Gain Code Execution on ADFS Server via SMB + Remote Service or Scheduled Task

Status: available
Severity: medium
Time window: 7d
Group by: SubjectLogonId, TargetLogonId
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

This query detects instances where an attacker has gained the ability to execute code on an ADFS Server through SMB and Remote Service or Scheduled Task.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Lateral Movement	`T1210` Exploitation of Remote Services

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4624	An account was successfully logged on.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4697	A service was installed in the system.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4698	A scheduled task was created.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4699	A scheduled task was deleted.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4700	A scheduled task was enabled.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4701	A scheduled task was disabled.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4702	A scheduled task was updated.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 5145	A network share object was checked to see whether client can be granted desired access.

Rule body kusto

id: 12dcea64-bec2-41c9-9df2-9f28461b1295
name: Gain Code Execution on ADFS Server via SMB + Remote Service or Scheduled Task
description: |
   'This query detects instances where an attacker has gained the ability to execute code on an ADFS Server through SMB and Remote Service or Scheduled Task.'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
  - connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 7d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
status: Available
tactics:
  - LateralMovement
relevantTechniques:
  - T1210
tags:
  - Solorigate
  - NOBELIUM
query: |
  let timeframe = 1d;
  // Adjust for a longer timeframe for identifying ADFS Servers
  let lookback = 6d;
  // Identify ADFS Servers
  let ADFS_Servers = (
  SecurityEvent
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
  | where EventID == 4688 and SubjectLogonId != "0x3e4"
  | where NewProcessName has "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
  | distinct Computer
  );
  SecurityEvent
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
  | where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
  | where Account !endswith "$"
  // Check for scheduled task events
  | where EventID in (4697, 4698, 4699, 4700, 4701, 4702)
  | extend EventDataParsed = parse_xml(EventData)
  | extend SubjectLogonId = tostring(EventDataParsed.EventData.Data[3]["#text"])
  // Check specifically for access to IPC$ share and PIPE\svcctl and PIPE\atsvc for Service Control Services and Schedule Control Services
  | union (
      SecurityEvent
      | where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
      | where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
      | where Account !endswith "$"
      | where EventID == 5145
      | where RelativeTargetName =~ "svcctl" or RelativeTargetName  =~ "atsvc"
  )
  // Check for lateral movement
  | join kind=inner
  (SecurityEvent
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
  | where Account !endswith "$"
  | where EventID == 4624 and LogonType == 3
  ) on $left.SubjectLogonId == $right.TargetLogonId
  | project TimeGenerated, Account, Computer, EventID, RelativeTargetName
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[0])
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Account
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: AccountNTDomain
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Computer
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
version: 1.2.1
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let timeframe = 1d;
let lookback = 6d;

Let binding: `ADFS_Servers`

let ADFS_Servers = (
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
| where EventID == 4688 and SubjectLogonId != "0x3e4"
| where NewProcessName has "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| distinct Computer
);

Derived from timeframe, lookback.

Stage 1: `source`

let ADFS_Servers

Stage 2: `source`

SecurityEvent

Stage 3: `where`

| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)

Stage 4: `where`

| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)

References ADFS_Servers (defined above).

Stage 5: `where`

| where Account !endswith "$"

Stage 6: `where`

| where EventID in (4697, 4698, 4699, 4700, 4701, 4702)

Stage 7: `extend`

| extend EventDataParsed = parse_xml(EventData)

Stage 8: `extend`

| extend SubjectLogonId = tostring(EventDataParsed.EventData.Data[3]["#text"])

Stage 9: `union`

| union

Stage 10: `source`

SecurityEvent

Stage 11: `where`

| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)

Stage 12: `where`

| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)

References ADFS_Servers (defined above).

Stage 13: `where`

| where Account !endswith "$"

Stage 14: `where`

| where EventID == 5145

Stage 15: `where`

| where RelativeTargetName =~ "svcctl" or RelativeTargetName  =~ "atsvc"

Stage 16: `join`

| join kind=inner
(SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Account !endswith "$"
| where EventID == 4624 and LogonType == 3
) on $left.SubjectLogonId == $right.TargetLogonId

Stage 17: `project`

| project TimeGenerated, Account, Computer, EventID, RelativeTargetName

Stage 18: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[1]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, @'\')[0])

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`Account`	ends_with	`$`
`Account`	ends_with	`$`
`Account`	ends_with	`$`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Computer`	in	`ADFS_Servers` corpus 5 (kusto 5)
`EventID`	eq	`4624` transforms: `cased` corpus 25 (splunk 13, kusto 8, chronicle 4) `5145` transforms: `cased` corpus 18 (splunk 16, kusto 2)
`EventID`	in	`4697` transforms: `cased` corpus 2 (splunk 2) `4698` transforms: `cased` corpus 14 (splunk 14) `4699` transforms: `cased` `4700` transforms: `cased` `4701` transforms: `cased` `4702` transforms: `cased`
`LogonType`	eq	`3` transforms: `cased` corpus 40 (splunk 13, sigma 12, elastic 9, kusto 6)
`RelativeTargetName`	eq	`atsvc` corpus 4 (sigma 3, kusto 1) `svcctl` corpus 6 (sigma 5, kusto 1)

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`Account`	`project`
`Computer`	`project`
`EventID`	`project`
`RelativeTargetName`	`project`
`TimeGenerated`	`project`
`timestamp`	`extend`
`DomainIndex`	`extend`
`HostName`	`extend`
`HostNameDomain`	`extend`
`AccountNTDomain`	`extend`
`AccountName`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Gain Code Execution on ADFS Server via SMB + Remote Service or Scheduled Task

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: `ADFS_Servers`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `source`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `where`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `extend`

Stage 9: `union`

Stage 10: `source`

Stage 11: `where`

Stage 12: `where`

Stage 13: `where`

Stage 14: `where`

Stage 15: `where`

Stage 16: `join`

Stage 17: `project`

Stage 18: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Gain Code Execution on ADFS Server via SMB + Remote Service or Scheduled Task

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: ADFS_Servers

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: source

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: where

Stage 7: extend

Stage 8: extend

Stage 9: union

Stage 10: source

Stage 11: where

Stage 12: where

Stage 13: where

Stage 14: where

Stage 15: where

Stage 16: join

Stage 17: project

Stage 18: extend (4 consecutive steps)

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `ADFS_Servers`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `source`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `where`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `extend`

Stage 9: `union`

Stage 10: `source`

Stage 11: `where`

Stage 12: `where`

Stage 13: `where`

Stage 14: `where`

Stage 15: `where`

Stage 16: `join`

Stage 17: `project`

Stage 18: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)