New EXE deployed via Default Domain or Default Domain Controller Policies (ASIM Version)

Severity: high
Time window: 14d
Group by: CommandLine, DvcHostname, Process
Author: Microsoft Security Community
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

This detection highlights executables deployed to hosts via either the Default Domain or Default Domain Controller Policies. These policies apply to all hosts or Domain Controllers and best practice is that these policies should not be used for deployment of files. A threat actor may use these policies to deploy files or scripts to all hosts in a domain. This query uses the ASIM parsers and will need them deployed before usage - https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/normalization

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	`T1072` Software Deployment Tools
Lateral Movement	`T1072` Software Deployment Tools, `T1570` Lateral Tool Transfer

Event coverage

Provider	Event	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation
Sysmon	Event ID 5	Process terminated
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4689	A process has exited.

Rule body kusto

id: 0dd2a343-4bf9-4c93-a547-adf3658ddaec
name: New EXE deployed via Default Domain or Default Domain Controller Policies (ASIM Version)
description: |
  'This detection highlights executables deployed to hosts via either the Default Domain or Default Domain Controller Policies. These policies apply to all hosts or Domain Controllers and best practice is that these policies should not be used for deployment of files.
    A threat actor may use these policies to deploy files or scripts to all hosts in a domain.
    This query uses the ASIM parsers and will need them deployed before usage - https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/sentinel/normalization'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvents
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 14d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Execution
  - LateralMovement
relevantTechniques:
  - T1072
  - T1570
query: |
  let known_processes = (
    imProcess
    // Change these values if adjusting Query Frequency or Query Period
    | where TimeGenerated between(ago(14d)..ago(1d))
    | where Process has_any ("Policies\\{6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}", "Policies\\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}")
    | summarize by Process);
    imProcess
    // Change these values if adjusting Query Frequency or Query Period
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
    | where Process has_any ("Policies\\{6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}", "Policies\\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}")
    | where Process !in (known_processes)
    | summarize FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated) by Process, CommandLine, DvcHostname
    | extend HostName = tostring(split(DvcHostname, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DvcHostname, '.'))
    | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DvcHostname, DomainIndex + 1), DvcHostname)
    | project-away DomainIndex
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: DvcHostname
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
version: 1.0.5
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Microsoft Security Community
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Threat Protection" ]

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `known_processes`

let known_processes = (
  imProcess
  | where TimeGenerated between(ago(14d)..ago(1d))
  | where Process has_any ("Policies\\{6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}", "Policies\\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}")
  | summarize by Process);

Stage 1: `source`

imProcess

Stage 2: `where`

| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)

Stage 3: `where`

| where Process has_any ("Policies\\{6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}", "Policies\\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}")

Stage 4: `where`

| where Process !in (known_processes)

References known_processes (defined above).

Stage 5: `summarize`

| summarize FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated) by Process, CommandLine, DvcHostname

Stage 6: `extend`

| extend HostName = tostring(split(DvcHostname, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DvcHostname, '.'))

Stage 7: `extend`

| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DvcHostname, DomainIndex + 1), DvcHostname)

HostNameDomain =

ifDomainIndex != -1substring(DvcHostname, (DomainIndex + 1))

elseDvcHostname

Stage 8: `project-away`

| project-away DomainIndex

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`Process`	eq	`known_processes`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Process`	match	`Policies\\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}` `Policies\\{6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04fB984F9}`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`CommandLine`	`summarize`
`DvcHostname`	`summarize`
`FirstSeen`	`summarize`
`LastSeen`	`summarize`
`Process`	`summarize`
`HostName`	`extend`
`HostNameDomain`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

New EXE deployed via Default Domain or Default Domain Controller Policies (ASIM Version)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `known_processes`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `summarize`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `project-away`

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

New EXE deployed via Default Domain or Default Domain Controller Policies (ASIM Version)

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: known_processes

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: summarize

Stage 6: extend

Stage 7: extend

Stage 8: project-away

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `known_processes`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `summarize`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `project-away`