Detection rules › Kusto

[Entra ID] Mass Privileged Role Change Activity Detected

Status
available
Severity
high
Time window
1h
Group by
TimeGenerated, TimeWindow
Source
github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Detects multiple privileged role changes occurring around the same time. This may signal bulk abuse or administrative misconfiguration.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Privilege Escalation

Telemetry coverage

Rules detecting the same action

These rules filter on the same operation.

Rule body

id: d6cd3c6f-1d2a-4c42-a048-dbe91cf35b18
name: "[Entra ID] Mass Privileged Role Change Activity Detected"
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled
description: |
  Detects multiple privileged role changes occurring around the same time. This may signal bulk abuse or administrative misconfiguration.
severity: High
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
      - AuditLogs
queryFrequency: 2h
queryPeriod: 2h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques:
  - T1078
query: |
  AuditLogs
  | where Category =~ "RoleManagement"
  | where ActivityDisplayName has_any ("Add eligible member to role", "Add member to role")
  | mv-expand TargetResources
  | mv-expand TargetResources.modifiedProperties
  | extend displayName_ = tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.displayName)
  | extend RoleName = tostring(parse_json(tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.newValue)))
  | extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalName)
  | where RoleName contains "Admin"
  | extend Target = tostring(TargetResources.userPrincipalName)
  | summarize dcount(Target) by bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
  | where dcount_Target >= 9
  | join kind=rightsemi  (AuditLogs
      | where Category =~ "RoleManagement"
      | where ActivityDisplayName has_any ("Add eligible member to role", "Add member to role")
      | mv-expand TargetResources
      | mv-expand TargetResources.modifiedProperties
      | extend displayName_ = tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.displayName)
      | where displayName_ =~ "Role.DisplayName"
      | extend RoleName = tostring(parse_json(tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.newValue)))
      | extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
      | extend Source_UserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
      | extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
      | where RoleName contains "Admin"
      | extend Target = tostring(TargetResources.userPrincipalName)
      | extend InitiatingIpAddress = tostring(iff(isnotempty(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress, InitiatedBy.app.ipAddress))
      | extend Source_Network_IPLocation = ""
      | extend TimeWindow = bin(TimeGenerated, 1h))
      on $left.TimeGenerated == $right.TimeWindow
  | project
          Alert_Category_en = "Entra ID",
      Alert_SubCategory_en = "Anomaly Identity Privilege Modification",
      Alert_Name_en = "Mass Privileged Role Change Activity Detected",
      Alert_Description_en =  strcat(
                              "At Taiwan time: ",
                              format_datetime(datetime_utc_to_local(TimeGenerated, "Asia/Taipei"), "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"),
                              "in the Microsoft Entra ID tenant"
      ", user:  ",
                              iff(isnotempty(Source_UserPrincipalName), Source_UserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName),
                              " at IP: ",
                              InitiatingIpAddress,
                              ", performed mass permission changes. Newly added role permission: ",
                              RoleName
                          ),
      Alert_TriageStep_en=
      strcat(
      "1. Confirm whether the high-privilege role assignment  ",
      iff(isnotempty(RoleName), RoleName, "<NoRole>"),
      "  has a corresponding change request or approval record.",
      "2. Verify whether target account  ",
      iff(isnotempty(Target), Target, "<NoTargetUser>"),
      "  is a user who actually needs this administrative permission.",
      "3. Check whether source IP  ",
      iff(isnotempty(InitiatingIpAddress), InitiatingIpAddress, "<NoIP>"),
      "  and sign-in location  ",
      iff(isnotempty(Source_Network_IPLocation), Source_Network_IPLocation, "<NoLocation>"),
      "  are company IPs and commonly used locations."
  ),
      Alert_Containment_en = strcat(
                             "1. Immediately review and suspend all Admin role members added during the event time window, confirm whether they are approved permission changes, and immediately remove unauthorized roles.",
                             "2. Immediately restrict or disable the source account or application that performed the role assignment (",
                             iff(isnotempty(InitiatingAppName), InitiatingAppName, "<NoInitiator>"),
                             "), and revoke its existing sign-in tokens and sessions. ",
                             "3. If the source is a Service Principal, immediately disable the application, revoke credentials/secrets and Graph API permissions, and prevent continued automation abuse. "
                         ),
      Alert_Remediation_en = strcat(
                             "1. Strengthen Admin role assignment governance: allow Just-In-Time access only through PIM, require approval and access justification, and prohibit permanent assignments. ",
                             "2. Establish real-time alerts and automated response (SOAR) for role changes, including mass assignments, off-hours activity, or abnormal geolocation behavior.",
                             "3. Regularly audit Admin role members/Service Principal permissions and API consent, and remove unnecessary or long-unused high-privilege access. "
                         ),
              Alert_Time_TW = datetime_utc_to_local(TimeGenerated, "Asia/Taipei"),
      Alert_Time_UTC0 = TimeGenerated,
      Event_Action = ActivityDisplayName,
      Event_Status = Result,
      //Event_Description = ActivityDisplayName,
      Source_Identity_FullName = iff(isnotempty(Source_UserPrincipalName), Source_UserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName),
      //Source_Identity_ID = ActorID,
      Source_Identity_Type = iff(isnotempty(Source_UserPrincipalName), "User", "Service"),
      Source_Network_IPAddress = InitiatingIpAddress,
      Source_Network_IPLocation = Source_Network_IPLocation,
      //Source_Resource_Name = InitiatingAppName,
      Target_Identity_FullName = Target,
      Target_Identity_DomainType = iff(Target contains "EXT", 'External', 'Internal'),
      Target_Identity_Type = "User",
      Target_Resource_ID = "",
      Target_Resource_Type = "Entra ID"
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Source_Identity_FullName
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: Source_Network_IPAddress
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Target_Identity_FullName
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDynamicProperties: []

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

AuditLogs

Stage 2: where

| where Category =~ "RoleManagement"

Stage 3: where

| where ActivityDisplayName has_any ("Add eligible member to role", "Add member to role")

Stage 4: mv-expand

| mv-expand TargetResources

Stage 5: mv-expand

| mv-expand TargetResources.modifiedProperties

Stage 6: extend (3 consecutive steps)

| extend displayName_ = tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.displayName)
| extend RoleName = tostring(parse_json(tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.newValue)))
| extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalName)

Stage 7: where

| where RoleName contains "Admin"

Stage 8: extend

| extend Target = tostring(TargetResources.userPrincipalName)

Stage 9: summarize

| summarize dcount(Target) by bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)

Stage 10: where

| where dcount_Target >= 9

Stage 11: join

| join kind=rightsemi  (AuditLogs
    | where Category =~ "RoleManagement"
    | where ActivityDisplayName has_any ("Add eligible member to role", "Add member to role")
    | mv-expand TargetResources
    | mv-expand TargetResources.modifiedProperties
    | extend displayName_ = tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.displayName)
    | where displayName_ =~ "Role.DisplayName"
    | extend RoleName = tostring(parse_json(tostring(TargetResources_modifiedProperties.newValue)))
    | extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
    | extend Source_UserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
    | extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
    | where RoleName contains "Admin"
    | extend Target = tostring(TargetResources.userPrincipalName)
    | extend InitiatingIpAddress = tostring(iff(isnotempty(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress), InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress, InitiatedBy.app.ipAddress))
    | extend Source_Network_IPLocation = ""
    | extend TimeWindow = bin(TimeGenerated, 1h))
    on $left.TimeGenerated == $right.TimeWindow

Stage 12: project

| project
        Alert_Category_en = "Entra ID",
    Alert_SubCategory_en = "Anomaly Identity Privilege Modification",
    Alert_Name_en = "Mass Privileged Role Change Activity Detected",
    Alert_Description_en =  strcat(
                            "At Taiwan time: ",
                            format_datetime(datetime_utc_to_local(TimeGenerated, "Asia/Taipei"), "yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss"),
                            "in the Microsoft Entra ID tenant"
    ", user:  ",
                            iff(isnotempty(Source_UserPrincipalName), Source_UserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName),
                            " at IP: ",
                            InitiatingIpAddress,
                            ", performed mass permission changes. Newly added role permission: ",
                            RoleName
                        ),
    Alert_TriageStep_en=
    strcat(
    "1. Confirm whether the high-privilege role assignment  ",
    iff(isnotempty(RoleName), RoleName, "<NoRole>"),
    "  has a corresponding change request or approval record.",
    "2. Verify whether target account  ",
    iff(isnotempty(Target), Target, "<NoTargetUser>"),
    "  is a user who actually needs this administrative permission.",
    "3. Check whether source IP  ",
    iff(isnotempty(InitiatingIpAddress), InitiatingIpAddress, "<NoIP>"),
    "  and sign-in location  ",
    iff(isnotempty(Source_Network_IPLocation), Source_Network_IPLocation, "<NoLocation>"),
    "  are company IPs and commonly used locations."
),
    Alert_Containment_en = strcat(
                           "1. Immediately review and suspend all Admin role members added during the event time window, confirm whether they are approved permission changes, and immediately remove unauthorized roles.",
                           "2. Immediately restrict or disable the source account or application that performed the role assignment (",
                           iff(isnotempty(InitiatingAppName), InitiatingAppName, "<NoInitiator>"),
                           "), and revoke its existing sign-in tokens and sessions. ",
                           "3. If the source is a Service Principal, immediately disable the application, revoke credentials/secrets and Graph API permissions, and prevent continued automation abuse. "
                       ),
    Alert_Remediation_en = strcat(
                           "1. Strengthen Admin role assignment governance: allow Just-In-Time access only through PIM, require approval and access justification, and prohibit permanent assignments. ",
                           "2. Establish real-time alerts and automated response (SOAR) for role changes, including mass assignments, off-hours activity, or abnormal geolocation behavior.",
                           "3. Regularly audit Admin role members/Service Principal permissions and API consent, and remove unnecessary or long-unused high-privilege access. "
                       ),
            Alert_Time_TW = datetime_utc_to_local(TimeGenerated, "Asia/Taipei"),
    Alert_Time_UTC0 = TimeGenerated,
    Event_Action = ActivityDisplayName,
    Event_Status = Result,
    Source_Identity_FullName = iff(isnotempty(Source_UserPrincipalName), Source_UserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName),
    Source_Identity_Type = iff(isnotempty(Source_UserPrincipalName), "User", "Service"),
    Source_Network_IPAddress = InitiatingIpAddress,
    Source_Network_IPLocation = Source_Network_IPLocation,
    Target_Identity_FullName = Target,
    Target_Identity_DomainType = iff(Target contains "EXT", 'External', 'Internal'),
    Target_Identity_Type = "User",
    Target_Resource_ID = "",
    Target_Resource_Type = "Entra ID"

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

Output fields

These fields are emitted when the rule matches.

FieldSource
Alert_Category_enproject
Alert_Containment_enproject
Alert_Description_enproject
Alert_Name_enproject
Alert_Remediation_enproject
Alert_SubCategory_enproject
Alert_Time_TWproject
Alert_Time_UTC0project
Alert_TriageStep_enproject
Event_Actionproject
Event_Statusproject
Source_Identity_FullNameproject
Source_Identity_Typeproject
Source_Network_IPAddressproject
Source_Network_IPLocationproject
Target_Identity_DomainTypeproject
Target_Identity_FullNameproject
Target_Identity_Typeproject
Target_Resource_IDproject
Target_Resource_Typeproject