Detection rules › Kusto
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) signatures for Azure Synapse pipelines and Azure Data Factory
This query looks for Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detections related to the remote command execution attempts on Azure IR with Managed VNet or SHIR. In Microsoft Sentinel, the SecurityAlerts table includes the name of the impacted device. Additionally, this query joins the DeviceInfo table to connect other information such as device group, IP address, signed in users, and others allowing analysts using Microsoft Sentinel to have more context related to the alert. Reference: https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-29972 , https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/09/vulnerability-mitigated-in-the-third-party-data-connector-used-in-azure-synapse-pipelines-and-azure-data-factory-cve-2022-29972
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access |
Telemetry coverage
| Platform | Record / event type |
|---|---|
| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | DeviceInfo action any: Device information |
Rule body
id: a333d8bf-22a3-4c55-a1e9-5f0a135c0253
name: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) signatures for Azure Synapse pipelines and Azure Data Factory
description: |
'This query looks for Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detections related to the remote command execution attempts on Azure IR with Managed VNet or SHIR.
In Microsoft Sentinel, the SecurityAlerts table includes the name of the impacted device. Additionally, this query joins the DeviceInfo table to connect other information such as device group, IP address, signed in users, and others allowing analysts using Microsoft Sentinel to have more context related to the alert.
Reference: https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-29972 ,
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/05/09/vulnerability-mitigated-in-the-third-party-data-connector-used-in-azure-synapse-pipelines-and-azure-data-factory-cve-2022-29972'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
dataTypes:
- SecurityAlert
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- InitialAccess
relevantTechniques:
- T1190
tags:
- CVE-2022-29972
query: |
let mde_threats = dynamic(["Behavior:Win32/SuspAzureRequest.A", "Behavior:Win32/SuspAzureRequest.B", "Behavior:Win32/SuspAzureRequest.C", "Behavior:Win32/LaunchingSuspCMD.B"]);
DeviceInfo
| extend DeviceName = tolower(DeviceName)
| join kind=inner ( SecurityAlert
| where ProviderName == "MDATP"
| extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)
| extend ThreatFamilyName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatFamilyName)
| where ThreatName in~ (mde_threats) or ThreatFamilyName in~ (mde_threats)
| extend CompromisedEntity = tolower(CompromisedEntity)
) on $left.DeviceName == $right.CompromisedEntity
| summarize by bin(TimeGenerated, 1d), DisplayName, ThreatName, ThreatFamilyName, PublicIP, AlertSeverity, Description, tostring(LoggedOnUsers), DeviceId, TenantId, CompromisedEntity, tostring(LoggedOnUsers), ProductName, Entities
| extend HostName = tostring(split(CompromisedEntity, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(CompromisedEntity, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(CompromisedEntity, DomainIndex + 1), CompromisedEntity)
| project-away DomainIndex
entityMappings:
- entityType: Host
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: CompromisedEntity
- identifier: HostName
columnName: HostName
- identifier: DnsDomain
columnName: HostNameDomain
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: PublicIP
version: 1.0.6
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
source:
kind: Community
author:
name: Microsoft Security Research
support:
tier: Community
categories:
domains: [ "Security - Threat Protection" ]
Stages and Predicates
Let binding: mde_threats
let mde_threats = dynamic(["Behavior:Win32/SuspAzureRequest.A", "Behavior:Win32/SuspAzureRequest.B", "Behavior:Win32/SuspAzureRequest.C", "Behavior:Win32/LaunchingSuspCMD.B"]);
Stage 1: source
DeviceInfo
Stage 2: extend
| extend DeviceName = tolower(DeviceName)
Stage 3: join
| join kind=inner ( SecurityAlert
| where ProviderName == "MDATP"
| extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)
| extend ThreatFamilyName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatFamilyName)
| where ThreatName in~ (mde_threats) or ThreatFamilyName in~ (mde_threats)
| extend CompromisedEntity = tolower(CompromisedEntity)
) on $left.DeviceName == $right.CompromisedEntity
Stage 4: summarize
| summarize by bin(TimeGenerated, 1d), DisplayName, ThreatName, ThreatFamilyName, PublicIP, AlertSeverity, Description, tostring(LoggedOnUsers), DeviceId, TenantId, CompromisedEntity, tostring(LoggedOnUsers), ProductName, Entities
Stage 5: extend
| extend HostName = tostring(split(CompromisedEntity, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(CompromisedEntity, '.'))
Stage 6: extend
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(CompromisedEntity, DomainIndex + 1), CompromisedEntity)
HostNameDomain =DomainIndex != -1substring(CompromisedEntity, (DomainIndex + 1))CompromisedEntityStage 7: project-away
| project-away DomainIndex
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
ProviderName | eq |
| field:"ProviderName" kind:eq value:"MDATP" |
ThreatFamilyName | in |
| field:"ThreatFamilyName" kind:in |
ThreatName | in |
| field:"ThreatName" kind:in |
Output fields
These fields are emitted when the rule matches.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
AlertSeverity | summarize |
CompromisedEntity | summarize |
Description | summarize |
DeviceId | summarize |
DisplayName | summarize |
Entities | summarize |
ProductName | summarize |
PublicIP | summarize |
TenantId | summarize |
ThreatFamilyName | summarize |
ThreatName | summarize |
HostName | extend |
HostNameDomain | extend |