Detection rules › Kusto

Exchange Worker Process Making Remote Call

Severity
medium
Time window
1d
Author
Microsoft Security Community
Source
github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

This query dynamically identifies Exchange servers and then looks for instances where the IIS worker process initiates a call out to a remote URL using either cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This behaviour was described as post-compromise behaviour following exploitation of CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082, this pattern of activity was use to download additional tools to the server. This suspicious activity is generic.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

id: 2c701f94-783c-4cd4-bc9b-3b3334976090
name: Exchange Worker Process Making Remote Call
description: |
  'This query dynamically identifies Exchange servers and then looks for instances where the IIS worker process initiates a call out to a remote URL using either cmd.exe or powershell.exe.
  This behaviour was described as post-compromise behaviour following exploitation of CVE-2022-41040 and CVE-2022-41082, this pattern of activity was use to download additional tools to the server. This suspicious activity is generic.'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureMonitor(IIS)
    dataTypes:
      - W3CIISLog
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
    - DeviceProcessEvents
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt 
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Execution
relevantTechniques:
  - T1059.001
  - T1059.003
query: |
  let suspiciousCmdLineKeywords = dynamic(["http://", "https://"]);
  // Identify exchange servers based on known paths
  // Summarize these to get a list of exchange server hostnames
  let exchangeServers = W3CIISLog
  | where csUriStem has_any("/owa/","/ews/","/ecp/","/autodiscover/")
  // Only where successful, rule out failed scanning
  | where scStatus startswith "2"
  | summarize by Computer;
  DeviceProcessEvents
  | where DeviceName in~ (exchangeServers)
  // Where the IIS worker process initiated CMD or PowerShell
  | where InitiatingProcessParentFileName == "w3wp.exe"
  | where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe")
  // Where CMD or PowerShell command line included parameters associated with CVE-2022-41040/CVE-2022-41082 exploitation
  | where ProcessCommandLine has_any(suspiciousCmdLineKeywords)
  | project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName
  | extend Account = strcat(AccountDomain, "\\", AccountName)
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Account
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: AccountDomain
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: DeviceName
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
version: 1.1.2
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Microsoft Security Community
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Application" ]

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let suspiciousCmdLineKeywords = dynamic(["http://", "https://"]);

Let binding: exchangeServers used in Stage 2

let exchangeServers = W3CIISLog
| where csUriStem has_any("/owa/","/ews/","/ecp/","/autodiscover/")
| where scStatus startswith "2"
| summarize by Computer;

Stage 1: source

DeviceProcessEvents

Stage 2: where

| where DeviceName in~ (exchangeServers)

Stage 3: where

| where InitiatingProcessParentFileName == "w3wp.exe"

Stage 4: where

| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe")

Stage 5: where

| where ProcessCommandLine has_any(suspiciousCmdLineKeywords)

Stage 6: project

| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountDomain = InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, AccountName = InitiatingProcessAccountName

Stage 7: extend (3 consecutive steps)

| extend Account = strcat(AccountDomain, "\\", AccountName)
| extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
DeviceNamein
  • exchangeServers
field:"Computer" kind:in value:"exchangeServers"
InitiatingProcessFileNamematch
  • cmd.exe transforms: term corpus 2 (kusto 2)
  • powershell.exe transforms: term corpus 2 (kusto 2)
field:"parent_process_name" kind:match
InitiatingProcessParentFileNameeq
  • w3wp.exe
field:"GrandParentImage" kind:eq value:"w3wp.exe"
ProcessCommandLinematch
  • http:// transforms: term corpus 23 (sigma 18, elastic 2, kusto 2, splunk 1)
  • https:// transforms: term corpus 23 (sigma 18, elastic 2, kusto 2, splunk 1)
field:"CommandLine" kind:match

Output fields

These fields are emitted when the rule matches.

FieldSource
AccountDomainproject
AccountNameproject
DeviceIdproject
DeviceNameproject
InitiatingProcessFileNameproject
ProcessCommandLineproject
TimeGeneratedproject
Accountextend
DomainIndexextend
HostNameextend
HostNameDomainextend