Detection rules › Kusto
CTERA Mass Access Denied Detection Analytic
This analytic rule detects and alerts when access denied operations generated by the CTERA Edge Filer goes over a predefined threshold
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Defense Impairment |
Rule body
id: 88341fc3-38e1-46db-8bb1-6c052e749991
name: CTERA Mass Access Denied Detection Analytic
description: 'This analytic rule detects and alerts when access denied operations generated by the CTERA Edge Filer goes over a predefined threshold'
kind: Scheduled
severity: High
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: CTERA
dataTypes:
- Syslog
queryFrequency: 5m
queryPeriod: 5m
triggerOperator: GreaterThan
triggerThreshold: 1000
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
- T1562
query: |
Syslog
| where ProcessName == 'gw-audit'
| extend
TenantName = extract("\"vportal\":\"([^\"]*)\"", 1, SyslogMessage),
UserName = extract("user=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
Operation = extract("op=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
EdgeFiler = extract("\"client\":\"([^\"]*)\"", 1, SyslogMessage),
RootPath = extract("rootPath=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
Share = extract("share=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
LocalPath = extract("path=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
Timestamp = todatetime(extract("\"@timestamp\":\"([^\"]*)\"", 1, SyslogMessage))
| where Operation in ('OpenDenied', 'createDenied', 'AclDenied', 'deleteDenied')
| summarize Count = count() by bin(Timestamp, 5m), UserName, EdgeFiler
| where Count > 1000
incidentConfiguration:
createIncident: true
groupingConfiguration:
enabled: false
reopenClosedIncident: false
lookbackDuration: PT5H
matchingMethod: AllEntities
eventGroupingSettings:
aggregationKind: SingleAlert
alertDetailsOverride:
alertnameFormat: 'CTERA Batch Access Denied Detection'
alertDescriptionFormat: >
Detected {{Count}} denied access attempts by user {{UserName}} on Edge Filer
{{EdgeFiler}} within 5 minutes. Please investigate unauthorized access attempts or misconfigurations.
customDetails:
TenantName: TenantName
UserName: UserName
EdgeFiler: EdgeFiler
RootPath: RootPath
Share: Share
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Name
columnName: UserName
- entityType: File
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Name
columnName: EdgeFiler
suppressionDuration: PT5H
suppressionEnabled: false
version: 1.0.0
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: source
Syslog
Stage 2: where
| where ProcessName == 'gw-audit'
Stage 3: extend
| extend
TenantName = extract("\"vportal\":\"([^\"]*)\"", 1, SyslogMessage),
UserName = extract("user=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
Operation = extract("op=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
EdgeFiler = extract("\"client\":\"([^\"]*)\"", 1, SyslogMessage),
RootPath = extract("rootPath=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
Share = extract("share=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
LocalPath = extract("path=([^|]*)", 1, SyslogMessage),
Timestamp = todatetime(extract("\"@timestamp\":\"([^\"]*)\"", 1, SyslogMessage))
Stage 4: where
| where Operation in ('OpenDenied', 'createDenied', 'AclDenied', 'deleteDenied')
Stage 5: summarize
| summarize Count = count() by bin(Timestamp, 5m), UserName, EdgeFiler
Stage 6: where
| where Count > 1000
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
Count | gt |
| field:"Count" kind:gt value:"1000" |
Operation | in |
| field:"Operation" kind:in |
ProcessName | eq |
| field:"process_name" kind:eq value:"gw-audit" |
Output fields
These fields are emitted when the rule matches.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
Count | summarize |
EdgeFiler | summarize |
UserName | summarize |