Detection rules › Kusto

Red Canary Threat Detection

This is a third-party alert feed, not a detection over modeled telemetry. The vendor product raised the finding; this rule forwards it into the SIEM. It is searchable for reference but is excluded from the detection-rule browse and the ATT&CK coverage matrix.

Severity: high
Time window: 5m
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Triggers Incidents using detection data assembled by Red Canary.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Initial Access	`T1566` Phishing
Execution	`T1059` Command and Scripting Interpreter
Persistence	`T1547` Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Privilege Escalation	`T1547` Boot or Logon Autostart Execution, `T1548` Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Stealth	`T1562` Impair Defenses
Credential Access	`T1003` OS Credential Dumping
Discovery	`T1087` Account Discovery
Lateral Movement	`T1021` Remote Services
Collection	`T1119` Automated Collection
Command & Control	`T1071` Application Layer Protocol
Exfiltration	`T1041` Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Impact	`T1499` Endpoint Denial of Service

Rule body kusto

id: 6d263abb-6445-45cc-93e9-c593d3d77b89
kind: Scheduled
name: Red Canary Threat Detection
description: Triggers Incidents using detection data assembled by Red Canary.
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: RedCanaryDataConnector
    dataTypes:
      - RedCanaryDetections_CL
queryPeriod: 5m
queryFrequency: 5m
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Collection
  - CommandAndControl
  - CredentialAccess
  - DefenseEvasion
  - Discovery
  - Execution
  - Exfiltration
  - Impact
  - InitialAccess
  - LateralMovement
  - Persistence
  - PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques:
  - T1566
  - T1059
  - T1547
  - T1548
  - T1562
  - T1003
  - T1087
  - T1021
  - T1119
  - T1071
  - T1041
  - T1499
query: |
  RedCanaryDetections_CL
  | extend    process_ioc_array = todynamic(process_iocs_s),
              child_process_ioc_array = todynamic(child_process_iocs_s),
              cross_process_ioc_array = todynamic(cross_process_iocs_s),
              file_mod_ioc_array = todynamic(file_modification_iocs_s),
              identities_array = todynamic(identities_s)
  | extend    entities = array_concat(process_ioc_array, child_process_ioc_array, cross_process_ioc_array, file_mod_ioc_array, identities_array)
  | mv-expand entities
  | evaluate  bag_unpack(entities)
  | extend    file_hash_array = todynamic(column_ifexists('file_hashes', '[]'))
  | mv-expand file_hash_array
  | evaluate  bag_unpack(file_hash_array, 'file_hash_')
  | project   detection_id_s = column_ifexists('detection_id_s', ''),
              detection_url_s = column_ifexists('detection_url_s', ''),
              detection_headline_s = column_ifexists('detection_headline_s', ''),
              detection_details_s = column_ifexists('detection_details_s', ''),
              detection_severity_s = column_ifexists('detection_severity_s', ''),
              host_name_s = column_ifexists('host_name_s', ''),
              host_full_name_s = column_ifexists('host_full_name_s', ''),
              host_os_family_s = column_ifexists('host_os_family_s', ''),
              host_os_version_s = column_ifexists('host_os_version_s', ''),
              tactics_s = column_ifexists('tactics_s', ''),
              process_id = column_ifexists('process_id', ''),
              process_command_line = column_ifexists('process_command_line', ''),
              process_creation_time_utc = column_ifexists('process_creation_time_utc', ''),
              file_hash_algorithm = column_ifexists('file_hash_algorithm', ''),
              file_hash_value = column_ifexists('file_hash_value', ''),
              file_directory = column_ifexists('file_directory', ''),
              file_name = column_ifexists('file_name', ''),
              user_name = column_ifexists('user_name', ''),
              user_uid = column_ifexists('user_uid', '')
eventGroupingSettings:
  aggregationKind: AlertPerResult
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Process
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: ProcessId
        columnName: process_id
      - identifier: CommandLine
        columnName: process_command_line
      - identifier: CreationTimeUtc
        columnName: process_creation_time_utc
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: user_name
      - identifier: Sid
        columnName: user_uid
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: user_name
  - entityType: File
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Directory
        columnName: file_directory
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: file_name
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: host_name_s
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: host_full_name_s
      - identifier: OSFamily
        columnName: host_os_family_s
  - entityType: FileHash
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Algorithm
        columnName: file_hash_algorithm
      - identifier: Value
        columnName: file_hash_value
customDetails:
  detection_id: detection_id_s
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: Red Canary has published Detection-{{detection_id_s}}
  alertDescriptionFormat: |
    Red Canary has published a {{detection_severity_s}} severity detection with details:

    {{detection_details_s}}

    View the Detection at: {{detection_url_s}}
  alertTacticsColumnName: tactics_s
  alertSeverityColumnName: detection_severity_s
version: 1.0.1
incidentConfiguration:
  createIncident: true
  groupingConfiguration:
    enabled: true
    reopenClosedIncident: false
    lookbackDuration: 5m
    matchingMethod: Selected
    groupByEntities: []
    groupByAlertDetails: []
    groupByCustomDetails:
      - detection_id

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

RedCanaryDetections_CL

Stage 2: `extend`

| extend    process_ioc_array = todynamic(process_iocs_s),
            child_process_ioc_array = todynamic(child_process_iocs_s),
            cross_process_ioc_array = todynamic(cross_process_iocs_s),
            file_mod_ioc_array = todynamic(file_modification_iocs_s),
            identities_array = todynamic(identities_s)

Stage 3: `extend`

| extend    entities = array_concat(process_ioc_array, child_process_ioc_array, cross_process_ioc_array, file_mod_ioc_array, identities_array)

Stage 4: `mv-expand`

| mv-expand entities

Stage 5: `evaluate`

| evaluate  bag_unpack(entities)

Stage 6: `extend`

| extend    file_hash_array = todynamic(column_ifexists('file_hashes', '[]'))

Stage 7: `mv-expand`

| mv-expand file_hash_array

Stage 8: `evaluate`

| evaluate  bag_unpack(file_hash_array, 'file_hash_')

Stage 9: `project`

| project   detection_id_s = column_ifexists('detection_id_s', ''),
            detection_url_s = column_ifexists('detection_url_s', ''),
            detection_headline_s = column_ifexists('detection_headline_s', ''),
            detection_details_s = column_ifexists('detection_details_s', ''),
            detection_severity_s = column_ifexists('detection_severity_s', ''),
            host_name_s = column_ifexists('host_name_s', ''),
            host_full_name_s = column_ifexists('host_full_name_s', ''),
            host_os_family_s = column_ifexists('host_os_family_s', ''),
            host_os_version_s = column_ifexists('host_os_version_s', ''),
            tactics_s = column_ifexists('tactics_s', ''),
            process_id = column_ifexists('process_id', ''),
            process_command_line = column_ifexists('process_command_line', ''),
            process_creation_time_utc = column_ifexists('process_creation_time_utc', ''),
            file_hash_algorithm = column_ifexists('file_hash_algorithm', ''),
            file_hash_value = column_ifexists('file_hash_value', ''),
            file_directory = column_ifexists('file_directory', ''),
            file_name = column_ifexists('file_name', ''),
            user_name = column_ifexists('user_name', ''),
            user_uid = column_ifexists('user_uid', '')

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`detection_details_s`	`project`
`detection_headline_s`	`project`
`detection_id_s`	`project`
`detection_severity_s`	`project`
`detection_url_s`	`project`
`file_directory`	`project`
`file_hash_algorithm`	`project`
`file_hash_value`	`project`
`file_name`	`project`
`host_full_name_s`	`project`
`host_name_s`	`project`
`host_os_family_s`	`project`
`host_os_version_s`	`project`
`process_command_line`	`project`
`process_creation_time_utc`	`project`
`process_id`	`project`
`tactics_s`	`project`
`user_name`	`project`
`user_uid`	`project`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Red Canary Threat Detection

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `extend`

Stage 3: `extend`

Stage 4: `mv-expand`

Stage 5: `evaluate`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `mv-expand`

Stage 8: `evaluate`

Stage 9: `project`

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Red Canary Threat Detection

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: extend

Stage 3: extend

Stage 4: mv-expand

Stage 5: evaluate

Stage 6: extend

Stage 7: mv-expand

Stage 8: evaluate

Stage 9: project

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `extend`

Stage 3: `extend`

Stage 4: `mv-expand`

Stage 5: `evaluate`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `mv-expand`

Stage 8: `evaluate`

Stage 9: `project`