Detection rules › Kusto

Exchange SSRF Autodiscover ProxyShell - Detection

Severity
high
Time window
12h
Author
Thomas McElroy
Source
github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'This query looks for suspicious request patterns to Exchange servers that fit patterns recently blogged about by PeterJson. This exploitation chain utilises an SSRF vulnerability in Exchange which eventually allows the attacker to execute arbitrary Powershell on the server. In the example powershell can be used to write an email to disk with an encoded attachment containing a shell. Reference: https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Initial Access

Rule body

id: 968358d6-6af8-49bb-aaa4-187b3067fb95
name: Exchange SSRF Autodiscover ProxyShell - Detection
description: |
  'This query looks for suspicious request patterns to Exchange servers that fit patterns recently blogged about by PeterJson. This exploitation chain utilises an SSRF vulnerability in Exchange which eventually allows the attacker to execute arbitrary Powershell on the server.
  In the example powershell can be used to write an email to disk with an encoded attachment containing a shell.
  Reference: https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureMonitor(IIS)
    dataTypes:
      - W3CIISLog
queryFrequency: 12h
queryPeriod: 12h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1190
query: |
  let successCodes = dynamic([200, 302, 401]);
  W3CIISLog
  | where scStatus has_any (successCodes)
  | where ipv4_is_private(cIP) == False
  | where csUriStem hasprefix "/autodiscover/autodiscover.json"
  | project TimeGenerated, cIP, sIP, sSiteName, csUriStem, csUriQuery, Computer, csUserName, _ResourceId, FileUri
  | where (csUriQuery !has "Protocol" and isnotempty(csUriQuery))
  or (csUriQuery has_any("/mapi/", "powershell"))
  or (csUriQuery contains "@" and csUriQuery matches regex @"\.[a-zA-Z]{2,4}?(?:[a-zA-Z]{2,4}\/)")
  or (csUriQuery contains ":" and csUriQuery matches regex @"\:[0-9]{2,4}\/")
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(csUserName, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(csUserName, "@")[1])
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: csUserName
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AccountUPNSuffix  
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Computer
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: cIP
  - entityType: AzureResource
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: ResourceId
        columnName: _ResourceId
version: 1.0.3
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Thomas McElroy
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Others" ]

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let successCodes = dynamic([200, 302, 401]);

Stage 1: source

W3CIISLog

Stage 2: where

| where scStatus has_any (successCodes)

Stage 3: where

| where ipv4_is_private(cIP) == False

Stage 4: where

| where csUriStem hasprefix "/autodiscover/autodiscover.json"

Stage 5: project

| project TimeGenerated, cIP, sIP, sSiteName, csUriStem, csUriQuery, Computer, csUserName, _ResourceId, FileUri

Stage 6: where

| where (csUriQuery !has "Protocol" and isnotempty(csUriQuery))
or (csUriQuery has_any("/mapi/", "powershell"))
or (csUriQuery contains "@" and csUriQuery matches regex @"\.[a-zA-Z]{2,4}?(?:[a-zA-Z]{2,4}\/)")
or (csUriQuery contains ":" and csUriQuery matches regex @"\:[0-9]{2,4}\/")

Stage 7: extend (3 consecutive steps)

| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(csUserName, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(csUserName, "@")[1])

Exclusions

The rule actively suppresses these predicates.

FieldKindExcluded valuesSearch
cIPcidr_match10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8excludes:cIP

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
csUriQuerycontains
  • :
  • @
field:"csUriQuery" kind:contains
csUriQueryis_not_null
  • (no value, null check)
field:"csUriQuery" kind:is_not_null
csUriQuerymatch
  • /mapi/ transforms: term
  • powershell transforms: term
field:"csUriQuery" kind:match
csUriQueryregex_match
  • .[a-zA-Z]{2,4}?(?:[a-zA-Z]{2,4}\/)
  • \:[0-9]{2,4}\/
field:"csUriQuery" kind:regex_match
csUriStemstarts_with
  • /autodiscover/autodiscover.json
field:"csUriStem" kind:starts_with value:"/autodiscover/autodiscover.json"
scStatusmatch
  • 200 transforms: term
  • 302 transforms: term
  • 401 transforms: term
field:"scStatus" kind:match

Output fields

These fields are emitted when the rule matches.

FieldSource
Computerproject
FileUriproject
TimeGeneratedproject
_ResourceIdproject
cIPproject
csUriQueryproject
csUriStemproject
csUserNameproject
sIPproject
sSiteNameproject
DomainIndexextend
HostNameextend
HostNameDomainextend
AccountNameextend
AccountUPNSuffixextend