Prestige ransomware IOCs Oct 2022

Severity: high
Time window: 1d
Author: Microsoft Security Research
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'This query looks for file hashes and AV signatures associated with Prestige ransomware payload.'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Execution	`T1203` Exploitation for Client Execution

Rule body kusto

id: bca9c877-2afc-4246-a26d-087ab1cdcd5f
name: Prestige ransomware IOCs Oct 2022
description: |
  'This query looks for file hashes and AV signatures associated with Prestige ransomware payload.'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - DeviceEvents
      - DeviceFileEvents
      - DeviceImageLoadEvents
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvents  
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Execution
relevantTechniques:
  - T1203
tags:
  - Prestige
  - Ransomware
query: |
  let sha256Hashes = dynamic(["5dd1ca0d471dee41eb3ea0b6ea117810f228354fc3b7b47400a812573d40d91d", "5fc44c7342b84f50f24758e39c8848b2f0991e8817ef5465844f5f2ff6085a57", "6cff0bbd62efe99f381e5cc0c4182b0fb7a9a34e4be9ce68ee6b0d0ea3eee39c"]);
  let signames = dynamic(["Ransom:Win32/Prestige"]);
  (union isfuzzy=true
  (CommonSecurityLog
  | where FileHash in (sha256Hashes)
  | project TimeGenerated, Message, SourceUserID, FileHash, Type
  | extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, Algorithm = "SHA256", AccountNTName = SourceUserID
  ),
  (imFileEvent
  | where TargetFileSHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
  | extend AccountNT = ActorUsername, Computer = DvcHostname, IPAddress = SrcIpAddr, CommandLine = ActingProcessCommandLine, FileHash = TargetFileSHA256
  | project Type, TimeGenerated, Computer, AccountNT, IPAddress, CommandLine, FileHash, Algorithm = "SHA256"
  ),
  (Event
  | where Source =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
  | where EventID == 1
  | extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)
  | extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data
  | extend ProcessId = tolong(EventDetail.[3].["#text"]), Image = tostring(EventDetail.[4].["#text"]), CommandLine = tostring(EventDetail.[10].["#text"]), Hashes = tostring(EventDetail.[17].["#text"])
  | extend Hashes = extract_all(@"(?P<key>\w+)=(?P<value>[a-zA-Z0-9]+)", dynamic(["key","value"]), Hashes)
  | extend Hashes = column_ifexists("Hashes", dynamic(["", ""])), CommandLine = column_ifexists("CommandLine", "")
  | mv-expand Hashes
  | where Hashes[0] =~ "SHA256" and Hashes[1] has_any (sha256Hashes)  
  | project TimeGenerated, EventDetail, UserName, Computer, Type, Source, ProcessId, Hashes, CommandLine, Image
  | extend Type = strcat(Type, ": ", Source)
  | extend AccountNT = UserName, InitiatingProcessId = ProcessId
  | extend Process = tostring(split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]), Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(Hashes[1]) 
  ),
  (DeviceEvents
  | where InitiatingProcessSHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes) or SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
  | project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type
  | extend AccountNT = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Computer = DeviceName
  | extend Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(InitiatingProcessSHA256), CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Image = InitiatingProcessFolderPath
  ),
  (DeviceFileEvents
  | where SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
  | project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type
  | extend AccountNT = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Computer = DeviceName
  | extend Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(InitiatingProcessSHA256), CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Image = InitiatingProcessFolderPath
  ),
  (DeviceImageLoadEvents
  | where SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
  | project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type
  | extend AccountNT = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Computer = DeviceName
  | extend Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(InitiatingProcessSHA256), CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Image = InitiatingProcessFolderPath
  ),
  (SecurityAlert
  | where ProductName == "Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection"
  | extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)
  | where isnotempty(ThreatName)
  | where ThreatName has_any (signames)
  | extend Computer = tostring(parse_json(Entities)[0].HostName)
  )
  )
  | extend AccountNTName = tostring(split(AccountNT, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(AccountNT, "\\")[1])
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
  | project-away DomainIndex
entityMappings:
  - entityType: FileHash
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Algorithm
        columnName: Algorithm
      - identifier: Value
        columnName: FileHash
  - entityType: Process
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: ProcessId
        columnName: InitiatingProcessId
      - identifier: CommandLine
        columnName: CommandLine
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: AccountNT
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountNTName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AccountNTDomain
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Computer
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
version: 1.0.4
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Microsoft Security Research
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Others" ]

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let signames = dynamic(["Ransom:Win32/Prestige"]);

Let binding: `sha256Hashes`

let sha256Hashes = dynamic(["5dd1ca0d471dee41eb3ea0b6ea117810f228354fc3b7b47400a812573d40d91d", "5fc44c7342b84f50f24758e39c8848b2f0991e8817ef5465844f5f2ff6085a57", "6cff0bbd62efe99f381e5cc0c4182b0fb7a9a34e4be9ce68ee6b0d0ea3eee39c"]);

union `isfuzzy=true` (7 sources)

Each leg below queries one source; the rule matches if any leg does. Sources: CommonSecurityLog, imFileEvent, Event, DeviceEvents, DeviceFileEvents, DeviceImageLoadEvents, SecurityAlert

Leg 1: `CommonSecurityLog`

CommonSecurityLog
| where FileHash in (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, Message, SourceUserID, FileHash, Type
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated, Algorithm = "SHA256", AccountNTName = SourceUserID

Leg 2: `imFileEvent`

imFileEvent
| where TargetFileSHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
| extend AccountNT = ActorUsername, Computer = DvcHostname, IPAddress = SrcIpAddr, CommandLine = ActingProcessCommandLine, FileHash = TargetFileSHA256
| project Type, TimeGenerated, Computer, AccountNT, IPAddress, CommandLine, FileHash, Algorithm = "SHA256"

Leg 3: `Event`

Event
| where Source =~ "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 1
| extend EvData = parse_xml(EventData)
| extend EventDetail = EvData.DataItem.EventData.Data
| extend ProcessId = tolong(EventDetail.[3].["#text"]), Image = tostring(EventDetail.[4].["#text"]), CommandLine = tostring(EventDetail.[10].["#text"]), Hashes = tostring(EventDetail.[17].["#text"])
| extend Hashes = extract_all(@"(?P<key>\w+)=(?P<value>[a-zA-Z0-9]+)", dynamic(["key","value"]), Hashes)
| extend Hashes = column_ifexists("Hashes", dynamic(["", ""])), CommandLine = column_ifexists("CommandLine", "")
| mv-expand Hashes
| where Hashes[0] =~ "SHA256" and Hashes[1] has_any (sha256Hashes)  
| project TimeGenerated, EventDetail, UserName, Computer, Type, Source, ProcessId, Hashes, CommandLine, Image
| extend Type = strcat(Type, ": ", Source)
| extend AccountNT = UserName, InitiatingProcessId = ProcessId
| extend Process = tostring(split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]), Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(Hashes[1])

Leg 4: `DeviceEvents`

DeviceEvents
| where InitiatingProcessSHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes) or SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type
| extend AccountNT = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Computer = DeviceName
| extend Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(InitiatingProcessSHA256), CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Image = InitiatingProcessFolderPath

Leg 5: `DeviceFileEvents`

DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type
| extend AccountNT = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Computer = DeviceName
| extend Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(InitiatingProcessSHA256), CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Image = InitiatingProcessFolderPath

Leg 6: `DeviceImageLoadEvents`

DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where SHA256 has_any (sha256Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, ActionType, DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountDomain, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessSHA256, Type
| extend AccountNT = InitiatingProcessAccountName, Computer = DeviceName
| extend Algorithm = "SHA256", FileHash = tostring(InitiatingProcessSHA256), CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Image = InitiatingProcessFolderPath

Leg 7: `SecurityAlert`

SecurityAlert
| where ProductName == "Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection"
| extend ThreatName = tostring(parse_json(ExtendedProperties).ThreatName)
| where isnotempty(ThreatName)
| where ThreatName has_any (signames)
| extend Computer = tostring(parse_json(Entities)[0].HostName)

Applied to the combined result

| extend AccountNTName = tostring(split(AccountNT, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(AccountNT, "\\")[1])
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| project-away DomainIndex

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`EventID`	eq	`1` transforms: `cased` corpus 237 (splunk 224, kusto 13)
`FileHash`	in	`5dd1ca0d471dee41eb3ea0b6ea117810f228354fc3b7b47400a812573d40d91d` transforms: `cased` `5fc44c7342b84f50f24758e39c8848b2f0991e8817ef5465844f5f2ff6085a57` transforms: `cased` `6cff0bbd62efe99f381e5cc0c4182b0fb7a9a34e4be9ce68ee6b0d0ea3eee39c` transforms: `cased`
`Hashes[0]`	eq	`SHA256` corpus 3 (kusto 3)
`Hashes[1]`	match	`5dd1ca0d471dee41eb3ea0b6ea117810f228354fc3b7b47400a812573d40d91d` `5fc44c7342b84f50f24758e39c8848b2f0991e8817ef5465844f5f2ff6085a57` `6cff0bbd62efe99f381e5cc0c4182b0fb7a9a34e4be9ce68ee6b0d0ea3eee39c`
`InitiatingProcessSHA256`	match	`5dd1ca0d471dee41eb3ea0b6ea117810f228354fc3b7b47400a812573d40d91d` `5fc44c7342b84f50f24758e39c8848b2f0991e8817ef5465844f5f2ff6085a57` `6cff0bbd62efe99f381e5cc0c4182b0fb7a9a34e4be9ce68ee6b0d0ea3eee39c`
`ProductName`	eq	`Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection` transforms: `cased`
`SHA256`	match	`5dd1ca0d471dee41eb3ea0b6ea117810f228354fc3b7b47400a812573d40d91d` `5fc44c7342b84f50f24758e39c8848b2f0991e8817ef5465844f5f2ff6085a57` `6cff0bbd62efe99f381e5cc0c4182b0fb7a9a34e4be9ce68ee6b0d0ea3eee39c`
`TargetFileSHA256`	match	`5dd1ca0d471dee41eb3ea0b6ea117810f228354fc3b7b47400a812573d40d91d` `5fc44c7342b84f50f24758e39c8848b2f0991e8817ef5465844f5f2ff6085a57` `6cff0bbd62efe99f381e5cc0c4182b0fb7a9a34e4be9ce68ee6b0d0ea3eee39c`
`ThreatName`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`ThreatName`	match	`signames`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`ActionType`	`project`
`DeviceId`	`project`
`DeviceName`	`project`
`InitiatingProcessAccountDomain`	`project`
`InitiatingProcessAccountName`	`project`
`InitiatingProcessCommandLine`	`project`
`InitiatingProcessFileName`	`project`
`InitiatingProcessFolderPath`	`project`
`InitiatingProcessId`	`project`
`InitiatingProcessParentFileName`	`project`
`InitiatingProcessSHA256`	`project`
`TimeGenerated`	`project`
`Type`	`project`
`AccountNT`	`extend`
`Computer`	`extend`
`Algorithm`	`extend`
`CommandLine`	`extend`
`FileHash`	`extend`
`Image`	`extend`
`ThreatName`	`extend`
`AccountNTDomain`	`extend`
`AccountNTName`	`extend`
`HostName`	`extend`
`HostNameDomain`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Prestige ransomware IOCs Oct 2022

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: `sha256Hashes`

union `isfuzzy=true` (7 sources)

Leg 1: `CommonSecurityLog`

Leg 2: `imFileEvent`

Leg 3: `Event`

Leg 4: `DeviceEvents`

Leg 5: `DeviceFileEvents`

Leg 6: `DeviceImageLoadEvents`

Leg 7: `SecurityAlert`

Applied to the combined result

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Prestige ransomware IOCs Oct 2022

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

Let binding: sha256Hashes

union isfuzzy=true (7 sources)

Leg 1: CommonSecurityLog

Leg 2: imFileEvent

Leg 3: Event

Leg 4: DeviceEvents

Leg 5: DeviceFileEvents

Leg 6: DeviceImageLoadEvents

Leg 7: SecurityAlert

Applied to the combined result

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `sha256Hashes`

union `isfuzzy=true` (7 sources)

Leg 1: `CommonSecurityLog`

Leg 2: `imFileEvent`

Leg 3: `Event`

Leg 4: `DeviceEvents`

Leg 5: `DeviceFileEvents`

Leg 6: `DeviceImageLoadEvents`

Leg 7: `SecurityAlert`