Regsvr32 Rundll32 with Anomalous Parent Process

Status: available
Severity: high
Time window: 1h
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

This analytical rule looks for rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe being spawned by abnormal processes: wscript.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe, pwsh.exe, cscript.exe. Blog: https://threathunt.blog/running-live-malware-for-threat-hunting-purposes/

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Stealth	`T1218.010` System Binary Proxy Execution: Regsvr32, `T1218.011` System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32

Event coverage

Provider	Event/ActionType	Title
Sysmon	Event ID 1	Process creation
Security-Auditing	Event ID 4688	A new process has been created.
Defender-DeviceProcessEvents	any	Process activity (any)

Rule body kusto

id: 2624fc55-0998-4897-bb48-1c6422befce4
name: Regsvr32 Rundll32 with Anomalous Parent Process
description: |
  This analytical rule looks for rundll32.exe or regsvr32.exe being spawned by abnormal processes: wscript.exe, powershell.exe, cmd.exe, pwsh.exe, cscript.exe.
  Blog: https://threathunt.blog/running-live-malware-for-threat-hunting-purposes/
severity: High
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - DeviceProcessEvents
      - DeviceNetworkEvents
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1h
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
  - T1218.010
  - T1218.011
tags:
  - Defense Evasion
  - Image Load
  - Regsvr32 Abuse
  - Rundll32 Abuse
query: |
  DeviceProcessEvents
  | where FileName has_any ("rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
  | where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("wscript.exe","powershell.exe","cmd.exe","pwsh.exe","cscript.exe")
  | project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InvestigatedProcessName=FileName, InvestigatedProcessCommandLine = ProcessCommandLine,InvestigatedProcessStartTime = ProcessCreationTime, InvestigatedProcessId = ProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
  | join (
  DeviceNetworkEvents
  | where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
  | where RemoteIPType == "Public"
  | project DeviceName, InvestigatedProcessName=InitiatingProcessFileName, InvestigatedProcessCommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,InvestigatedProcessStartTime = InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InvestigatedProcessId = InitiatingProcessId, LocalIP, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl
  ) on DeviceName, InvestigatedProcessCommandLine, InvestigatedProcessId, InvestigatedProcessName, InvestigatedProcessStartTime
  | project-away DeviceName1, InvestigatedProcessCommandLine1, InvestigatedProcessId1, InvestigatedProcessName1, InvestigatedProcessStartTime1
  | extend HostName = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, 0, indexof(DeviceName, '.')), DeviceName)
  | extend DnsDomain = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, indexof(DeviceName, '.') + 1), "")
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: DeviceName
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: DnsDomain
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: LocalIP
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: RemoteIP
  - entityType: URL
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Url
        columnName: RemoteUrl
version: 1.0.0
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

DeviceProcessEvents

Stage 2: `where`

| where FileName has_any ("rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")

Stage 3: `where`

| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("wscript.exe","powershell.exe","cmd.exe","pwsh.exe","cscript.exe")

Stage 4: `project`

| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InvestigatedProcessName=FileName, InvestigatedProcessCommandLine = ProcessCommandLine,InvestigatedProcessStartTime = ProcessCreationTime, InvestigatedProcessId = ProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName

Stage 5: `join`

| join (
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| where RemoteIPType == "Public"
| project DeviceName, InvestigatedProcessName=InitiatingProcessFileName, InvestigatedProcessCommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,InvestigatedProcessStartTime = InitiatingProcessCreationTime, InvestigatedProcessId = InitiatingProcessId, LocalIP, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl
) on DeviceName, InvestigatedProcessCommandLine, InvestigatedProcessId, InvestigatedProcessName, InvestigatedProcessStartTime

Stage 6: `project-away`

| project-away DeviceName1, InvestigatedProcessCommandLine1, InvestigatedProcessId1, InvestigatedProcessName1, InvestigatedProcessStartTime1

Stage 7: `extend`

| extend HostName = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, 0, indexof(DeviceName, '.')), DeviceName)

HostName =

ifDeviceName has "."substring(DeviceName, 0, indexof(DeviceName, '.'))

elseDeviceName

Stage 8: `extend`

| extend DnsDomain = iff(DeviceName has '.', substring(DeviceName, indexof(DeviceName, '.') + 1), "")

DnsDomain =

ifDeviceName has "."substring(DeviceName, (indexof(DeviceName, '.') + 1))

else""

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`FileName`	match	`regsvr32.exe` `rundll32.exe`
`InitiatingProcessFileName`	match	`cmd.exe` corpus 2 (kusto 2) `cscript.exe` `powershell.exe` corpus 2 (kusto 2) `pwsh.exe` `regsvr32.exe` corpus 2 (kusto 2) `rundll32.exe` corpus 2 (kusto 2) `wscript.exe`
`RemoteIPType`	eq	`Public` transforms: `cased` corpus 5 (kusto 5)

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`DeviceName`	`project`
`InitiatingProcessCommandLine`	`project`
`InitiatingProcessFileName`	`project`
`InitiatingProcessParentFileName`	`project`
`InvestigatedProcessCommandLine`	`project`
`InvestigatedProcessId`	`project`
`InvestigatedProcessName`	`project`
`InvestigatedProcessStartTime`	`project`
`TimeGenerated`	`project`
`HostName`	`extend`
`DnsDomain`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Regsvr32 Rundll32 with Anomalous Parent Process

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `project`

Stage 5: `join`

Stage 6: `project-away`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `extend`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Regsvr32 Rundll32 with Anomalous Parent Process

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: project

Stage 5: join

Stage 6: project-away

Stage 7: extend

Stage 8: extend

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `project`

Stage 5: `join`

Stage 6: `project-away`

Stage 7: `extend`

Stage 8: `extend`