Insider Risk_Sensitive Data Access Outside Organizational Geo-location

Severity: high
Time window: 6h
Group by: Activity_s, City, Country_Region, LabelName_s, State, TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'This alert joins Azure Information Protection Logs (InformationProtectionLogs_CL) with Microsoft Entra ID Sign in Logs (SigninLogs) to provide a correlation of sensitive data access by geo-location. Results include User Principal Name, Label Name, Activity, City, State, Country/Region, and Time Generated. Recommended configuration is to include (or exclude) Sign in geo-locations (City, State, Country and/or Region) for trusted organizational locations. There is an option for configuration of correlations against Microsoft Sentinel watchlists. Accessing sensitive data from a new or unauthorized geo-location warrants further review. For more information see Sign-in logs in Microsoft Entra ID: Location Filtering'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Exfiltration	`T1567` Exfiltration Over Web Service

Rule body kusto

id: b81ed294-28cf-48c3-bac8-ac60dcef293b
name: Insider Risk_Sensitive Data Access Outside Organizational Geo-location
description: |
  'This alert joins Azure Information Protection Logs (InformationProtectionLogs_CL) with Microsoft Entra ID Sign in Logs (SigninLogs) to provide a correlation of sensitive data access by geo-location. Results include User Principal Name, Label Name, Activity, City, State, Country/Region, and Time Generated. Recommended configuration is to include (or exclude) Sign in geo-locations (City, State, Country and/or Region) for trusted organizational locations. There is an option for configuration of correlations against Microsoft Sentinel watchlists. Accessing sensitive data from a new or unauthorized geo-location warrants further review. For more information see [Sign-in logs in Microsoft Entra ID: Location Filtering](https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/concept-sign-ins)'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureInformationProtection
    dataTypes:
      - InformationProtectionLogs_CL 
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
      - SigninLogs 
queryFrequency: 6h
queryPeriod: 6h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Exfiltration
relevantTechniques:
  - T1567
query: |
  InformationProtectionLogs_CL
  | extend UserPrincipalName = UserId_s
  | where LabelName_s <> ""
  | join kind=inner (SigninLogs) on UserPrincipalName
  | extend City = tostring(LocationDetails.city)
  // | where City <> "New York" // Configure Location Details within Organizational Requirements
  | extend State = tostring(LocationDetails.state)
  // | where State <> "Texas" // Configure Location Details within Organizational Requirements
  | extend Country_Region = tostring(LocationDetails.countryOrRegion)
  // | where Country_Region <> "US" // Configure Location Details within Organizational Requirements
  // | lookup kind=inner _GetWatchlist('<Your Watchlist Name>') on $left.UserPrincipalName == $right.SearchKey
  | summarize count() by UserPrincipalName, LabelName_s, Activity_s, City, State, Country_Region, TimeGenerated
  | sort by count_ desc
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: SingleAlert
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: UserPrincipalName
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
incidentConfiguration:
  createIncident: true
  groupingConfiguration:
    enabled: true
    reopenClosedIncident: true
    lookbackDuration: 3d
    matchingMethod: Selected
    groupByEntities:
      - Account
version: 1.1.3
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

InformationProtectionLogs_CL

Stage 2: `extend`

| extend UserPrincipalName = UserId_s

Stage 3: `where`

| where LabelName_s <> ""

Stage 4: `join`

| join kind=inner (SigninLogs) on UserPrincipalName

Stage 5: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

| extend City = tostring(LocationDetails.city)
| extend State = tostring(LocationDetails.state)
| extend Country_Region = tostring(LocationDetails.countryOrRegion)

Stage 6: `summarize`

| summarize count() by UserPrincipalName, LabelName_s, Activity_s, City, State, Country_Region, TimeGenerated

Stage 7: `sort`

| sort by count_ desc

Stage 8: `extend`

| extend AccountName = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[1])

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`Activity_s`	`summarize`
`City`	`summarize`
`Country_Region`	`summarize`
`LabelName_s`	`summarize`
`State`	`summarize`
`TimeGenerated`	`summarize`
`UserPrincipalName`	`summarize`
`AccountName`	`extend`
`AccountUPNSuffix`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Insider Risk_Sensitive Data Access Outside Organizational Geo-location

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `extend`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `join`

Stage 5: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 6: `summarize`

Stage 7: `sort`

Stage 8: `extend`

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Insider Risk_Sensitive Data Access Outside Organizational Geo-location

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: extend

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: join

Stage 5: extend (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 6: summarize

Stage 7: sort

Stage 8: extend

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `extend`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `join`

Stage 5: `extend` (3 consecutive steps)

Stage 6: `summarize`

Stage 7: `sort`

Stage 8: `extend`