Risky user signin observed in non-Microsoft network device

Severity: medium
Time window: 1d
Group by: ConditionalAccessStatus, IPAddress, IsRisky, ResourceDisplayName, ResultType, RiskDetail, RiskLevelAggregated, RiskLevelDuringSignIn, RiskState, SourceSystem, UserPrincipalName
Author: Arjun Trivedi
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'This content is utilized to identify instances of successful login by risky users, who have been observed engaging in potentially suspicious network activity on non-Microsoft network devices.'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Command & Control	`T1071` Application Layer Protocol

Rules detecting the same action

Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.

Anomalous sign-in location by user account and authenticating application (Kusto)
Anomalous Single Factor Signin (Kusto)
Authentications of Privileged Accounts Outside of Expected Controls (Kusto)
Azure Many Failed SignIns (Panther)
Azure Portal sign in from another Azure Tenant (Kusto)
Azure Service Principal Sign-In Followed by Arc Cluster Credential Access (Elastic)
Azure SignIn via Legacy Authentication Protocol (Panther)
Detect non-admin requesting token for admin applications (Kusto)

Rule body kusto

id: 042f2801-a375-4cfd-bd29-041fc7ed88a0
name: Risky user signin observed in non-Microsoft network device
description: |
  'This content is utilized to identify instances of successful login by risky users, who have been observed engaging in potentially suspicious network activity on non-Microsoft network devices.'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId:  AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
        - SigninLogs
  - connectorId:  PaloAltoNetworks
    dataTypes:
    - CommonSecurityLog (PaloAlto)
  - connectorId:  Fortinet
    dataTypes:
    - CommonSecurityLog (Fortinet)
  - connectorId:  CheckPoint
    dataTypes:
    - CommonSecurityLog (CheckPoint)
  - connectorId:  Zscaler
    dataTypes:
    - CommonSecurityLog (Zscaler)
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - CommandAndControl
relevantTechniques:
  - T1071
query: |
    SigninLogs
    //Find risky Signin
    | where RiskState == "atRisk" and ResultType == 0
    | extend Signin_Time = TimeGenerated
    | summarize
        AppDisplayName=make_set(AppDisplayName),
        ClientAppUsed=make_set(ClientAppUsed),
        UserAgent=make_set(UserAgent),
        CorrelationId=make_set(CorrelationId),
        Signin_Time= min(Signin_Time),
        RiskEventTypes=make_set(RiskEventTypes)
        by
        ConditionalAccessStatus,
        IPAddress,
        IsRisky,
        ResourceDisplayName,
        RiskDetail,
        ResultType,
        RiskLevelAggregated,
        RiskLevelDuringSignIn,
        RiskState,
        UserPrincipalName=tostring(tolower(UserPrincipalName)),
        SourceSystem
    | join kind=inner (
        CommonSecurityLog
        | where DeviceVendor has_any  ("Palo Alto Networks", "Fortinet", "Check Point", "Zscaler")
        | where DeviceProduct startswith "FortiGate" or DeviceProduct startswith  "PAN" or DeviceProduct startswith  "VPN" or DeviceProduct startswith "FireWall" or DeviceProduct startswith  "NSSWeblog" or DeviceProduct startswith "URL"
        | where DeviceAction != "Block"
        | where isnotempty(RequestURL)
        | where isnotempty(SourceUserName)
        | extend SourceUserName = tolower(SourceUserName)
        | summarize
            min(TimeGenerated),
            max(TimeGenerated),
            Activity=make_set(Activity)
            by DestinationHostName, DestinationIP, RequestURL, SourceUserName=tostring(tolower(SourceUserName)),DeviceVendor,DeviceProduct
        | extend 3p_observed_Time= min_TimeGenerated,Name = tostring(split(SourceUserName,"@")[0]),UPNSuffix =tostring(split(SourceUserName,"@")[1]))
        on $left.IPAddress == $right.DestinationIP and $left.UserPrincipalName == $right.SourceUserName
    | extend Timediff = datetime_diff('day', 3p_observed_Time, Signin_Time)
    | where Timediff <= 1 and Timediff >= 0
entityMappings:
    - entityType: Account
      fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: UserPrincipalName
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Name
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: UPNSuffix
    - entityType: IP
      fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: DestinationIP
    - entityType: DNS
      fieldMappings:
      - identifier: DomainName
        columnName: DestinationHostName
kind: Scheduled
version: 1.0.6
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Arjun Trivedi
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Threat Protection" ]

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

SigninLogs

Stage 2: `where`

| where RiskState == "atRisk" and ResultType == 0

Stage 3: `extend`

| extend Signin_Time = TimeGenerated

Stage 4: `summarize`

| summarize
    AppDisplayName=make_set(AppDisplayName),
    ClientAppUsed=make_set(ClientAppUsed),
    UserAgent=make_set(UserAgent),
    CorrelationId=make_set(CorrelationId),
    Signin_Time= min(Signin_Time),
    RiskEventTypes=make_set(RiskEventTypes)
    by
    ConditionalAccessStatus,
    IPAddress,
    IsRisky,
    ResourceDisplayName,
    RiskDetail,
    ResultType,
    RiskLevelAggregated,
    RiskLevelDuringSignIn,
    RiskState,
    UserPrincipalName=tostring(tolower(UserPrincipalName)),
    SourceSystem

Stage 5: `join`

| join kind=inner (
    CommonSecurityLog
    | where DeviceVendor has_any  ("Palo Alto Networks", "Fortinet", "Check Point", "Zscaler")
    | where DeviceProduct startswith "FortiGate" or DeviceProduct startswith  "PAN" or DeviceProduct startswith  "VPN" or DeviceProduct startswith "FireWall" or DeviceProduct startswith  "NSSWeblog" or DeviceProduct startswith "URL"
    | where DeviceAction != "Block"
    | where isnotempty(RequestURL)
    | where isnotempty(SourceUserName)
    | extend SourceUserName = tolower(SourceUserName)
    | summarize
        min(TimeGenerated),
        max(TimeGenerated),
        Activity=make_set(Activity)
        by DestinationHostName, DestinationIP, RequestURL, SourceUserName=tostring(tolower(SourceUserName)),DeviceVendor,DeviceProduct
    | extend 3p_observed_Time= min_TimeGenerated,Name = tostring(split(SourceUserName,"@")[0]),UPNSuffix =tostring(split(SourceUserName,"@")[1]))
    on $left.IPAddress == $right.DestinationIP and $left.UserPrincipalName == $right.SourceUserName

Stage 6: `extend`

| extend Timediff = datetime_diff('day', 3p_observed_Time, Signin_Time)

Stage 7: `where`

| where Timediff <= 1 and Timediff >= 0

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`DeviceAction`	ne	`Block` transforms: `cased`
`DeviceProduct`	starts_with	`FireWall` `FortiGate` `NSSWeblog` `PAN` `URL` `VPN`
`DeviceVendor`	match	`Check Point` `Fortinet` `Palo Alto Networks` `Zscaler`
`RequestURL`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`ResultType`	eq	`0` transforms: `cased`
`RiskState`	eq	`atRisk` transforms: `cased`
`SourceUserName`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`Timediff`	ge	`0` transforms: `cased`
`Timediff`	le	`1` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`AppDisplayName`	`summarize`
`ClientAppUsed`	`summarize`
`ConditionalAccessStatus`	`summarize`
`CorrelationId`	`summarize`
`IPAddress`	`summarize`
`IsRisky`	`summarize`
`ResourceDisplayName`	`summarize`
`ResultType`	`summarize`
`RiskDetail`	`summarize`
`RiskEventTypes`	`summarize`
`RiskLevelAggregated`	`summarize`
`RiskLevelDuringSignIn`	`summarize`
`RiskState`	`summarize`
`Signin_Time`	`summarize`
`SourceSystem`	`summarize`
`UserAgent`	`summarize`
`UserPrincipalName`	`summarize`
`Timediff`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Risky user signin observed in non-Microsoft network device

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend`

Stage 4: `summarize`

Stage 5: `join`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `where`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Risky user signin observed in non-Microsoft network device

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: extend

Stage 4: summarize

Stage 5: join

Stage 6: extend

Stage 7: where

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend`

Stage 4: `summarize`

Stage 5: `join`

Stage 6: `extend`

Stage 7: `where`