Lookout - Critical Audit and Policy Changes (v2)

Status: available
Severity: medium
Time window: 1h
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'Monitors critical audit events and policy changes from Lookout Mobile Risk API v2. Detects unauthorized configuration changes, policy modifications, security setting adjustments, and administrative actions that could impact mobile security posture. Provides comprehensive audit trail for compliance and security governance.'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Privilege Escalation	`T1626` Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Defense Evasion	`T1629` Impair Defenses

Rule body kusto

id: 6b2d4e8a-5f7c-4b9e-8a1d-3c5e7a9b2f4d
name: Lookout - Critical Audit and Policy Changes (v2)
description: |
  'Monitors critical audit events and policy changes from Lookout Mobile Risk API v2. Detects unauthorized configuration changes, policy modifications, security setting adjustments, and administrative actions that could impact mobile security posture. Provides comprehensive audit trail for compliance and security governance.'
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: LookoutAPI
    dataTypes:
      - LookoutEvents
queryFrequency: 15m
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - DefenseEvasion
  - Persistence
  - PrivilegeEscalation
  - Impact
relevantTechniques:
  - T1629
  - T1626
query: |
  LookoutEvents
  | where EventType == "AUDIT"
  | where AuditType in ("POLICY_CHANGE", "SECURITY_SETTING_CHANGE", "USER_MANAGEMENT", "CONFIGURATION_CHANGE")
  | extend 
      ChangeImpact = case(
          AuditType == "POLICY_CHANGE", "High",
          AuditType == "SECURITY_SETTING_CHANGE", "High",
          AuditType == "USER_MANAGEMENT", "Medium",
          AuditType == "CONFIGURATION_CHANGE", "Medium",
          "Low"
      ),
      RiskLevel = case(
          ActorType == "SYSTEM" and AuditType in ("POLICY_CHANGE", "SECURITY_SETTING_CHANGE"), "Automated Change",
          ActorType == "ADMIN_USER" and AuditType == "POLICY_CHANGE", "Administrative Change",
          ActorType == "USER" and AuditType in ("POLICY_CHANGE", "SECURITY_SETTING_CHANGE"), "Unauthorized Change",
          ActorType == "UNKNOWN", "Suspicious Change",
          "Standard Change"
      )
  | extend SecurityImplications = case(
      AuditAttributeChanges has "threat_response_level" and AuditAttributeChanges has "LOW", "Threat Response Weakened",
      AuditAttributeChanges has "auto_quarantine_enabled" and AuditAttributeChanges has "false", "Auto-Quarantine Disabled",
      AuditAttributeChanges has "compliance_enforcement" and AuditAttributeChanges has "false", "Compliance Enforcement Disabled",
      AuditAttributeChanges has "device_wipe_enabled" and AuditAttributeChanges has "false", "Device Wipe Disabled",
      AuditAttributeChanges has "admin" or AuditAttributeChanges has "privilege", "Privilege Changes",
      "Configuration Update"
  )
  | extend ComplianceRisk = case(
      SecurityImplications in ("Threat Response Weakened", "Auto-Quarantine Disabled", "Compliance Enforcement Disabled"), "Critical",
      SecurityImplications == "Device Wipe Disabled", "High",
      SecurityImplications == "Privilege Changes", "High",
      RiskLevel == "Unauthorized Change", "High",
      RiskLevel == "Suspicious Change", "Medium",
      "Low"
  )
  | extend ChangeDetails = case(
      isnotempty(AuditAttributeChanges), strcat("Attribute changes: ", tostring(AuditAttributeChanges)),
      isnotempty(TargetGuid), strcat("Target: ", TargetType, " (", TargetGuid, ")"),
      "General audit event"
  )
  | project
      TimeGenerated,
      EventId,
      AuditType,
      ChangeImpact,
      RiskLevel,
      SecurityImplications,
      ComplianceRisk,
      ChangeDetails,
      AuditAttributeChanges,
      ActorType,
      ActorGuid,
      TargetType,
      TargetGuid,
      TargetEmailAddress,
      ChangeType,
      EnterpriseGuid
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: ActorGuid
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: TargetEmailAddress
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: TargetGuid
customDetails:
  AuditType: AuditType
  ChangeImpact: ChangeImpact
  RiskLevel: RiskLevel
  SecurityImpact: SecurityImplications
  ComplianceRisk: ComplianceRisk
  ActorType: ActorType
  TargetType: TargetType
  ChangeType: ChangeType
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: "Critical Audit Event: {{SecurityImplications}} by {{ActorType}}"
  alertDescriptionFormat: "{{AuditType}} by {{ActorType}} with {{ComplianceRisk}} risk"
  alertTacticsColumnName: SecurityImplications
  alertSeverityColumnName: ComplianceRisk
incidentConfiguration:
  createIncident: true
  groupingConfiguration:
    enabled: true
    reopenClosedIncident: false
    lookbackDuration: P1D
    matchingMethod: Selected
    groupByEntities:
      - Account
    groupByAlertDetails:
      - AuditType
      - ActorGuid
    groupByCustomDetails:
      - SecurityImpact
      - ComplianceRisk
      - ActorType
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
suppressionEnabled: false
suppressionDuration: PT30M
version: 2.0.3
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

LookoutEvents

Stage 2: `where`

| where EventType == "AUDIT"

Stage 3: `where`

| where AuditType in ("POLICY_CHANGE", "SECURITY_SETTING_CHANGE", "USER_MANAGEMENT", "CONFIGURATION_CHANGE")

Stage 4: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

| extend 
    ChangeImpact = case(
        AuditType == "POLICY_CHANGE", "High",
        AuditType == "SECURITY_SETTING_CHANGE", "High",
        AuditType == "USER_MANAGEMENT", "Medium",
        AuditType == "CONFIGURATION_CHANGE", "Medium",
        "Low"
    ),
    RiskLevel = case(
        ActorType == "SYSTEM" and AuditType in ("POLICY_CHANGE", "SECURITY_SETTING_CHANGE"), "Automated Change",
        ActorType == "ADMIN_USER" and AuditType == "POLICY_CHANGE", "Administrative Change",
        ActorType == "USER" and AuditType in ("POLICY_CHANGE", "SECURITY_SETTING_CHANGE"), "Unauthorized Change",
        ActorType == "UNKNOWN", "Suspicious Change",
        "Standard Change"
    )
| extend SecurityImplications = case(
    AuditAttributeChanges has "threat_response_level" and AuditAttributeChanges has "LOW", "Threat Response Weakened",
    AuditAttributeChanges has "auto_quarantine_enabled" and AuditAttributeChanges has "false", "Auto-Quarantine Disabled",
    AuditAttributeChanges has "compliance_enforcement" and AuditAttributeChanges has "false", "Compliance Enforcement Disabled",
    AuditAttributeChanges has "device_wipe_enabled" and AuditAttributeChanges has "false", "Device Wipe Disabled",
    AuditAttributeChanges has "admin" or AuditAttributeChanges has "privilege", "Privilege Changes",
    "Configuration Update"
)
| extend ComplianceRisk = case(
    SecurityImplications in ("Threat Response Weakened", "Auto-Quarantine Disabled", "Compliance Enforcement Disabled"), "Critical",
    SecurityImplications == "Device Wipe Disabled", "High",
    SecurityImplications == "Privilege Changes", "High",
    RiskLevel == "Unauthorized Change", "High",
    RiskLevel == "Suspicious Change", "Medium",
    "Low"
)
| extend ChangeDetails = case(
    isnotempty(AuditAttributeChanges), strcat("Attribute changes: ", tostring(AuditAttributeChanges)),
    isnotempty(TargetGuid), strcat("Target: ", TargetType, " (", TargetGuid, ")"),
    "General audit event"
)

ChangeImpact =

ifAuditType == "POLICY_CHANGE""High"

elifAuditType == "SECURITY_SETTING_CHANGE""High"

elifAuditType == "USER_MANAGEMENT""Medium"

elifAuditType == "CONFIGURATION_CHANGE""Medium"

else"Low"

RiskLevel =

ifActorType == "SYSTEM" and AuditType in ("POLICY_CHANGE", "SECURITY_SETTING_CHANGE")"Automated Change"

elifActorType == "ADMIN_USER" and AuditType == "POLICY_CHANGE""Administrative Change"

elifActorType == "USER" and AuditType in ("POLICY_CHANGE", "SECURITY_SETTING_CHANGE")"Unauthorized Change"

elifActorType == "UNKNOWN""Suspicious Change"

else"Standard Change"

Stage 5: `project`

| project
    TimeGenerated,
    EventId,
    AuditType,
    ChangeImpact,
    RiskLevel,
    SecurityImplications,
    ComplianceRisk,
    ChangeDetails,
    AuditAttributeChanges,
    ActorType,
    ActorGuid,
    TargetType,
    TargetGuid,
    TargetEmailAddress,
    ChangeType,
    EnterpriseGuid

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`AuditType`	in	`CONFIGURATION_CHANGE` transforms: `cased` `POLICY_CHANGE` transforms: `cased` `SECURITY_SETTING_CHANGE` transforms: `cased` `USER_MANAGEMENT` transforms: `cased`
`EventType`	eq	`AUDIT` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`ActorGuid`	`project`
`ActorType`	`project`
`AuditAttributeChanges`	`project`
`AuditType`	`project`
`ChangeDetails`	`project`
`ChangeImpact`	`project`
`ChangeType`	`project`
`ComplianceRisk`	`project`
`EnterpriseGuid`	`project`
`EventId`	`project`
`RiskLevel`	`project`
`SecurityImplications`	`project`
`TargetEmailAddress`	`project`
`TargetGuid`	`project`
`TargetType`	`project`
`TimeGenerated`	`project`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Lookout - Critical Audit and Policy Changes (v2)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 5: `project`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Lookout - Critical Audit and Policy Changes (v2)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: extend (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 5: project

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 5: `project`