Detection rules › Kusto
Qakbot Campaign Self Deletion
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Qakbot blight lingers, seeds ransomware Qakbot is malware that steals login credentials from banking and financial services. It has been deployed against small businesses as well as major corporations. Some outbreaks have involved targeted ransomware campaigns that use a similar set of techniques. Links to related queries are listed under See also. The following query detects if an instance of Qakbot has attempted to overwrite its original binary. Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/11/06/mitigating-and-eliminating-info-stealing-qakbot-and-emotet-in-corporate-networks/
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Stealth | T1070 Indicator Removal |
Event coverage
| Provider | Event/ActionType | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon | Event ID 1 | Process creation |
| Security-Auditing | Event ID 4688 | A new process has been created. |
| Defender-DeviceProcessEvents | any | Process activity (any) |
Rule body kusto
id: 47c02e21-3949-4e05-a28e-576cd75ff6f6
name: Qakbot Campaign Self Deletion
description: |
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Qakbot blight lingers, seeds ransomware
Qakbot is malware that steals login credentials from banking and financial services. It has been deployed against small businesses as well as major corporations. Some outbreaks have involved targeted ransomware campaigns that use a similar set of techniques. Links to related queries are listed under See also.
The following query detects if an instance of Qakbot has attempted to overwrite its original binary.
Reference - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/11/06/mitigating-and-eliminating-info-stealing-qakbot-and-emotet-in-corporate-networks/
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
dataTypes:
- DeviceProcessEvents
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
- T1070
tags:
- Qakbot
- Ransomware
- Self Deletion
- Defense Evasion
query: |
DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "ping.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "cmd.exe"
| where (InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "calc.exe") and (InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "-n 6") and (InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "127.0.0.1")
| project TimeGenerated, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, DeviceId, DeviceName
| extend HostName = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, 0, indexof(DeviceName, '.')), DeviceName)
| extend DnsDomain = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, indexof(DeviceName, '.') + 1), "")
entityMappings:
- entityType: Host
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: DeviceName
- identifier: HostName
columnName: HostName
- identifier: DnsDomain
columnName: DnsDomain
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: source
DeviceProcessEvents
Stage 2: where
| where FileName =~ "ping.exe"
Stage 3: where
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "cmd.exe"
Stage 4: where
| where (InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "calc.exe") and (InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "-n 6") and (InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "127.0.0.1")
Stage 5: project
| project TimeGenerated, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, DeviceId, DeviceName
Stage 6: extend
| extend HostName = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, 0, indexof(DeviceName, '.')), DeviceName)
HostName =DeviceName has "."substring(DeviceName, 0, indexof(DeviceName, '.'))DeviceNameStage 7: extend
| extend DnsDomain = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, indexof(DeviceName, '.') + 1), "")
DnsDomain =DeviceName has "."substring(DeviceName, (indexof(DeviceName, '.') + 1))""Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
FileName | eq |
|
InitiatingProcessCommandLine | match |
|
InitiatingProcessFileName | eq |
|
Output fields
Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
DeviceId | project |
DeviceName | project |
InitiatingProcessCommandLine | project |
InitiatingProcessParentFileName | project |
ProcessCommandLine | project |
TimeGenerated | project |
HostName | extend |
DnsDomain | extend |