Hunt for critical credentials on non-TPM enabled devices

Group by: DeviceName, NodeId, OnboardingStatus, SourceNodeId, TpmState
Author: Robbe Van den Daele
Source: github.com/HybridBrothers/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules

This query searches for devices that does not have a TPM (Trusted Platform Module) enabled but contains critical credentials. The output shows for how many users each non-TPM device has credentials, together with the rules why each user is considered a critical user.

Rule body yaml

let no_tpm_devices = (
    ExposureGraphNodes
    // Get device nodes with their inventory ID
    | mv-expand EntityIds
    | where EntityIds.type == "DeviceInventoryId"
    // Get interesting properties
    | extend OnboardingStatus = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["onboardingStatus"]),
        TpmSupported = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["tpmData"]["supported"]),
        TpmEnabled = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["tpmData"]["enabled"]),
        TpmActivated = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["tpmData"]["activated"]),
        DeviceName = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["deviceName"]),
        DeviceId = tostring(EntityIds.id)
    // Search for distinct devices
    | distinct NodeId, DeviceName, OnboardingStatus, TpmSupported, TpmEnabled, TpmActivated
    // Get device with no TPM enabled
    | where TpmSupported != "true" and TpmActivated != "true" and TpmEnabled != "true"
    | extend TpmSupported = iff(TpmSupported == "", "unknown", TpmSupported),
        TpmActivated = iff(TpmActivated == "", "unknown", TpmActivated),
        TpmEnabled = iff(TpmEnabled == "", "unknown", TpmEnabled)
);
let critical_users = toscalar(
    // Search for critical users
    ExposureGraphNodes
    | where NodeLabel == "user"
    | extend CriticalityLevel = todynamic(NodeProperties).rawData.criticalityLevel.criticalityLevel
    | extend RuleNames = todynamic(NodeProperties).rawData.criticalityLevel.ruleNames
    | where CriticalityLevel == 0
    | distinct NodeName, NodeId, tostring(CriticalityLevel), tostring(RuleNames)
    | summarize make_set(NodeName)
);
// Make graph for max of 3 edges, where we start from a device and end with an user
ExposureGraphEdges
| make-graph SourceNodeId --> TargetNodeId with ExposureGraphNodes on NodeId
| graph-match (SourceNode)-[anyEdge*1..3]->(TargetNode)
    where SourceNode.NodeLabel in ("device", "microsoft.compute/virtualmachines") and TargetNode.NodeLabel == "user" and TargetNode.NodeName in ( critical_users )
    project SourceNodeName = SourceNode.NodeName,
    SourceNodeId = SourceNode.NodeId,
    Edges = anyEdge.EdgeLabel,
    TargetNodeId = TargetNode.NodeId,
    TargetNodeName = TargetNode.NodeName,
    TargetNodeLabel = TargetNode.NodeLabel,
    TargetCriticalityLevel = TargetNode.NodeProperties.rawData.criticalityLevel.criticalityLevel,
    TargetRuleNames = TargetNode.NodeProperties.rawData.criticalityLevel.ruleNames
| distinct SourceNodeId, SourceNodeName, TargetNodeId, TargetNodeName, tostring(TargetCriticalityLevel), tostring(TargetRuleNames)
// Only return devices that does not have a TPM fully enabled
| join kind=inner no_tpm_devices on $left.SourceNodeId == $right.NodeId
// Make JSON of tpm data
| extend TpmState = tostring(bag_pack(
    'TpmSupported', TpmSupported,
    'TpmEnabled', TpmEnabled,
    'TpmActivated', TpmActivated
))
// Make JSON of users data
| extend Json = bag_pack(
    'User', TargetNodeName,
    'UserCriticalityLevel', TargetCriticalityLevel,
    'UserRuleNames', TargetRuleNames
)
// Make list of users per device
| summarize UserList = make_list(Json) by DeviceName, OnboardingStatus, TpmState
// Count amount of exposed users per device
| extend UserCount = array_length(UserList)
| sort by UserCount desc

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `no_tpm_devices`

let no_tpm_devices = (
    ExposureGraphNodes
    | mv-expand EntityIds
    | where EntityIds.type == "DeviceInventoryId"
    | extend OnboardingStatus = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["onboardingStatus"]),
        TpmSupported = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["tpmData"]["supported"]),
        TpmEnabled = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["tpmData"]["enabled"]),
        TpmActivated = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["tpmData"]["activated"]),
        DeviceName = tostring(parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["deviceName"]),
        DeviceId = tostring(EntityIds.id)
    | distinct NodeId, DeviceName, OnboardingStatus, TpmSupported, TpmEnabled, TpmActivated
    | where TpmSupported != "true" and TpmActivated != "true" and TpmEnabled != "true"
    | extend TpmSupported = iff(TpmSupported == "", "unknown", TpmSupported),
        TpmActivated = iff(TpmActivated == "", "unknown", TpmActivated),
        TpmEnabled = iff(TpmEnabled == "", "unknown", TpmEnabled)
);

Let binding: `critical_users`

let critical_users = toscalar(
    ExposureGraphNodes
    | where NodeLabel == "user"
    | extend CriticalityLevel = todynamic(NodeProperties).rawData.criticalityLevel.criticalityLevel
    | extend RuleNames = todynamic(NodeProperties).rawData.criticalityLevel.ruleNames
    | where CriticalityLevel == 0
    | distinct NodeName, NodeId, tostring(CriticalityLevel), tostring(RuleNames)
    | summarize make_set(NodeName)
);

Stage 1: `source`

ExposureGraphEdges

Stage 2: `macro`

| make-graph SourceNodeId --> TargetNodeId with ExposureGraphNodes on NodeId

Stage 3: `macro`

| graph-match (SourceNode)-[anyEdge*1..3]->(TargetNode)
    where SourceNode.NodeLabel in ("device", "microsoft.compute/virtualmachines") and TargetNode.NodeLabel == "user" and TargetNode.NodeName in ( critical_users )
    project SourceNodeName = SourceNode.NodeName,
    SourceNodeId = SourceNode.NodeId,
    Edges = anyEdge.EdgeLabel,
    TargetNodeId = TargetNode.NodeId,
    TargetNodeName = TargetNode.NodeName,
    TargetNodeLabel = TargetNode.NodeLabel,
    TargetCriticalityLevel = TargetNode.NodeProperties.rawData.criticalityLevel.criticalityLevel,
    TargetRuleNames = TargetNode.NodeProperties.rawData.criticalityLevel.ruleNames

Stage 4: `distinct`

| distinct SourceNodeId, SourceNodeName, TargetNodeId, TargetNodeName, tostring(TargetCriticalityLevel), tostring(TargetRuleNames)

Stage 5: `join`

| join kind=inner no_tpm_devices on $left.SourceNodeId == $right.NodeId

Stage 6: `extend`

| extend TpmState = tostring(bag_pack(
    'TpmSupported', TpmSupported,
    'TpmEnabled', TpmEnabled,
    'TpmActivated', TpmActivated
))

Stage 7: `extend`

| extend Json = bag_pack(
    'User', TargetNodeName,
    'UserCriticalityLevel', TargetCriticalityLevel,
    'UserRuleNames', TargetRuleNames
)

Stage 8: `summarize`

| summarize UserList = make_list(Json) by DeviceName, OnboardingStatus, TpmState

Stage 9: `extend`

| extend UserCount = array_length(UserList)

Stage 10: `sort`

| sort by UserCount desc

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`TpmActivated`	ne	`true` transforms: `cased`
`TpmEnabled`	ne	`true` transforms: `cased`
`TpmSupported`	ne	`true` transforms: `cased`
`type`	eq	`DeviceInventoryId` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`DeviceName`	`summarize`
`OnboardingStatus`	`summarize`
`TpmState`	`summarize`
`UserList`	`summarize`
`UserCount`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Hunt for critical credentials on non-TPM enabled devices

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `no_tpm_devices`

Let binding: `critical_users`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `macro`

Stage 3: `macro`

Stage 4: `distinct`

Stage 5: `join`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `summarize`

Stage 9: `extend`

Stage 10: `sort`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Hunt for critical credentials on non-TPM enabled devices

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: no_tpm_devices

Let binding: critical_users

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: macro

Stage 3: macro

Stage 4: distinct

Stage 5: join

Stage 6: extend

Stage 7: extend

Stage 8: summarize

Stage 9: extend

Stage 10: sort

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `no_tpm_devices`

Let binding: `critical_users`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `macro`

Stage 3: `macro`

Stage 4: `distinct`

Stage 5: `join`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `summarize`

Stage 9: `extend`

Stage 10: `sort`