Hunt for critical credentials on non Credential Guard enabled devices

Group by: DeviceName, NodeId, SourceNodeId
Author: Robbe Van den Daele
Source: github.com/HybridBrothers/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules

This query searches for devices that does not have Credential Guard enabled but contains critical credentials. The output shows for how many users each non Credential Guard device has credentials, together with the list of users being exposed.

Rule body yaml

let no_credguard_devices = (
        ExposureGraphNodes
        // Get devices with credential guard misconfiguration
        | where array_length(NodeProperties.rawData.hasGuardMisconfigurations) > 0
        // Get interesting data
        | extend DeviceName = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["deviceName"]),
            DeviceId = tostring(EntityIds.id)
        | extend DeviceName = iff(isempty(DeviceName), NodeName, DeviceName)
        // Search for distinct devices
        | distinct NodeId, DeviceName
    );
    let critical_users = toscalar(
        // Search for critical users
        ExposureGraphNodes
        | where NodeLabel == "user"
        | extend CriticalityLevel = todynamic(NodeProperties).rawData.criticalityLevel.criticalityLevel
        | extend RuleNames = todynamic(NodeProperties).rawData.criticalityLevel.ruleNames
        | where CriticalityLevel == 0
        | distinct NodeName, NodeId, tostring(CriticalityLevel), tostring(RuleNames)
        | summarize make_set(NodeName)
    );
    // Make graph for max of 3 edges, where we start from a device and end with an user
    ExposureGraphEdges
    | make-graph SourceNodeId --> TargetNodeId with ExposureGraphNodes on NodeId
    | graph-match (SourceNode)-[anyEdge*1..3]->(TargetNode)
        where SourceNode.NodeLabel in ("device", "microsoft.compute/virtualmachines") and TargetNode.NodeLabel == "user" and TargetNode.NodeName in ( critical_users )
        project SourceNodeName = SourceNode.NodeName,
        SourceNodeId = SourceNode.NodeId,
        Edges = anyEdge.EdgeLabel,
        TargetNodeId = TargetNode.NodeId,
        TargetNodeName = TargetNode.NodeName,
        TargetNodeLabel = TargetNode.NodeLabel,
        TargetCriticalityLevel = TargetNode.NodeProperties.rawData.criticalityLevel.criticalityLevel,
        TargetRuleNames = TargetNode.NodeProperties.rawData.criticalityLevel.ruleNames
    | distinct SourceNodeId, SourceNodeName, TargetNodeId, TargetNodeName, tostring(TargetCriticalityLevel), tostring(TargetRuleNames)
    // Only return devices that does not have a TPM fully enabled
    | join kind=inner no_credguard_devices on $left.SourceNodeId == $right.NodeId
    // Make list of users per device
    | summarize UserList = make_list(TargetNodeName) by DeviceName
    // Count amount of exposed users per device
    | extend UserCount = array_length(UserList)
    | sort by UserCount desc

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `no_credguard_devices`

let no_credguard_devices = (
        ExposureGraphNodes
        | where array_length(NodeProperties.rawData.hasGuardMisconfigurations) > 0
        | extend DeviceName = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["deviceName"]),
            DeviceId = tostring(EntityIds.id)
        | extend DeviceName = iff(isempty(DeviceName), NodeName, DeviceName)
        | distinct NodeId, DeviceName
    );

Let binding: `critical_users`

let critical_users = toscalar(
        ExposureGraphNodes
        | where NodeLabel == "user"
        | extend CriticalityLevel = todynamic(NodeProperties).rawData.criticalityLevel.criticalityLevel
        | extend RuleNames = todynamic(NodeProperties).rawData.criticalityLevel.ruleNames
        | where CriticalityLevel == 0
        | distinct NodeName, NodeId, tostring(CriticalityLevel), tostring(RuleNames)
        | summarize make_set(NodeName)
    );

Stage 1: `source`

ExposureGraphEdges

Stage 2: `macro`

| make-graph SourceNodeId --> TargetNodeId with ExposureGraphNodes on NodeId

Stage 3: `macro`

| graph-match (SourceNode)-[anyEdge*1..3]->(TargetNode)
        where SourceNode.NodeLabel in ("device", "microsoft.compute/virtualmachines") and TargetNode.NodeLabel == "user" and TargetNode.NodeName in ( critical_users )
        project SourceNodeName = SourceNode.NodeName,
        SourceNodeId = SourceNode.NodeId,
        Edges = anyEdge.EdgeLabel,
        TargetNodeId = TargetNode.NodeId,
        TargetNodeName = TargetNode.NodeName,
        TargetNodeLabel = TargetNode.NodeLabel,
        TargetCriticalityLevel = TargetNode.NodeProperties.rawData.criticalityLevel.criticalityLevel,
        TargetRuleNames = TargetNode.NodeProperties.rawData.criticalityLevel.ruleNames

Stage 4: `distinct`

| distinct SourceNodeId, SourceNodeName, TargetNodeId, TargetNodeName, tostring(TargetCriticalityLevel), tostring(TargetRuleNames)

Stage 5: `join`

| join kind=inner no_credguard_devices on $left.SourceNodeId == $right.NodeId

Stage 6: `summarize`

| summarize UserList = make_list(TargetNodeName) by DeviceName

Stage 7: `extend`

| extend UserCount = array_length(UserList)

Stage 8: `sort`

| sort by UserCount desc

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`hasGuardMisconfigurations`	gt	`0` transforms: `array_length`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`DeviceName`	`summarize`
`UserList`	`summarize`
`UserCount`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Hunt for critical credentials on non Credential Guard enabled devices

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `no_credguard_devices`

Let binding: `critical_users`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `macro`

Stage 3: `macro`

Stage 4: `distinct`

Stage 5: `join`

Stage 6: `summarize`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `sort`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Hunt for critical credentials on non Credential Guard enabled devices

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: no_credguard_devices

Let binding: critical_users

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: macro

Stage 3: macro

Stage 4: distinct

Stage 5: join

Stage 6: summarize

Stage 7: extend

Stage 8: sort

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `no_credguard_devices`

Let binding: `critical_users`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `macro`

Stage 3: `macro`

Stage 4: `distinct`

Stage 5: `join`

Stage 6: `summarize`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `sort`