Detection rules › Kusto

Rare client observed with high reverse DNS lookup count - Anomaly based (ASIM DNS Solution)

Status
available
Severity
medium
Time window
14d
Group by
SrcIpAddr
Source
github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

This rule makes use of the series decompose anomaly method to identify clients with high reverse DNS counts. This helps in detecting the possible initial phases of an attack, like discovery and reconnaissance. It utilizes ASIM normalization and is applied to any source that supports the ASIM DNS schema.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
ReconnaissanceT1590 Gather Victim Network Information

Event coverage

ProviderEventTitle
SysmonEvent ID 22DNSEvent (DNS query)

Rule body kusto

id: 0fe6bde4-b215-480c-99b4-84a96edcdbd7
name: Rare client observed with high reverse DNS lookup count - Anomaly based (ASIM DNS Solution)
description: |
  'This rule makes use of the series decompose anomaly method to identify clients with high reverse DNS counts. This helps in detecting the possible initial phases of an attack, like discovery and reconnaissance. It utilizes [ASIM](https://aka.ms/AboutASIM) normalization and is applied to any source that supports the ASIM DNS schema.'
severity: Medium
status: Available 
tags:
  - Schema: ASimDns
    SchemaVersion: 0.1.6
requiredDataConnectors: []
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 14d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Reconnaissance
relevantTechniques:
  - T1590
query: |
  let threshold = 2.5;
  let SearchDomain = dynamic(["in-addr.arpa"]);
  let min_t = ago(14d);
  let max_t = now();
  let timeframe = 1d;
  let DNSEvents=(stime: datetime, etime: datetime) {
    _Im_Dns(starttime=stime, endtime=etime, domain_has_any=SearchDomain)
  };
  DNSEvents(stime=min_t, etime=max_t)
  | make-series QueryCount=dcount(DnsQuery) on TimeGenerated from min_t to max_t step timeframe by SrcIpAddr
  | extend (anomalies, score, baseline) = series_decompose_anomalies(QueryCount, threshold, -1, 'linefit')
  | mv-expand anomalies, score, baseline, TimeGenerated, QueryCount
  | extend
    anomalies = toint(anomalies),
    score = toint(score),
    baseline = toint(baseline),
    EventTime = todatetime(TimeGenerated),
    Total = tolong(QueryCount)
  | where EventTime >= ago(timeframe)
  | where score >= threshold * 2
  | join kind = inner (DNSEvents(stime=ago(timeframe), etime=max_t)
    | summarize DNSQueries=make_set(DnsQuery, 1000) by SrcIpAddr)
    on SrcIpAddr
  | project-away SrcIpAddr1
entityMappings:
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SrcIpAddr
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
customDetails:
  DNSQueries: DNSQueries
  AnomalyScore: score
  baseline: baseline
  Total: Total
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: "[Anomaly] Rare client has been observed as making high reverse DNS lookup count  - client IP: '{{SrcIpAddr}}'"
  alertDescriptionFormat: "Client has been identified as making high reverse DNS counts which could be carrying out reconnaissance or discovery activity.\n\nReverse DNS lookup count baseline for this client: '{{baseline}}'\n\nCurrent reverse DNS lookup count by this client showing as: '{{Total}}'\n\nDNS queries requested by this client inlcude: '{{DNSQueries}}'"
version: 1.0.2
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let threshold = 2.5;
let SearchDomain = dynamic(["in-addr.arpa"]);
let min_t = ago(14d);
let max_t = now();
let timeframe = 1d;

Let binding: DNSEvents

let DNSEvents = (stime: datetime, etime: datetime) {
  _Im_Dns(starttime=stime, endtime=etime, domain_has_any=SearchDomain)
};

Derived from SearchDomain.

Stage 1: source

DNSEvents(stime=min_t, etime=max_t)

The stages below score time-series anomalies (make-series, series_decompose_anomalies).

Stage 2: summarize

| make-series QueryCount=dcount(DnsQuery) on TimeGenerated from min_t to max_t step timeframe by SrcIpAddr

Stage 3: extend

| extend (anomalies, score, baseline) = series_decompose_anomalies(QueryCount, threshold, -1, 'linefit')

Stage 4: mv-expand

| mv-expand anomalies, score, baseline, TimeGenerated, QueryCount

Stage 5: extend

| extend
  anomalies = toint(anomalies),
  score = toint(score),
  baseline = toint(baseline),
  EventTime = todatetime(TimeGenerated),
  Total = tolong(QueryCount)

Stage 6: where

| where EventTime >= ago(timeframe)

Stage 7: where

| where score >= threshold * 2

Stage 8: join

| join kind = inner (DNSEvents(stime=ago(timeframe), etime=max_t)
  | summarize DNSQueries=make_set(DnsQuery, 1000) by SrcIpAddr)
  on SrcIpAddr

Stage 9: project-away

| project-away SrcIpAddr1

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

FieldKindValues
scorege
  • 5 transforms: cased corpus 6 (kusto 6)

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

FieldSource
QueryCountsummarize
SrcIpAddrsummarize
anomaliesextend
baselineextend
scoreextend
EventTimeextend
Totalextend