New PA, PCA, or PCAS added to Azure DevOps

Status: available
Severity: medium
Time window: 1d
Group by: ActorUPN, AddingUser, IpAddress, PermissionGrantDetails, TimeAdded, UserAgent
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'In order for an attacker to be able to conduct many potential attacks against Azure DevOps they will need to gain elevated permissions. This detection looks for users being granted key administrative permissions. If the principal of least privilege is applied, the number of users granted these permissions should be small. Note that permissions can also be granted via Microsoft Entra ID Protection groups and monitoring of these should also be conducted.'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Initial Access	`T1078.004` Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts

Rule body kusto

id: 35ce9aff-1708-45b8-a295-5e9a307f5f17
name: New PA, PCA, or PCAS added to Azure DevOps
description: |
  'In order for an attacker to be able to conduct many potential attacks against Azure DevOps they will need to gain elevated permissions. 
  This detection looks for users being granted key administrative permissions. If the principal of least privilege is applied, the number of users granted these permissions should be small. Note that permissions can also be granted via Microsoft Entra ID Protection groups and monitoring of these should also be conducted.'
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors: []
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1078.004
query: |
  ADOAuditLogs
  | where OperationName =~ "Group.UpdateGroupMembership.Add"
  | where Details has_any ("Project Administrators", "Project Collection Administrators", "Project Collection Service Accounts", "Build Administrator")
  | project-reorder TimeGenerated, Details, ActorUPN, IpAddress, UserAgent, AuthenticationMechanism, ScopeDisplayName
  | extend timekey = bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
  | extend ActorUserId = tostring(Data.MemberId)
  | project timekey, ActorUserId, AddingUser=ActorUPN, TimeAdded=TimeGenerated, PermissionGrantDetails = Details
  // Get details of operations conducted by user soon after elevation of permissions
  | join (ADOAuditLogs
  | extend ActorUserId = tostring(Data.MemberId)
  | extend timekey = bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)) on timekey, ActorUserId
  | summarize ActionsWhenAdded = make_set(OperationName) by ActorUPN, AddingUser, TimeAdded, PermissionGrantDetails, IpAddress, UserAgent
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[1])
  | extend AddingUserAccountName = tostring(split(AddingUser, "@")[0]), AddingUserAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AddingUser, "@")[1])
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: ActorUPN
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: AddingUser
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AddingUserAccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AddingUserAccountUPNSuffix
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: IpAddress
version: 1.0.6
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

ADOAuditLogs

Stage 2: `where`

| where OperationName =~ "Group.UpdateGroupMembership.Add"

Stage 3: `where`

| where Details has_any ("Project Administrators", "Project Collection Administrators", "Project Collection Service Accounts", "Build Administrator")

Stage 4: `project-reorder`

| project-reorder TimeGenerated, Details, ActorUPN, IpAddress, UserAgent, AuthenticationMechanism, ScopeDisplayName

Stage 5: `extend`

| extend timekey = bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)

Stage 6: `extend`

| extend ActorUserId = tostring(Data.MemberId)

Stage 7: `project`

| project timekey, ActorUserId, AddingUser=ActorUPN, TimeAdded=TimeGenerated, PermissionGrantDetails = Details

Stage 8: `join`

| join (ADOAuditLogs
| extend ActorUserId = tostring(Data.MemberId)
| extend timekey = bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)) on timekey, ActorUserId

Stage 9: `summarize`

| summarize ActionsWhenAdded = make_set(OperationName) by ActorUPN, AddingUser, TimeAdded, PermissionGrantDetails, IpAddress, UserAgent

Stage 10: `extend`

| extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(ActorUPN, "@")[1])

Stage 11: `extend`

| extend AddingUserAccountName = tostring(split(AddingUser, "@")[0]), AddingUserAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(AddingUser, "@")[1])

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Details`	match	`Build Administrator` `Project Administrators` `Project Collection Administrators` `Project Collection Service Accounts`
`OperationName`	eq	`Group.UpdateGroupMembership.Add`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`ActionsWhenAdded`	`summarize`
`ActorUPN`	`summarize`
`AddingUser`	`summarize`
`IpAddress`	`summarize`
`PermissionGrantDetails`	`summarize`
`TimeAdded`	`summarize`
`UserAgent`	`summarize`
`AccountName`	`extend`
`AccountUPNSuffix`	`extend`
`AddingUserAccountName`	`extend`
`AddingUserAccountUPNSuffix`	`extend`

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`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
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`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
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`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

New PA, PCA, or PCAS added to Azure DevOps

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `project-reorder`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `project`

Stage 8: `join`

Stage 9: `summarize`

Stage 10: `extend`

Stage 11: `extend`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

New PA, PCA, or PCAS added to Azure DevOps

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: project-reorder

Stage 5: extend

Stage 6: extend

Stage 7: project

Stage 8: join

Stage 9: summarize

Stage 10: extend

Stage 11: extend

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `project-reorder`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `project`

Stage 8: `join`

Stage 9: `summarize`

Stage 10: `extend`

Stage 11: `extend`