SUNSPOT malware hashes

Status: available
Severity: medium
Time window: 1d
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

This query uses Microsoft Defender for Endpoint data to look for IoCs associated with the SUNSPOT malware shared by Crowdstrike. More details: - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-analysis/ - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/microsoftsentinelblog/monitoring-the-software-supply-chain-with-azure-sentinel/2176463/

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Persistence	`T1554` Compromise Host Software Binary

Event coverage

Provider	ActionType	Title
Defender-DeviceEvents	any	Defender event (any)

Rule body kusto

id: 53e936c6-6c30-4d12-8343-b8a0456e8429
name: SUNSPOT malware hashes
description: |
  'This query uses Microsoft Defender for Endpoint data to look for IoCs associated with the SUNSPOT malware shared by Crowdstrike.
  More details: 
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/sunspot-malware-technical-analysis/
    - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/microsoftsentinelblog/monitoring-the-software-supply-chain-with-azure-sentinel/2176463/'
severity: Medium
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - DeviceImageLoadEvents
      - DeviceEvents
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Persistence
relevantTechniques:
  - T1554
tags:
  - Solorigate
  - NOBELIUM
query: |
  let SUNSPOT_Hashes = dynamic(["c45c9bda8db1d470f1fd0dcc346dc449839eb5ce9a948c70369230af0b3ef168", "0819db19be479122c1d48743e644070a8dc9a1c852df9a8c0dc2343e904da389"]);
  union isfuzzy=true(
  DeviceEvents
  | where InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (SUNSPOT_Hashes)),
  (DeviceImageLoadEvents
  | where InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (SUNSPOT_Hashes))
  | extend timestamp=TimeGenerated
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName 
        columnName: DeviceName
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: DnsDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName 
        columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountUpn
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountDomain
version: 1.0.4
kind: Scheduled

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let SUNSPOT_Hashes = dynamic(["c45c9bda8db1d470f1fd0dcc346dc449839eb5ce9a948c70369230af0b3ef168", "0819db19be479122c1d48743e644070a8dc9a1c852df9a8c0dc2343e904da389"]);

union `isfuzzy=true` (2 sources)

Each leg below queries one source; the rule matches if any leg does. Sources: DeviceEvents, DeviceImageLoadEvents

Leg 1: `DeviceEvents`

DeviceEvents
| where InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (SUNSPOT_Hashes)

Leg 2: `DeviceImageLoadEvents`

DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where InitiatingProcessSHA256 in (SUNSPOT_Hashes)

Applied to the combined result

| extend timestamp=TimeGenerated
| extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`InitiatingProcessSHA256`	in	`0819db19be479122c1d48743e644070a8dc9a1c852df9a8c0dc2343e904da389` transforms: `cased` `c45c9bda8db1d470f1fd0dcc346dc449839eb5ce9a948c70369230af0b3ef168` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`timestamp`	`extend`
`DomainIndex`	`extend`
`HostName`	`extend`
`HostNameDomain`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

SUNSPOT malware hashes

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

union `isfuzzy=true` (2 sources)

Leg 1: `DeviceEvents`

Leg 2: `DeviceImageLoadEvents`

Applied to the combined result

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

SUNSPOT malware hashes

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Event coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

union isfuzzy=true (2 sources)

Leg 1: DeviceEvents

Leg 2: DeviceImageLoadEvents

Applied to the combined result

Indicators

Output fields

union `isfuzzy=true` (2 sources)

Leg 1: `DeviceEvents`

Leg 2: `DeviceImageLoadEvents`