIP", SourceIP, IPMatch == "DestinationIP", DestinationIP, "None")
  ), 
  (imFileEvent
  | where TargetFileSHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
  | extend Account = ActorUsername, Computer = DvcHostname, IPAddress = SrcIpAddr, CommandLine = ActingProcessCommandLine, FileHash = TargetFileSHA256
  | project Type, TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, IPAddress, CommandLine, FileHash
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = IPAddress,  HostEntity = Computer, Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(FileHash)
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[1]), AccountDomain = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[0])
  | extend InitiatingProcessAccount = Account
  ),
  (DeviceFileEvents
  | where SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
  | project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, 
  InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, 
  Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(InitiatingProcessSHA256), CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,Image = InitiatingProcessFolderPath
  | extend InitiatingProcessAccount = strcat(AccountDomain, "\\", AccountName)
  ),
  (DeviceImageLoadEvents
  | where SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
  | project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, 
  InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, 
  Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(InitiatingProcessSHA256),  CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,Image = InitiatingProcessFolderPath
  | extend InitiatingProcessAccount = strcat(AccountDomain, "\\", AccountName)
  ),
  (Event
  | where Source =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
  | where EventID == 1
  | extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)
  | extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data
  | extend Image = EventDetail.[4].["#text"],  CommandLine = EventDetail.[10].["#text"], Hashes = tostring(EventDetail.[17].["#text"])
  | extend Hashes = extract_all(@"(?P<key>\w+)=(?P<value>[a-zA-Z0-9]+)", dynamic(["key","value"]), Hashes)
  | extend Hashes = column_ifexists("Hashes", dynamic(["", ""])), CommandLine = column_ifexists("CommandLine", "")
  | mv-expand Hashes
  | where Hashes[0] =~ "SHA256" and Hashes[1] has_any (sha256Hashes)  
  | project TimeGenerated, EventDetail, UserName, Computer, Type, Source, Hashes, CommandLine, Image
  | extend Type = strcat(Type, ": ", Source)
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = Computer, AccountName = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[1]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[0]), FileHash = tostring(Hashes[1])
  | extend InitiatingProcessAccount = UserName
  )
  )
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(HostEntity, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(HostEntity, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(HostEntity, DomainIndex + 1), HostEntity)
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: InitiatingProcessAccount
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: AccountDomain
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: HostEntity
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: IPEntity
  - entityType: FileHash
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Algorithm
        columnName: Algorithm
      - identifier: Value
        columnName: FileHash
version: 1.1.1
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Microsoft Security Research
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Threat Intelligence" ]

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let IPRegex = '[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}\\.[0-9]{1,3}';

Let binding: `iocs`

let iocs = externaldata(DateAdded:string,IoC:string,Type:string,TLP:string) [@"https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/master/Sample%20Data/Feeds/Europium_September2022.csv"] with (format="csv", ignoreFirstRecord=True);

Let binding: `sha256Hashes`

let sha256Hashes = (iocs | where Type =~ "sha256" | project IoC);

Derived from iocs.

Let binding: `IPList`

let IPList = (iocs | where Type =~ "ip"| project IoC);

Derived from iocs.

union `isfuzzy=true` (11 sources)

Each leg below queries one source; the rule matches if any leg does. Sources: CommonSecurityLog, DnsEvents, VMConnection, Event, OfficeActivity, DeviceNetworkEvents, WindowsFirewall, imFileEvent, DeviceFileEvents, DeviceImageLoadEvents, Event

Leg 1: `CommonSecurityLog`

CommonSecurityLog
| where SourceIP in (IPList) or DestinationIP in (IPList) or Message has_any (IPList)
| parse Message with * '(' DNSName ')' * 
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, Message, SourceUserID, RequestURL, DNSName, Type
| extend MessageIP = extract(IPRegex, 0, Message), RequestIP = extract(IPRegex, 0, RequestURL)
| extend IPMatch = case(SourceIP in (IPList), "SourceIP", DestinationIP in (IPList), "DestinationIP", MessageIP in (IPList), "Message",  "NoMatch")
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = case(IPMatch == "SourceIP", SourceIP, IPMatch == "DestinationIP", DestinationIP, IPMatch == "Message", MessageIP, "NoMatch")

Leg 2: `DnsEvents`

DnsEvents
| where IPAddresses in (IPList)  
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, IPAddresses, Name, ClientIP, Type
| extend DestinationIPAddress = IPAddresses, DNSName = Name, Computer 
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = DestinationIPAddress, HostEntity = Computer

Leg 3: `VMConnection`

VMConnection
| where SourceIp in (IPList) or DestinationIp in (IPList)
| parse RemoteDnsCanonicalNames with * '["' DNSName '"]' *
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Direction, ProcessName, SourceIp, DestinationIp, DestinationPort, RemoteDnsQuestions, DNSName,BytesSent, BytesReceived, RemoteCountry, Type
| extend IPMatch = case( SourceIp in (IPList), "SourceIP", DestinationIp in (IPList), "DestinationIP", "None") 
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = case(IPMatch == "SourceIP", SourceIp, IPMatch == "DestinationIP", DestinationIp, "NoMatch"), File = ProcessName, HostEntity = Computer

Leg 4: `Event`

Event
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 3
| extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)
| extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data
| extend SourceIP = tostring(EventDetail.[9].["#text"]), DestinationIP = tostring(EventDetail.[14].["#text"]), Image = tostring(EventDetail.[4].["#text"])
| where SourceIP in (IPList) or DestinationIP in (IPList)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, Image, UserName, Computer, Type
| extend IPMatch = case( SourceIP in (IPList), "SourceIP", DestinationIP in (IPList), "DestinationIP", "None")
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, File = tostring(split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]), IPEntity = case(IPMatch == "SourceIP", SourceIP, IPMatch == "DestinationIP", DestinationIP, "None"), 
HostEntity = Computer, AccountName = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[1]), AccountDomain = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[0])
| extend InitiatingProcessAccount = UserName

Leg 5: `OfficeActivity`

OfficeActivity
| where ClientIP in (IPList) 
| project TimeGenerated, UserAgent, Operation, RecordType, UserId, ClientIP, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = ClientIP, AccountName = tostring(split(UserId, "@")[0]), AccountDomain = tostring(split(UserId, "@")[1])
| extend InitiatingProcessAccount = UserId

Leg 6: `DeviceNetworkEvents`

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (IPList) or InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, Computer = DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, 
InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort, LocalIP, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = RemoteIP, HostEntity = Computer, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain
| extend InitiatingProcessAccount = strcat(AccountDomain, "\\", AccountName)

Leg 7: `WindowsFirewall`

WindowsFirewall
| where SourceIP in (IPList) or DestinationIP in (IPList) 
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, CommunicationDirection, SourceIP, DestinationIP, SourcePort, DestinationPort, Type
| extend IPMatch = case( SourceIP in (IPList), "SourceIP", DestinationIP in (IPList), "DestinationIP", "None")
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = Computer, IPEntity = case(IPMatch == "SourceIP", SourceIP, IPMatch == "DestinationIP", DestinationIP, "None")

Leg 8: `imFileEvent`

imFileEvent
| where TargetFileSHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
| extend Account = ActorUsername, Computer = DvcHostname, IPAddress = SrcIpAddr, CommandLine = ActingProcessCommandLine, FileHash = TargetFileSHA256
| project Type, TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, IPAddress, CommandLine, FileHash
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, IPEntity = IPAddress,  HostEntity = Computer, Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(FileHash)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[1]), AccountDomain = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[0])
| extend InitiatingProcessAccount = Account

Leg 9: `DeviceFileEvents`

DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, 
InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, 
Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(InitiatingProcessSHA256), CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,Image = InitiatingProcessFolderPath
| extend InitiatingProcessAccount = strcat(AccountDomain, "\\", AccountName)

Leg 10: `DeviceImageLoadEvents`

DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, 
InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = DeviceName, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, 
Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(InitiatingProcessSHA256),  CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,Image = InitiatingProcessFolderPath
| extend InitiatingProcessAccount = strcat(AccountDomain, "\\", AccountName)

Leg 11: `Event`

Event
| where Source =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 1
| extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)
| extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data
| extend Image = EventDetail.[4].["#text"],  CommandLine = EventDetail.[10].["#text"], Hashes = tostring(EventDetail.[17].["#text"])
| extend Hashes = extract_all(@"(?P<key>\w+)=(?P<value>[a-zA-Z0-9]+)", dynamic(["key","value"]), Hashes)
| extend Hashes = column_ifexists("Hashes", dynamic(["", ""])), CommandLine = column_ifexists("CommandLine", "")
| mv-expand Hashes
| where Hashes[0] =~ "SHA256" and Hashes[1] has_any (sha256Hashes)  
| project TimeGenerated, EventDetail, UserName, Computer, Type, Source, Hashes, CommandLine, Image
| extend Type = strcat(Type, ": ", Source)
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, HostEntity = Computer, AccountName = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[1]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserName, @'\')[0]), FileHash = tostring(Hashes[1])
| extend InitiatingProcessAccount = UserName

Applied to the combined result

| extend HostName = tostring(split(HostEntity, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(HostEntity, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(HostEntity, DomainIndex + 1), HostEntity)

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ClientIP`	in	`IPList` transforms: `cased`
`DestinationIP`	in	`IPList` transforms: `cased`
`DestinationIp`	in	`IPList` transforms: `cased`
`EventID`	eq	`1` transforms: `cased` `3` transforms: `cased`
`Hashes[0]`	eq	`SHA256`
`Hashes[1]`	match	`sha256Hashes`
`IPAddresses`	in	`IPList` transforms: `cased`
`InitiatingProcessSHA256`	in	`sha256Hashes` transforms: `cased`
`Message`	match	`IPList`
`RemoteIP`	in	`IPList` transforms: `cased`
`SHA256`	match	`sha256Hashes`
`SourceIP`	in	`IPList` transforms: `cased`
`SourceIp`	in	`IPList` transforms: `cased`
`TargetFileSHA256`	match	`sha256Hashes`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`CommandLine`	`project`
`Computer`	`project`
`EventDetail`	`project`
`Hashes`	`project`
`Image`	`project`
`Source`	`project`
`TimeGenerated`	`project`
`Type`	`extend`
`UserName`	`project`
`AccountName`	`extend`
`AccountUPNSuffix`	`extend`
`FileHash`	`extend`
`HostEntity`	`extend`
`timestamp`	`extend`
`InitiatingProcessAccount`	`extend`
`DomainIndex`	`extend`
`HostName`	`extend`
`HostNameDomain`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Europium - Hash and IP IOCs - September 2022

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: `iocs`

Let binding: `sha256Hashes`

Let binding: `IPList`

union `isfuzzy=true` (11 sources)

Leg 1: `CommonSecurityLog`

Leg 2: `DnsEvents`

Leg 3: `VMConnection`

Leg 4: `Event`

Leg 5: `OfficeActivity`

Leg 6: `DeviceNetworkEvents`

Leg 7: `WindowsFirewall`

Leg 8: `imFileEvent`

Leg 9: `DeviceFileEvents`

Leg 10: `DeviceImageLoadEvents`

Leg 11: `Event`

Applied to the combined result

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Europium - Hash and IP IOCs - September 2022

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: iocs

Let binding: sha256Hashes

Let binding: IPList

union isfuzzy=true (11 sources)

Leg 1: CommonSecurityLog

Leg 2: DnsEvents

Leg 3: VMConnection

Leg 4: Event

Leg 5: OfficeActivity

Leg 6: DeviceNetworkEvents

Leg 7: WindowsFirewall

Leg 8: imFileEvent

Leg 9: DeviceFileEvents

Leg 10: DeviceImageLoadEvents

Leg 11: Event

Applied to the combined result

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `iocs`

Let binding: `sha256Hashes`

Let binding: `IPList`

union `isfuzzy=true` (11 sources)

Leg 1: `CommonSecurityLog`

Leg 2: `DnsEvents`

Leg 3: `VMConnection`

Leg 4: `Event`

Leg 5: `OfficeActivity`

Leg 6: `DeviceNetworkEvents`

Leg 7: `WindowsFirewall`

Leg 8: `imFileEvent`

Leg 9: `DeviceFileEvents`

Leg 10: `DeviceImageLoadEvents`

Leg 11: `Event`