Hunt for Defender for Identity not installed but eligible

Group by: MdiDeviceName, NodeName
Author: Robbe Van den Daele
Source: github.com/HybridBrothers/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules

This query shows you which servers are eligible for Defender for identity but does not have the Defender for Identity agent installed. The query seach the eligible servers via Defender for Endpoint (requirement for this query to work), and is based on the server roles that MDE recongnizes.

Rule body yaml

let device_roles = dynamic(["EntraConnectServer", "AzureADConnectServer", "ActiveDirectoryCertificateServicesServer", "DomainController", "ADFS"]);
let mdi_servers = (
    DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory
    | where SoftwareName == "azure_advanced_threat_protection_sensor"
    | distinct MdiDeviceName=tolower(DeviceName)
);
let mdi_eligible_servers = (
    ExposureGraphNodes
    | extend DeviceRoles= parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["deviceRole"]
    | extend CriticalityRuleNames = parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["criticalityLevel"]["ruleNames"]
    | where DeviceRoles has_any (device_roles) or
        CriticalityRuleNames has_any (device_roles)
    | distinct NodeName=tolower(NodeName), tostring(DeviceRoles), tostring(CriticalityRuleNames)
);
mdi_servers
| join kind=rightouter mdi_eligible_servers on $left.MdiDeviceName == $right.NodeName
| extend Issue = iff(isempty(MdiDeviceName), "This server is eligible for MDI but does not have MDI installed", "None")
| where Issue != "None"

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let device_roles = dynamic(["EntraConnectServer", "AzureADConnectServer", "ActiveDirectoryCertificateServicesServer", "DomainController", "ADFS"]);

Let binding: `mdi_eligible_servers`

let mdi_eligible_servers = (
    ExposureGraphNodes
    | extend DeviceRoles= parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["deviceRole"]
    | extend CriticalityRuleNames = parse_json(NodeProperties)["rawData"]["criticalityLevel"]["ruleNames"]
    | where DeviceRoles has_any (device_roles) or
        CriticalityRuleNames has_any (device_roles)
    | distinct NodeName=tolower(NodeName), tostring(DeviceRoles), tostring(CriticalityRuleNames)
);

Derived from device_roles.

The stages below define let mdi_servers (the rule's main pipeline source).

Stage 1: `source`

DeviceTvmSoftwareInventory

Stage 2: `where`

| where SoftwareName == "azure_advanced_threat_protection_sensor"

Stage 3: `distinct`

| distinct MdiDeviceName=tolower(DeviceName)

The stages below run on mdi_servers (the outer pipeline).

Stage 4: `join`

mdi_servers
| join kind=rightouter mdi_eligible_servers on $left.MdiDeviceName == $right.NodeName

Stage 5: `extend`

| extend Issue = iff(isempty(MdiDeviceName), "This server is eligible for MDI but does not have MDI installed", "None")

Issue =

ifisempty(MdiDeviceName)"This server is eligible for MDI but does not have MDI installed"

else"None"

Stage 6: `where`

| where Issue != "None"

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CriticalityRuleNames`	match	`ADFS` `ActiveDirectoryCertificateServicesServer` `AzureADConnectServer` `DomainController` `EntraConnectServer`
`DeviceRoles`	match	`ADFS` `ActiveDirectoryCertificateServicesServer` `AzureADConnectServer` `DomainController` `EntraConnectServer`
`Issue`	ne	`None` transforms: `cased`
`SoftwareName`	eq	`azure_advanced_threat_protection_sensor` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`Issue`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Hunt for Defender for Identity not installed but eligible

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: `mdi_eligible_servers`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `distinct`

Stage 4: `join`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `where`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Hunt for Defender for Identity not installed but eligible

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: mdi_eligible_servers

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: distinct

Stage 4: join

Stage 5: extend

Stage 6: where

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `mdi_eligible_servers`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `distinct`

Stage 4: `join`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `where`