Quokka - Malicious Results Detected

Status: available
Severity: medium
Time window: 1h
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'Detects if there are any malicious results in the app events coming from organization devices.'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Initial Access	`T1474` Supply Chain Compromise
Execution	`T1623` Command and Scripting Interpreter
Persistence	`T1541` Foreground Persistence, `T1624` Event Triggered Execution, `T1625` Hijack Execution Flow
Privilege Escalation	`T1631` Process Injection
Defense Evasion	`T1406` Obfuscated Files or Information, `T1516` Input Injection, `T1541` Foreground Persistence, `T1617` Hooking, `T1627` Execution Guardrails, `T1628` Hide Artifacts, `T1629` Impair Defenses, `T1630` Indicator Removal on Host, `T1631` Process Injection, `T1633` Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Credential Access	`T1414` Clipboard Data, `T1417` Input Capture, `T1517` Access Notifications, `T1634` Credentials from Password Store, `T1635` Steal Application Access Token
Discovery	`T1418` Software Discovery, `T1422` System Network Configuration Discovery, `T1424` Process Discovery, `T1430` Location Tracking
Collection	`T1409` Stored Application Data, `T1414` Clipboard Data, `T1417` Input Capture, `T1429` Audio Capture, `T1430` Location Tracking, `T1512` Video Capture, `T1513` Screen Capture, `T1517` Access Notifications, `T1532` Archive Collected Data, `T1616` Call Control, `T1636` Protected User Data, `T1638` Adversary-in-the-Middle
Command and Control	`T1481` Web Service, `T1509` Non-Standard Port, `T1544` Ingress Tool Transfer, `T1616` Call Control
Impact	`T1471` Data Encrypted for Impact, `T1516` Input Injection, `T1582` SMS Control, `T1616` Call Control, `T1640` Account Access Removal, `T1641` Data Manipulation, `T1642` Endpoint Denial of Service, `T1643` Generate Traffic from Victim

Rule body kusto

id: 97ad71ed-e4c0-4f7a-b1a2-683108bece4f
name: Quokka - Malicious Results Detected
description: |
  'Detects if there are any malicious results in the app events coming from organization devices.'
severity: Medium
status : Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: QscoutAppEventsCCFDefinition
    dataTypes:
      - QscoutAppEvents_CL
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
  - Execution
  - Persistence
  - PrivilegeEscalation
  - DefenseEvasion
  - CredentialAccess
  - Discovery
  - Collection
  - CommandAndControl
  - Impact
relevantTechniques:
  - T1406
  - T1409
  - T1414
  - T1417
  - T1418
  - T1422
  - T1424
  - T1429
  - T1430
  - T1471
  - T1474
  - T1481
  - T1509
  - T1512
  - T1513
  - T1516
  - T1517
  - T1532
  - T1541
  - T1544
  - T1582
  - T1616
  - T1617
  - T1623
  - T1624
  - T1625
  - T1627
  - T1628
  - T1629
  - T1630
  - T1631
  - T1633
  - T1634
  - T1635
  - T1636
  - T1638
  - T1640
  - T1641
  - T1642
  - T1643
query: |
  let timeRange = 1h;
  let appEventsWithMaliciousResults = QscoutAppEvents_CL
  | extend AccountCustomEntity = tostring(org_id)
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeRange)
  | where result_type == 'maliciousness'
  | where isnotempty(results.entries);
  appEventsWithMaliciousResults
  | mv-expand entry = results.entries
  | project
      TimeGenerated,
      AccountCustomEntity,
      app_id,
      mdm_source,
      mdm_device_id,
      package,
      platform,
      version,
      rule_id = tostring(entry.ruleId),
      desription = tostring(entry.description),
      threat_level = toint(entry.threatLevel),
      threat_types = tostring(entry.threatTypes)
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountCustomEntity
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let timeRange = 1h;

The stages below define let appEventsWithMaliciousResults (the rule's main pipeline source).

Stage 1: `source`

QscoutAppEvents_CL

Stage 2: `extend`

| extend AccountCustomEntity = tostring(org_id)

Stage 3: `where`

| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeRange)

Stage 4: `where`

| where result_type == 'maliciousness'

Stage 5: `where`

| where isnotempty(results.entries)

The stages below run on appEventsWithMaliciousResults (the outer pipeline).

Stage 6: `mv-expand`

appEventsWithMaliciousResults
| mv-expand entry = results.entries

Stage 7: `project`

| project
    TimeGenerated,
    AccountCustomEntity,
    app_id,
    mdm_source,
    mdm_device_id,
    package,
    platform,
    version,
    rule_id = tostring(entry.ruleId),
    desription = tostring(entry.description),
    threat_level = toint(entry.threatLevel),
    threat_types = tostring(entry.threatTypes)

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`entries`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`result_type`	eq	`maliciousness` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`AccountCustomEntity`	`project`
`TimeGenerated`	`project`
`app_id`	`project`
`desription`	`project`
`mdm_device_id`	`project`
`mdm_source`	`project`
`package`	`project`
`platform`	`project`
`rule_id`	`project`
`threat_level`	`project`
`threat_types`	`project`
`version`	`project`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Quokka - Malicious Results Detected

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `extend`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `mv-expand`

Stage 7: `project`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Quokka - Malicious Results Detected

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: extend

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: mv-expand

Stage 7: project

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `extend`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `mv-expand`

Stage 7: `project`