Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled for a User

Status: available
Severity: medium
Time window: 1h
Group by: AADTenantId, Category, CorrelationId, IPAddress, InitiatedByUser, Operation, Source, TenantorInstance_Detail, Type, User
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) helps prevent credential compromise. This alert identifies when an attempt has been made to deactivate MFA for a user.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1098` Account Manipulation, `T1556` Modify Authentication Process
Credential Access	`T1556` Modify Authentication Process

Event coverage

Provider	Event
Entra-AuditLogs	Disable Strong Authentication

Rule body kusto

id: 65c78944-930b-4cae-bd79-c3664ae30ba7
name: Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled for a User
description: |
  'Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) helps prevent credential compromise. This alert identifies when an attempt has been made to deactivate MFA for a user.'
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
     - AuditLogs
  - connectorId: AWS
    dataTypes:
      - AWSCloudTrail
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - CredentialAccess
  - Persistence
relevantTechniques:
  - T1098
  - T1556
query: |
 (union isfuzzy=true
 (AuditLogs
 | where OperationName =~ "Disable Strong Authentication"
 | extend _parsedIntiatedByUser = parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.user))
 | extend _parsedIntiatedByApp = parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.app))
 | extend IPAddress = tostring(_parsedIntiatedByUser.ipAddress)
 | extend InitiatedByUser = iff(isnotempty(tostring(_parsedIntiatedByUser.userPrincipalName)),
  tostring(_parsedIntiatedByUser.userPrincipalName), tostring(_parsedIntiatedByApp.displayName))
 | extend Targetprop = todynamic(TargetResources)
 | extend TargetUser = tostring(Targetprop[0].userPrincipalName)
 | summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by User = TargetUser, InitiatedByUser , Operation = OperationName , CorrelationId, IPAddress, Category, Source = SourceSystem , AADTenantId, Type
 ),
 (AWSCloudTrail
 | where EventName in~ ("DeactivateMFADevice", "DeleteVirtualMFADevice")
 | extend _parsedRequestParameters = parse_json(RequestParameters)
 | extend InstanceProfileName = tostring(_parsedRequestParameters.InstanceProfileName)
 | extend TargetUser = tostring(_parsedRequestParameters.userName)
 | summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by User = TargetUser, Source = EventSource , Operation = EventName , TenantorInstance_Detail = InstanceProfileName, IPAddress = SourceIpAddress
 )
 )
 | extend timestamp = StartTimeUtc, UserName = tostring(split(User, '@', 0)[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(User, '@', 1)[0])
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: UserName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: UPNSuffix
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: IPAddress
version: 1.0.5
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

union `isfuzzy=true` (2 sources)

Each leg below queries one source; the rule matches if any leg does. Sources: AuditLogs, AWSCloudTrail

Leg 1: `AuditLogs`

AuditLogs
| where OperationName =~ "Disable Strong Authentication"
| extend _parsedIntiatedByUser = parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.user))
| extend _parsedIntiatedByApp = parse_json(tostring(InitiatedBy.app))
| extend IPAddress = tostring(_parsedIntiatedByUser.ipAddress)
| extend InitiatedByUser = iff(isnotempty(tostring(_parsedIntiatedByUser.userPrincipalName)),
 tostring(_parsedIntiatedByUser.userPrincipalName), tostring(_parsedIntiatedByApp.displayName))
| extend Targetprop = todynamic(TargetResources)
| extend TargetUser = tostring(Targetprop[0].userPrincipalName)
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by User = TargetUser, InitiatedByUser , Operation = OperationName , CorrelationId, IPAddress, Category, Source = SourceSystem , AADTenantId, Type

Leg 2: `AWSCloudTrail`

AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName in~ ("DeactivateMFADevice", "DeleteVirtualMFADevice")
| extend _parsedRequestParameters = parse_json(RequestParameters)
| extend InstanceProfileName = tostring(_parsedRequestParameters.InstanceProfileName)
| extend TargetUser = tostring(_parsedRequestParameters.userName)
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by User = TargetUser, Source = EventSource , Operation = EventName , TenantorInstance_Detail = InstanceProfileName, IPAddress = SourceIpAddress

Applied to the combined result

| extend timestamp = StartTimeUtc, UserName = tostring(split(User, '@', 0)[0]), UPNSuffix = tostring(split(User, '@', 1)[0])

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`EventName`	in	`DeactivateMFADevice` `DeleteVirtualMFADevice`
`OperationName`	eq	`Disable Strong Authentication`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`EndTimeUtc`	`summarize`
`IPAddress`	`summarize`
`Operation`	`summarize`
`Source`	`summarize`
`StartTimeUtc`	`summarize`
`TenantorInstance_Detail`	`summarize`
`User`	`summarize`
`UPNSuffix`	`extend`
`UserName`	`extend`
`timestamp`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled for a User

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

union `isfuzzy=true` (2 sources)

Leg 1: `AuditLogs`

Leg 2: `AWSCloudTrail`

Applied to the combined result

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Multi-Factor Authentication Disabled for a User

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

union isfuzzy=true (2 sources)

Leg 1: AuditLogs

Leg 2: AWSCloudTrail

Applied to the combined result

Indicators

Output fields

union `isfuzzy=true` (2 sources)

Leg 1: `AuditLogs`

Leg 2: `AWSCloudTrail`