Detection rules › Kusto

Password Exfiltration over SCIM application

This is a third-party alert feed, not a detection over modeled telemetry. The vendor product raised the finding; this rule forwards it into the SIEM. It is searchable for reference but is excluded from the detection-rule browse and the ATT&CK coverage matrix.

Status: available
Severity: high
Time window: 30m
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

This rule detects suspicious sync events that occurred to applications using SCIM for user provisioning.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Credential Access	`T1040` Network Sniffing, `T1552` Unsecured Credentials, `T1555` Credentials from Password Stores

Rule body kusto

id: 2e3c4ad5-8cb3-4b46-88ff-a88367ee7eaa
name: Password Exfiltration over SCIM application
kind: Scheduled
description: This rule detects suspicious sync events that occurred to applications using SCIM for user provisioning.
severity: High
status: Available
queryFrequency: 30m
queryPeriod: 30m
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - CredentialAccess
  - InitialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1555
  - T1040
  - T1552
query: |-
  Authomize_v2_CL
  | where ingestion_time() >= ago(30m)
  | extend EventID = id_s, Policy = policy_name_s, Severity = severity_s,Description = description_s,Recommendation = recommendation_s,URL = url_s,Tactics = tactics_s
  | where Policy has "Password Exfiltration over SCIM application"
  | project  EventID, Policy, Severity, Description, Recommendation, URL, Category, Tactics
entityMappings:
  - entityType: URL
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Url
        columnName: URL
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: Authomize
  dataTypes: [ "Authomize_v2_CL" ]
incidentConfiguration:
  createIncident: true
  groupingConfiguration:
    enabled: true
    reopenClosedIncident: false
    lookbackDuration: 5h
    matchingMethod: AnyAlert
    groupByEntities: []
    groupByAlertDetails: []
    groupByCustomDetails: []
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: SingleAlert
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertnameFormat: Alert from Authomize - Password Exfiltration over SCIM application
  alertDescriptionFormat: Password Exfiltration over SCIM application. This policy detects suspicious sync events that occurred to applications using SCIM for user provisioning.
  alertSeverity: Severity
  alertTactics: Tactics 
  alertDynamicProperties:
  - alertProperty: AlertLink
    value: URL
customDetails:
  AuthomizeEventID: EventID
  EventName: Policy
  EventDescription: Description
  EventRecommendation: Recommendation
  ReferencedURL: URL
suppressionDuration: 5h
suppressionEnabled: false
version: 1.0.2

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Authomize_v2_CL

Stage 2: `where`

| where ingestion_time() >= ago(30m)

Stage 3: `extend`

| extend EventID = id_s, Policy = policy_name_s, Severity = severity_s,Description = description_s,Recommendation = recommendation_s,URL = url_s,Tactics = tactics_s

Stage 4: `where`

| where Policy has "Password Exfiltration over SCIM application"

Stage 5: `project`

| project  EventID, Policy, Severity, Description, Recommendation, URL, Category, Tactics

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`Policy`	match	`Password Exfiltration over SCIM application` transforms: `term`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`Category`	`project`
`Description`	`project`
`EventID`	`project`
`Policy`	`project`
`Recommendation`	`project`
`Severity`	`project`
`Tactics`	`project`
`URL`	`project`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Password Exfiltration over SCIM application

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `project`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Password Exfiltration over SCIM application

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: extend

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: project

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `project`