Detection rules › Kusto
AWSCloudTrail - NRT Login to AWS Management Console without MFA
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) helps you to prevent credential compromise. This alert identifies logins to the AWS Management Console without MFA. You can limit this detection to trigger for administrative accounts if you do not have MFA enabled on all accounts. This is done by looking at the eventName ConsoleLogin and if the AdditionalEventData field indicates MFA was NOT used and the ResponseElements field indicates NOT a Failure. Thereby indicating that a non-MFA login was successful.
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Initial Access | |
| Persistence | |
| Privilege Escalation | |
| Stealth |
Telemetry coverage
Rules detecting the same action
These rules filter on the same operation.
- AWS Console Login (Panther)
- AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge (Splunk)
- AWS ConsoleLogin Failed Authentication (Sigma)
- AWS CreateLoginProfile (Splunk)
- AWS Credential Access Failed Login (Splunk)
- AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User (Splunk)
- AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip (Splunk)
- AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User (Splunk)
Rule body
id: 0ee2aafb-4500-4e36-bcb1-e90eec2f0b9b
name: AWSCloudTrail - NRT Login to AWS Management Console without MFA
description: |
'Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) helps you to prevent credential compromise. This alert identifies logins to the AWS Management Console without MFA.
You can limit this detection to trigger for administrative accounts if you do not have MFA enabled on all accounts.
This is done by looking at the eventName ConsoleLogin and if the AdditionalEventData field indicates MFA was NOT used and the ResponseElements field indicates NOT a Failure. Thereby indicating that a non-MFA login was successful.'
severity: Low
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: AWS
dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
- connectorId: AWSS3
dataTypes:
- AWSCloudTrail
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
- PrivilegeEscalation
- Persistence
- InitialAccess
relevantTechniques:
- T1078
query: |
AWSCloudTrail
| where EventName =~ "ConsoleLogin"
| extend MFAUsed = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalEventData).MFAUsed), LoginResult = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)
| where MFAUsed !~ "Yes" and LoginResult !~ "Failure"
| where SessionIssuerUserName !contains "AWSReservedSSO"
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, LoginResult, MFAUsed, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,
UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Name
columnName: AccountName
- identifier: UPNSuffix
columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
- identifier: CloudAppAccountId
columnName: RecipientAccountId
- entityType: IP
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Address
columnName: SourceIpAddress
version: 1.0.4
kind: NRT
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: source
AWSCloudTrail
Stage 2: where
| where EventName =~ "ConsoleLogin"
Stage 3: extend
| extend MFAUsed = tostring(parse_json(AdditionalEventData).MFAUsed), LoginResult = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)
Stage 4: where
| where MFAUsed !~ "Yes" and LoginResult !~ "Failure"
Stage 5: where
| where SessionIssuerUserName !contains "AWSReservedSSO"
Stage 6: extend (4 consecutive steps)
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
Stage 7: summarize
| summarize StartTimeUtc = min(TimeGenerated), EndTimeUtc = max(TimeGenerated) by EventName, EventTypeName, LoginResult, MFAUsed, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityAccountId, UserIdentityPrincipalid, UserAgent,
UserIdentityUserName, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, AWSRegion
Exclusions
The rule actively suppresses these predicates.
| Field | Kind | Excluded values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
SessionIssuerUserName | contains | AWSReservedSSO | excludes:SessionIssuerUserName field:"SessionIssuerUserName" value:"AWSReservedSSO" |
Indicators
These rows show field, operator, and value matches.
| Field | Kind | Values | Search |
|---|---|---|---|
EventName | eq |
| field:"aws::eventName" kind:eq value:"ConsoleLogin" |
LoginResult | ne |
| field:"LoginResult" kind:ne value:"Failure" |
MFAUsed | ne |
| field:"MFAUsed" kind:ne value:"Yes" |
Output fields
These fields are emitted when the rule matches.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
AWSRegion | summarize |
AccountName | summarize |
AccountUPNSuffix | summarize |
EndTimeUtc | summarize |
EventName | summarize |
EventTypeName | summarize |
LoginResult | summarize |
MFAUsed | summarize |
RecipientAccountId | summarize |
SessionMfaAuthenticated | summarize |
SourceIpAddress | summarize |
StartTimeUtc | summarize |
UserAgent | summarize |
UserIdentityAccountId | summarize |
UserIdentityPrincipalid | summarize |
UserIdentityUserName | summarize |