Imminent Ransomware

Status: available
Severity: high
Time window: 6h
Group by: BatExclusion, BootTampering, DefenderTamp, DisableControlledFolderAccess, Dvc, DvcId, ExeExclusion, NetshFirewallTampering, ScDeleteDefend, SchTasks, StartUpExclusionPath, TimeGenerated
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

This query checks for a series of commands that are commonly used by attackers to disable security tools and system recovery tools before deploying Macaw ransomware in an organization.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1547` Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Stealth	`T1562` Impair Defenses

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation
Sysmon	Event ID 5	Process terminated
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4689	A process has exited.

Rule body kusto

id: bb46dd86-e642-48a4-975c-44f5ac2b5033
name: Imminent Ransomware
description: |
  This query checks for a series of commands that are commonly used by attackers to disable security tools and system recovery tools before deploying Macaw ransomware in an organization.
severity: High
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors: []
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - DefenseEvasion
  - Persistence
relevantTechniques:
  - T1562
  - T1547
tags:
  - Schema: _ASim_ProcessEvent
    SchemaVersion: 0.1.4
  - Ransomware Campaign
  - Macaw Ransomware
query: |
  _ASim_ProcessEvent 
  // Pivot on specific commands 
  | where CommandLine has_any("-ExclusionPath", "Set-MpPreference", "advfirewall", "-ExclusionExtension", 
  "-EnableControlledFolderAccess", "windefend", "onstart", "bcdedit", "Startup") 
  // Making list of found commands 
  | summarize CommandLine = make_set(CommandLine, 10000) by DvcId, Dvc, bin(TimeGenerated, 6h) 
  // Extending columns for later aggregration, based on TTP
  | extend StartUpExclusionPath = iff(CommandLine has_all("-ExclusionPath", "Startup"), 1, 0) 
  | extend DefenderTamp = iff(CommandLine has "Set-MpPreference" 
  and CommandLine has_any( 
  "-SevereThreatDefaultAction 6" 
  "-HighThreatDefaultAction 6", 
  "-ModerateThreatDefaultAction 6", 
  "-LowThreatDefaultAction 6" 
  "-ScanScheduleDay 8"), 1, 0) 
  | extend NetshFirewallTampering = iff(CommandLine has_all( "netsh", "advfirewall", "allprofiles state off"), 1, 0) 
  | extend BatExclusion = iff(CommandLine has_all("-ExclusionExtension", ".bat"), 1, 0) 
  | extend ExeExclusion = iff(CommandLine has_all("-ExclusionExtension", ".exe"), 1, 0) 
  | extend DisableControlledFolderAccess = iff(CommandLine has_all("-EnableControlledFolderAccess", "Disabled"), 1, 0) 
  | extend ScDeleteDefend = iff(CommandLine has_all("sc", "delete", "windefend"), 1, 0) 
  | extend BootTampering = iff(CommandLine has_all("bcdedit", "default") and CommandLine has_any ("recoveryenabled No", "bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures"), 1, 0) 
  | extend SchTasks = iff(CommandLine has_all("/sc", "onstart", "system", "/create", "/delay"), 1, 0) 
  // Summarizing found commands 
  | summarize by NetshFirewallTampering ,BatExclusion, ExeExclusion, DisableControlledFolderAccess, ScDeleteDefend, SchTasks, BootTampering, DefenderTamp, StartUpExclusionPath, DvcId, Dvc, TimeGenerated 
  // Adding up each piece of evidence 
  | extend EvidenceCount = NetshFirewallTampering + BatExclusion + ExeExclusion + DisableControlledFolderAccess + ScDeleteDefend + SchTasks + BootTampering + DefenderTamp + StartUpExclusionPath 
  | where EvidenceCount > 4
  | extend HostName = iff(Dvc has '.', substring(Dvc, 0, indexof(Dvc, '.')), Dvc)
  | extend DnsDomain = iff(Dvc has '.', substring(Dvc, indexof(Dvc, '.') + 1), "")
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Dvc
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: DnsDomain
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

_ASim_ProcessEvent

Stage 2: `where`

| where CommandLine has_any("-ExclusionPath", "Set-MpPreference", "advfirewall", "-ExclusionExtension", 
"-EnableControlledFolderAccess", "windefend", "onstart", "bcdedit", "Startup")

Stage 3: `summarize`

| summarize CommandLine = make_set(CommandLine, 10000) by DvcId, Dvc, bin(TimeGenerated, 6h)

Stage 4: `extend` (9 consecutive steps)

| extend StartUpExclusionPath = iff(CommandLine has_all("-ExclusionPath", "Startup"), 1, 0)
| extend DefenderTamp = iff(CommandLine has "Set-MpPreference" 
and CommandLine has_any( 
"-SevereThreatDefaultAction 6" 
"-HighThreatDefaultAction 6", 
"-ModerateThreatDefaultAction 6", 
"-LowThreatDefaultAction 6" 
"-ScanScheduleDay 8"), 1, 0)
| extend NetshFirewallTampering = iff(CommandLine has_all( "netsh", "advfirewall", "allprofiles state off"), 1, 0)
| extend BatExclusion = iff(CommandLine has_all("-ExclusionExtension", ".bat"), 1, 0)
| extend ExeExclusion = iff(CommandLine has_all("-ExclusionExtension", ".exe"), 1, 0)
| extend DisableControlledFolderAccess = iff(CommandLine has_all("-EnableControlledFolderAccess", "Disabled"), 1, 0)
| extend ScDeleteDefend = iff(CommandLine has_all("sc", "delete", "windefend"), 1, 0)
| extend BootTampering = iff(CommandLine has_all("bcdedit", "default") and CommandLine has_any ("recoveryenabled No", "bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures"), 1, 0)
| extend SchTasks = iff(CommandLine has_all("/sc", "onstart", "system", "/create", "/delay"), 1, 0)

StartUpExclusionPath =

ifCommandLine contains "-ExclusionPath" and CommandLine contains "Startup"1

else0

Stage 5: `summarize`

| summarize by NetshFirewallTampering ,BatExclusion, ExeExclusion, DisableControlledFolderAccess, ScDeleteDefend, SchTasks, BootTampering, DefenderTamp, StartUpExclusionPath, DvcId, Dvc, TimeGenerated

Stage 6: `extend`

| extend EvidenceCount = NetshFirewallTampering + BatExclusion + ExeExclusion + DisableControlledFolderAccess + ScDeleteDefend + SchTasks + BootTampering + DefenderTamp + StartUpExclusionPath

Stage 7: `where`

| where EvidenceCount > 4

Stage 8: `extend`

| extend HostName = iff(Dvc has '.', substring(Dvc, 0, indexof(Dvc, '.')), Dvc)

HostName =

ifDvc has "."substring(Dvc, 0, indexof(Dvc, '.'))

elseDvc

Stage 9: `extend`

| extend DnsDomain = iff(Dvc has '.', substring(Dvc, indexof(Dvc, '.') + 1), "")

DnsDomain =

ifDvc has "."substring(Dvc, (indexof(Dvc, '.') + 1))

else""

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CommandLine`	match	`-EnableControlledFolderAccess` `-ExclusionExtension` `-ExclusionPath` corpus 2 (kusto 2) `Set-MpPreference` corpus 5 (sigma 3, splunk 1, kusto 1) `Startup` corpus 3 (sigma 2, kusto 1) `advfirewall` corpus 7 (sigma 6, kusto 1) `bcdedit` `onstart` corpus 2 (sigma 1, kusto 1) `windefend` corpus 4 (sigma 3, kusto 1)
`EvidenceCount`	gt	`4` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`BatExclusion`	`summarize`
`BootTampering`	`summarize`
`DefenderTamp`	`summarize`
`DisableControlledFolderAccess`	`summarize`
`Dvc`	`summarize`
`DvcId`	`summarize`
`ExeExclusion`	`summarize`
`NetshFirewallTampering`	`summarize`
`ScDeleteDefend`	`summarize`
`SchTasks`	`summarize`
`StartUpExclusionPath`	`summarize`
`TimeGenerated`	`summarize`
`EvidenceCount`	`extend`
`HostName`	`extend`
`DnsDomain`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Imminent Ransomware

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `summarize`

Stage 4: `extend` (9 consecutive steps)

Stage 5: `summarize`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `where`

Stage 8: `extend`

Stage 9: `extend`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Imminent Ransomware

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: summarize

Stage 4: extend (9 consecutive steps)

Stage 5: summarize

Stage 6: extend

Stage 7: where

Stage 8: extend

Stage 9: extend

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `summarize`

Stage 4: `extend` (9 consecutive steps)

Stage 5: `summarize`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `where`

Stage 8: `extend`

Stage 9: `extend`