Azure VM Run Command operation executed during suspicious login window

Severity: high
Time window: 2d
Group by: Authorization, Caller, CorrelationId
Author: Microsoft Security Rearch
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Identifies when the Azure Run Command operation is executed by a UserPrincipalName and IP Address that has resulted in a recent user entity behaviour alert.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Credential Access	`T1212` Exploitation for Credential Access
Lateral Movement	`T1570` Lateral Tool Transfer

Event coverage

Provider	Event
Azure-Microsoft.Compute	Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/runCommand/action

Rule body kusto

id: 11bda520-a965-4654-9a45-d09f372f71aa
name: Azure VM Run Command operation executed during suspicious login window
description: |
  'Identifies when the Azure Run Command operation is executed by a UserPrincipalName and IP Address that has resulted in a recent user entity behaviour alert.'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureActivity
    dataTypes:
      - AzureActivity
  - connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
    dataTypes:
      - BehaviorAnalytics
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 2d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - LateralMovement
  - CredentialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1570
  - T1212
query: |
  AzureActivity
  // Isolate run command actions
  | where OperationNameValue =~ "MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/RUNCOMMAND/ACTION"
  // Confirm that the operation impacted a virtual machine
  | where Authorization has "virtualMachines"
  // Each runcommand operation consists of three events when successful, Started, Accepted (or Rejected), Successful (or Failed).
  | summarize StartTime=min(TimeGenerated), EndTime=max(TimeGenerated), max(CallerIpAddress), make_list(ActivityStatusValue) by CorrelationId, Authorization, Caller
  // Limit to Run Command executions that Succeeded
  | where list_ActivityStatusValue has_any ("Success", "Succeeded")
  // Extract data from the Authorization field
  | extend Authorization_d = parse_json(Authorization)
  | extend Scope = Authorization_d.scope
  | extend Scope_s = split(Scope, "/")
  | extend Subscription = tostring(Scope_s[2])
  | extend VirtualMachineName = tostring(Scope_s[-1])
  | project StartTime, EndTime, Subscription, VirtualMachineName, CorrelationId, Caller, CallerIpAddress=max_CallerIpAddress
  // Create a join key using  the Caller (UPN)
  | extend joinkey = tolower(Caller)
  // Join the Run Command actions to UEBA data
  | join kind = inner (
      BehaviorAnalytics
      // We are specifically interested in unusual logins
      | where EventSource == "Azure AD" and ActivityInsights.ActionUncommonlyPerformedByUser == "True"
      | project UEBAEventTime=TimeGenerated, UEBAActionType=ActionType, UserPrincipalName, UEBASourceIPLocation=SourceIPLocation, UEBAActivityInsights=ActivityInsights, UEBAUsersInsights=UsersInsights
      | where isnotempty(UserPrincipalName) and isnotempty(UEBASourceIPLocation)
      | extend joinkey = tolower(UserPrincipalName)
  ) on joinkey
  // Create a window around the UEBA event times, check to see if the Run Command action was performed within them
  | extend UEBAWindowStart = UEBAEventTime - 1h, UEBAWindowEnd = UEBAEventTime + 6h
  | where StartTime between (UEBAWindowStart .. UEBAWindowEnd)
  | project StartTime, EndTime, Subscription, VirtualMachineName, Caller, CallerIpAddress, UEBAEventTime, UEBAActionType, UEBASourceIPLocation, UEBAActivityInsights, UEBAUsersInsights
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(Caller, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Caller, "@")[1])
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Caller
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: CallerIpAddress
version: 1.0.10
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Microsoft Security Rearch
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Others", "Platform" ]

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

AzureActivity

Stage 2: `where`

| where OperationNameValue =~ "MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/RUNCOMMAND/ACTION"

Stage 3: `where`

| where Authorization has "virtualMachines"

Stage 4: `summarize`

| summarize StartTime=min(TimeGenerated), EndTime=max(TimeGenerated), max(CallerIpAddress), make_list(ActivityStatusValue) by CorrelationId, Authorization, Caller

Threshold: ge UEBAWindowStart

Stage 5: `where`

| where list_ActivityStatusValue has_any ("Success", "Succeeded")

Stage 6: `extend` (5 consecutive steps)

| extend Authorization_d = parse_json(Authorization)
| extend Scope = Authorization_d.scope
| extend Scope_s = split(Scope, "/")
| extend Subscription = tostring(Scope_s[2])
| extend VirtualMachineName = tostring(Scope_s[-1])

Stage 7: `project`

| project StartTime, EndTime, Subscription, VirtualMachineName, CorrelationId, Caller, CallerIpAddress=max_CallerIpAddress

Stage 8: `extend`

| extend joinkey = tolower(Caller)

Stage 9: `join`

| join kind = inner (
    BehaviorAnalytics
    | where EventSource == "Azure AD" and ActivityInsights.ActionUncommonlyPerformedByUser == "True"
    | project UEBAEventTime=TimeGenerated, UEBAActionType=ActionType, UserPrincipalName, UEBASourceIPLocation=SourceIPLocation, UEBAActivityInsights=ActivityInsights, UEBAUsersInsights=UsersInsights
    | where isnotempty(UserPrincipalName) and isnotempty(UEBASourceIPLocation)
    | extend joinkey = tolower(UserPrincipalName)
) on joinkey

Stage 10: `extend`

| extend UEBAWindowStart = UEBAEventTime - 1h, UEBAWindowEnd = UEBAEventTime + 6h

Stage 11: `where`

| where StartTime between (UEBAWindowStart .. UEBAWindowEnd)

Stage 12: `project`

| project StartTime, EndTime, Subscription, VirtualMachineName, Caller, CallerIpAddress, UEBAEventTime, UEBAActionType, UEBASourceIPLocation, UEBAActivityInsights, UEBAUsersInsights

Stage 13: `extend`

| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Caller, "@")[0]), AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(Caller, "@")[1])

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ActionUncommonlyPerformedByUser`	eq	`True` transforms: `cased`
`Authorization`	match	`virtualMachines` transforms: `term`
`EventSource`	eq	`Azure AD` transforms: `cased`
`OperationNameValue`	eq	`MICROSOFT.COMPUTE/VIRTUALMACHINES/RUNCOMMAND/ACTION`
`StartTime`	ge	`UEBAWindowStart`
`StartTime`	le	`UEBAWindowEnd`
`UEBASourceIPLocation`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`UserPrincipalName`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`list_ActivityStatusValue`	match	`Succeeded` `Success`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`Caller`	`project`
`CallerIpAddress`	`project`
`EndTime`	`project`
`StartTime`	`project`
`Subscription`	`project`
`UEBAActionType`	`project`
`UEBAActivityInsights`	`project`
`UEBAEventTime`	`project`
`UEBASourceIPLocation`	`project`
`UEBAUsersInsights`	`project`
`VirtualMachineName`	`project`
`AccountName`	`extend`
`AccountUPNSuffix`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Azure VM Run Command operation executed during suspicious login window

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `summarize`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `extend` (5 consecutive steps)

Stage 7: `project`

Stage 8: `extend`

Stage 9: `join`

Stage 10: `extend`

Stage 11: `where`

Stage 12: `project`

Stage 13: `extend`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Azure VM Run Command operation executed during suspicious login window

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: summarize

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: extend (5 consecutive steps)

Stage 7: project

Stage 8: extend

Stage 9: join

Stage 10: extend

Stage 11: where

Stage 12: project

Stage 13: extend

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `summarize`

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `extend` (5 consecutive steps)

Stage 7: `project`

Stage 8: `extend`

Stage 9: `join`

Stage 10: `extend`

Stage 11: `where`

Stage 12: `project`

Stage 13: `extend`