Hunt for privilege escalation paths with high ACLs

Group by: OutgoingNodeId, SourceNodeId, SourceNodeLabel, SourceNodeName, TargetNodeLabel
Author: Robbe Van den Daele
Source: github.com/HybridBrothers/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules

When an adversary establishes data collection of an Active Directory domain, they regularly search for interesting accounts with privilege escalation paths using the genericWrite and genericAll ACL permissions on objects. When using BloodHound, it is very easy to get a visual overview of these paths in an Active Directory domain. This query tries to establish the same using Defender XDR Exposure Management.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Initial Access	`T1078` Valid Accounts
Persistence	`T1078` Valid Accounts
Privilege Escalation	`T1078` Valid Accounts
Stealth	`T1078` Valid Accounts

References

Rule body yaml

let high_permissions = dynamic(["genericWrite", "genericAll"]);
let edge_labels = dynamic(["member of", "has permissions to", "can authenticate to", "can authenticate as", "has credentials of", "can impersonate as"]);
// Get users and groups with high ACL permissions on other objects
let HighPermissionLinks = (ExposureGraphEdges
    // Get edges related to roles
    | where EdgeLabel == "has role on"
    // Get edges containing high permission ACLs
    | extend Permissions = todynamic(EdgeProperties).rawData.acl.controlTypes
    | where Permissions has_any (high_permissions)
    // Exclude Domain and Enterprise Administrators as source node
    | where not(SourceNodeLabel == "group" and SourceNodeName in ("Domain Admins", "Enterprise Admins"))
    // Exclude Built-in administrator account
    | where not(SourceNodeLabel == "user" and SourceNodeName == "Administrator")
    | summarize TargetNodes = make_set(TargetNodeName), TargetNodeCount = count() by SourceNodeName, SourceNodeLabel, tostring(Permissions), TargetNodeLabel, SourceNodeId
);
let HighPermissionNodes = toscalar(
    HighPermissionLinks
    | summarize SourceNodes = make_set(SourceNodeName)
);
// Get edges for links to the high ACL permissions
ExposureGraphEdges
| where TargetNodeName in (HighPermissionNodes)
| make-graph SourceNodeId --> TargetNodeId with ExposureGraphNodes on NodeId
// Get between one and three relations
| graph-match (SourceNode)-[anyEdge*1..3]->(TargetNode)
    project IncomingNodeName = SourceNode.NodeName, 
    IncomingNodeLabel = SourceNode.NodeLabel,
    Edges = anyEdge.EdgeLabel, 
    OutgoingNodeName = TargetNode.NodeName,
    OutgoingNodeId = TargetNode.NodeId
// Filter for interesting edges
| where Edges has_any (edge_labels)
// Join the high permission ACLs
| join kind=inner HighPermissionLinks on $left.OutgoingNodeId == $right.SourceNodeId
// Exclude Domain and Enterprise Administrators as source node
| where not(IncomingNodeLabel == "group" and IncomingNodeName in ("Domain Admins", "Enterprise Admins"))
// Exclude Built-in administrator account
| where not(IncomingNodeLabel == "user" and IncomingNodeName == "Administrator")
| distinct IncomingNodeName, IncomingNodeLabel, tostring(Edges), OutgoingNodeName, OutgoingNodeLabel = SourceNodeLabel, tostring(Permissions), TargetNodeLabel, tostring(TargetNodes), TargetNodeCount

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let high_permissions = dynamic(["genericWrite", "genericAll"]);
let edge_labels = dynamic(["member of", "has permissions to", "can authenticate to", "can authenticate as", "has credentials of", "can impersonate as"]);

Let binding: `HighPermissionLinks`

let HighPermissionLinks = (ExposureGraphEdges
    | where EdgeLabel == "has role on"
    | extend Permissions = todynamic(EdgeProperties).rawData.acl.controlTypes
    | where Permissions has_any (high_permissions)
    | where not(SourceNodeLabel == "group" and SourceNodeName in ("Domain Admins", "Enterprise Admins"))
    | where not(SourceNodeLabel == "user" and SourceNodeName == "Administrator")
    | summarize TargetNodes = make_set(TargetNodeName), TargetNodeCount = count() by SourceNodeName, SourceNodeLabel, tostring(Permissions), TargetNodeLabel, SourceNodeId
);

Derived from high_permissions.

Let binding: `HighPermissionNodes`

let HighPermissionNodes = toscalar(
    HighPermissionLinks
    | summarize SourceNodes = make_set(SourceNodeName)
);

Derived from HighPermissionLinks.

Stage 1: `source`

ExposureGraphEdges

Stage 2: `where`

| where TargetNodeName in (HighPermissionNodes)

References HighPermissionNodes (defined above).

Stage 3: `macro`

| make-graph SourceNodeId --> TargetNodeId with ExposureGraphNodes on NodeId

Stage 4: `macro`

| graph-match (SourceNode)-[anyEdge*1..3]->(TargetNode)
    project IncomingNodeName = SourceNode.NodeName, 
    IncomingNodeLabel = SourceNode.NodeLabel,
    Edges = anyEdge.EdgeLabel, 
    OutgoingNodeName = TargetNode.NodeName,
    OutgoingNodeId = TargetNode.NodeId

Stage 5: `where`

| where Edges has_any (edge_labels)

Stage 6: `join`

| join kind=inner HighPermissionLinks on $left.OutgoingNodeId == $right.SourceNodeId

Stage 7: `where`

| where not(IncomingNodeLabel == "group" and IncomingNodeName in ("Domain Admins", "Enterprise Admins"))

Stage 8: `where`

| where not(IncomingNodeLabel == "user" and IncomingNodeName == "Administrator")

Stage 9: `distinct`

| distinct IncomingNodeName, IncomingNodeLabel, tostring(Edges), OutgoingNodeName, OutgoingNodeLabel = SourceNodeLabel, tostring(Permissions), TargetNodeLabel, tostring(TargetNodes), TargetNodeCount

Stage 10: `summarize`

summarize by SourceNodeName, SourceNodeLabel, TargetNodeLabel, SourceNodeId

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`SourceNodeLabel`	eq	`group`
`SourceNodeName`	in	`Domain Admins`, `Enterprise Admins`
`SourceNodeLabel`	eq	`user`
`SourceNodeName`	eq	`Administrator`
`IncomingNodeLabel`	eq	`group`
`IncomingNodeName`	in	`Domain Admins`, `Enterprise Admins`
`IncomingNodeLabel`	eq	`user`
`IncomingNodeName`	eq	`Administrator`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`EdgeLabel`	eq	`has role on` transforms: `cased`
`Edges`	match	`can authenticate as` `can authenticate to` `can impersonate as` `has credentials of` `has permissions to` `member of`
`Permissions`	match	`genericAll` `genericWrite`
`TargetNodeName`	in	`HighPermissionNodes` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`SourceNodeId`	`summarize`
`SourceNodeLabel`	`summarize`
`SourceNodeName`	`summarize`
`TargetNodeLabel`	`summarize`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Hunt for privilege escalation paths with high ACLs

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: `HighPermissionLinks`

Let binding: `HighPermissionNodes`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `macro`

Stage 4: `macro`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `join`

Stage 7: `where`

Stage 8: `where`

Stage 9: `distinct`

Stage 10: `summarize`

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Hunt for privilege escalation paths with high ACLs

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

References

Rule body yaml

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: HighPermissionLinks

Let binding: HighPermissionNodes

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: macro

Stage 4: macro

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: join

Stage 7: where

Stage 8: where

Stage 9: distinct

Stage 10: summarize

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `HighPermissionLinks`

Let binding: `HighPermissionNodes`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `macro`

Stage 4: `macro`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `join`

Stage 7: `where`

Stage 8: `where`

Stage 9: `distinct`

Stage 10: `summarize`