AV detections related to Hive Ransomware

Severity: high
Time window: 1d
Group by: AlertSeverity, CompromisedEntity, Description, DeviceId, DeviceName, DisplayName, Entities, ProductName, PublicIP, TenantId, ThreatFamilyName, ThreatName
Author: Microsoft Security Research
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'This query looks for Microsoft Defender AV detections related to Hive Ransomware. In Microsoft Sentinel the SecurityAlerts table includes only the Device Name of the affected device, this query joins the DeviceInfo table to clearly connect other information such as Device group, ip, logged on users etc. This would allow the Microsoft Sentinel analyst to have more context related to the alert, if available.'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Impact	`T1486` Data Encrypted for Impact

Rule body kusto

id: 4e5914a4-2ccd-429d-a845-fa597f0bd8c5
name: AV detections related to Hive Ransomware
description: |
  'This query looks for Microsoft Defender AV detections related to Hive Ransomware.
  In Microsoft Sentinel the SecurityAlerts table includes only the Device Name of the affected device, this query joins the DeviceInfo table to clearly connect other information such as Device group, ip, logged on users etc. This would allow the Microsoft Sentinel analyst to have more context related to the alert, if available.'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityAlert
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Impact
relevantTechniques:
  - T1486
tags:
  - HiveRansomware
query: |
  let Hive_threats = dynamic(["Ransom:Win64/Hive", "Ransom:Win32/Hive"]);
  DeviceInfo
  | extend DeviceName = tolower(DeviceName)
  | join kind=inner ( SecurityAlert
  | where ProviderName == "MDATP"
  | extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)
  | extend ThreatFamilyName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatFamilyName)
  | where ThreatName in~ (Hive_threats) or ThreatFamilyName in~ (Hive_threats)
  | extend CompromisedEntity = tolower(CompromisedEntity)
  ) on $left.DeviceName == $right.CompromisedEntity
  | summarize by bin(TimeGenerated, 1d), DisplayName, ThreatName, ThreatFamilyName, PublicIP, AlertSeverity, Description, tostring(LoggedOnUsers), DeviceId, TenantId , CompromisedEntity, tostring(LoggedOnUsers), ProductName, Entities
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(CompromisedEntity, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(CompromisedEntity, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(CompromisedEntity, DomainIndex + 1), CompromisedEntity)
  | project-away DomainIndex
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: CompromisedEntity
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: PublicIP
version: 1.0.5
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Microsoft Security Research
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Others" ]

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let Hive_threats = dynamic(["Ransom:Win64/Hive", "Ransom:Win32/Hive"]);

Stage 1: `source`

DeviceInfo

Stage 2: `extend`

| extend DeviceName = tolower(DeviceName)

Stage 3: `join`

| join kind=inner ( SecurityAlert
| where ProviderName == "MDATP"
| extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)
| extend ThreatFamilyName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatFamilyName)
| where ThreatName in~ (Hive_threats) or ThreatFamilyName in~ (Hive_threats)
| extend CompromisedEntity = tolower(CompromisedEntity)
) on $left.DeviceName == $right.CompromisedEntity

Stage 4: `summarize`

| summarize by bin(TimeGenerated, 1d), DisplayName, ThreatName, ThreatFamilyName, PublicIP, AlertSeverity, Description, tostring(LoggedOnUsers), DeviceId, TenantId , CompromisedEntity, tostring(LoggedOnUsers), ProductName, Entities

Stage 5: `extend`

| extend HostName = tostring(split(CompromisedEntity, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(CompromisedEntity, '.'))

Stage 6: `extend`

| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(CompromisedEntity, DomainIndex + 1), CompromisedEntity)

HostNameDomain =

ifDomainIndex != -1substring(CompromisedEntity, (DomainIndex + 1))

elseCompromisedEntity

Stage 7: `project-away`

| project-away DomainIndex

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ProviderName`	eq	`MDATP` transforms: `cased` corpus 13 (kusto 13)
`ThreatFamilyName`	in	`Ransom:Win32/Hive` `Ransom:Win64/Hive`
`ThreatName`	in	`Ransom:Win32/Hive` `Ransom:Win64/Hive`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`AlertSeverity`	`summarize`
`CompromisedEntity`	`summarize`
`Description`	`summarize`
`DeviceId`	`summarize`
`DisplayName`	`summarize`
`Entities`	`summarize`
`ProductName`	`summarize`
`PublicIP`	`summarize`
`TenantId`	`summarize`
`ThreatFamilyName`	`summarize`
`ThreatName`	`summarize`
`HostName`	`extend`
`HostNameDomain`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

AV detections related to Hive Ransomware

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `extend`

Stage 3: `join`

Stage 4: `summarize`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `project-away`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

AV detections related to Hive Ransomware

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: extend

Stage 3: join

Stage 4: summarize

Stage 5: extend

Stage 6: extend

Stage 7: project-away

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `extend`

Stage 3: `join`

Stage 4: `summarize`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `project-away`