Detection rules › Kusto

Security Service Registry ACL Modification

Severity
high
Time window
1d
Author
Microsoft Security Research
Source
github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

Identifies attempts to modify registry ACL to evade security solutions. In the Solorigate attack, the attackers were found modifying registry permissions so services.exe cannot access the relevant registry keys to start the service. The detection leverages Security Event as well as MDE data to identify when specific security services registry permissions are modified. Only some portions of this detection are related to Solorigate, it also includes coverage for some common tools that perform this activity. Reference on guidance for enabling registry auditing: - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-auditing-faq - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/appendix-a-security-monitoring-recommendations-for-many-audit-events - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-registry - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4670 - For the event 4670 to be created the audit policy for the registry must have auditing enabled for Write DAC and/or Write Owner - https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule - https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/api/system.security.accesscontrol.registryrights?view=dotnet-plat-ext-5.0

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

TacticTechniques
Defense Impairment

Telemetry coverage

Rule body

id: 473d57e6-f787-435c-a16b-b38b51fa9a4b
name: Security Service Registry ACL Modification
description: |
    'Identifies attempts to modify registry ACL to evade security solutions. In the Solorigate attack, the attackers were found modifying registry permissions so services.exe cannot access the relevant registry keys to start the service.
     The detection leverages Security Event as well as MDE data to identify when specific security services registry permissions are modified.
     Only some portions of this detection are related to Solorigate, it also includes coverage for some common tools that perform this activity.
     Reference on guidance for enabling registry auditing:
     - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/advanced-security-auditing-faq
     - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/appendix-a-security-monitoring-recommendations-for-many-audit-events
     - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-registry
     - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4670
       - For the event 4670 to be created the audit policy for the registry must have auditing enabled for Write DAC and/or Write Owner
     - https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule
     - https://docs.microsoft.com/dotnet/api/system.security.accesscontrol.registryrights?view=dotnet-plat-ext-5.0'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - DeviceProcessEvents
  - connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvents
  - connectorId: WindowsForwardedEvents
    dataTypes:
      - WindowsEvent
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
  - T1562
tags:
  - Solorigate
  - NOBELIUM
query: |
  let servicelist = dynamic(['Services\\HealthService', 'Services\\Sense', 'Services\\WinDefend', 'Services\\MsSecFlt', 'Services\\DiagTrack', 'Services\\SgrmBroker', 'Services\\SgrmAgent', 'Services\\AATPSensorUpdater' , 'Services\\AATPSensor', 'Services\\mpssvc']);
  let filename = dynamic(["subinacl.exe",'SetACL.exe']);
  let parameters = dynamic (['/deny=SYSTEM', '/deny=S-1-5-18', '/grant=SYSTEM=r', '/grant=S-1-5-18=r', 'n:SYSTEM;p:READ', 'n1:SYSTEM;ta:remtrst;w:dacl']);
  let FullAccess = dynamic(['A;CI;KA;;;SY', 'A;ID;KA;;;SY', 'A;CIID;KA;;;SY']);
  let ReadAccess = dynamic(['A;CI;KR;;;SY', 'A;ID;KR;;;SY', 'A;CIID;KR;;;SY']);
  let DenyAccess = dynamic(['D;CI;KR;;;SY', 'D;ID;KR;;;SY', 'D;CIID;KR;;;SY']);
  let timeframe = 1d;
  (union isfuzzy=true
  (
  SecurityEvent
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where EventID == 4670
  | where ObjectType == 'Key'
  | where ObjectName has_any (servicelist)
  | parse EventData with * 'OldSd">' OldSd "<" *
  | parse EventData with * 'NewSd">' NewSd "<" *
  | extend Reason = case( (OldSd has ';;;SY' and NewSd !has ';;;SY'), 'System Account is removed', (OldSd has_any (FullAccess) and NewSd has_any (ReadAccess)) , 'System permission has been changed to read from full access', (OldSd has_any (FullAccess) and NewSd has_any (DenyAccess)), 'System account has been given denied permission', 'None')
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account,  ProcessName, ProcessId, ObjectName, EventData, Activity, HandleId, SubjectLogonId, OldSd, NewSd , Reason
  ),
  (
  SecurityEvent
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where EventID == 4688
  | extend ProcessName = tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
  | where ProcessName in~ (filename)
  | where CommandLine has_any (servicelist) and CommandLine has_any (parameters)
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, AccountDomain, ProcessName, ProcessNameFullPath = NewProcessName, EventID, Activity, CommandLine, EventSourceName, Type
  ),
  (
  WindowsEvent
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where EventID == 4670 and EventData has_any (servicelist) and EventData has 'Key'
  | extend ObjectType = tostring(EventData.ObjectType)
  | where ObjectType == 'Key'
  | extend ObjectName = tostring(EventData.ObjectName)
  | where ObjectName has_any (servicelist)
  | extend OldSd = tostring(EventData.OldSd)
  | extend NewSd = tostring(EventData.NewSd)
  | extend Reason = case( (OldSd has ';;;SY' and NewSd !has ';;;SY'), 'System Account is removed', (OldSd has_any (FullAccess) and NewSd has_any (ReadAccess)) , 'System permission has been changed to read from full access', (OldSd has_any (FullAccess) and NewSd has_any (DenyAccess)), 'System account has been given denied permission', 'None')
  | extend Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))
  | extend ProcessName = tostring(EventData.ProcessName)
  | extend ProcessId = tostring(EventData.ProcessId)
  | extend Activity= "4670 - Permissions on an object were changed."
  | extend HandleId = tostring(EventData.HandleId)
  | extend  SubjectLogonId = tostring(EventData.SubjectLogonId)
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account,  ProcessName, ProcessId, ObjectName, EventData, Activity, HandleId, SubjectLogonId, OldSd, NewSd , Reason
  ),
  (
  WindowsEvent
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where EventID == 4688 and EventData has_any (filename) and EventData has_any (servicelist) and EventData has_any (parameters)
  | extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)
  | extend ProcessName = tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
  | where ProcessName in~ (filename)
  | extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)
  | where CommandLine has_any (servicelist) and CommandLine has_any (parameters)
  | extend  Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))
  | extend  AccountDomain = tostring(EventData.AccountDomain)
  | extend  Activity="4688 - A new process has been created."
  | extend  EventSourceName=Provider
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, AccountDomain, ProcessName, ProcessNameFullPath = NewProcessName, EventID, Activity, CommandLine, EventSourceName, Type
  ),
  (
  DeviceProcessEvents
  | where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
  | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (filename)
  | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any(servicelist) and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (parameters)
  | extend Account = iff(isnotempty(InitiatingProcessAccountUpn), InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, InitiatingProcessAccountName), Computer = DeviceName
  | project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, AccountDomain, ProcessName = InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessNameFullPath = FolderPath, Activity = ActionType, CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Type, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
  )
  )
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[1])
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Account
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: AccountNTDomain
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: Computer
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
version: 1.1.4
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Microsoft Security Research
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Others" ]

Stages and Predicates

Parameters

let filename = dynamic(["subinacl.exe",'SetACL.exe']);
let parameters = dynamic (['/deny=SYSTEM', '/deny=S-1-5-18', '/grant=SYSTEM=r', '/grant=S-1-5-18=r', 'n:SYSTEM;p:READ', 'n1:SYSTEM;ta:remtrst;w:dacl']);
let FullAccess = dynamic(['A;CI;KA;;;SY', 'A;ID;KA;;;SY', 'A;CIID;KA;;;SY']);
let ReadAccess = dynamic(['A;CI;KR;;;SY', 'A;ID;KR;;;SY', 'A;CIID;KR;;;SY']);
let DenyAccess = dynamic(['D;CI;KR;;;SY', 'D;ID;KR;;;SY', 'D;CIID;KR;;;SY']);
let timeframe = 1d;

Let binding: servicelist

let servicelist = dynamic(['Services\\HealthService', 'Services\\Sense', 'Services\\WinDefend', 'Services\\MsSecFlt', 'Services\\DiagTrack', 'Services\\SgrmBroker', 'Services\\SgrmAgent', 'Services\\AATPSensorUpdater' , 'Services\\AATPSensor', 'Services\\mpssvc']);

union isfuzzy=true (5 sources)

Each leg below queries one source; the rule matches if any leg does. Sources: SecurityEvent, SecurityEvent, WindowsEvent, WindowsEvent, DeviceProcessEvents

Leg 1: SecurityEvent

SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 4670
| where ObjectType == 'Key'
| where ObjectName has_any (servicelist)
| parse EventData with * 'OldSd">' OldSd "<" *
| parse EventData with * 'NewSd">' NewSd "<" *
| extend Reason = case( (OldSd has ';;;SY' and NewSd !has ';;;SY'), 'System Account is removed', (OldSd has_any (FullAccess) and NewSd has_any (ReadAccess)) , 'System permission has been changed to read from full access', (OldSd has_any (FullAccess) and NewSd has_any (DenyAccess)), 'System account has been given denied permission', 'None')
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account,  ProcessName, ProcessId, ObjectName, EventData, Activity, HandleId, SubjectLogonId, OldSd, NewSd , Reason

Leg 2: SecurityEvent

SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 4688
| extend ProcessName = tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
| where ProcessName in~ (filename)
| where CommandLine has_any (servicelist) and CommandLine has_any (parameters)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, AccountDomain, ProcessName, ProcessNameFullPath = NewProcessName, EventID, Activity, CommandLine, EventSourceName, Type

Leg 3: WindowsEvent

WindowsEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 4670 and EventData has_any (servicelist) and EventData has 'Key'
| extend ObjectType = tostring(EventData.ObjectType)
| where ObjectType == 'Key'
| extend ObjectName = tostring(EventData.ObjectName)
| where ObjectName has_any (servicelist)
| extend OldSd = tostring(EventData.OldSd)
| extend NewSd = tostring(EventData.NewSd)
| extend Reason = case( (OldSd has ';;;SY' and NewSd !has ';;;SY'), 'System Account is removed', (OldSd has_any (FullAccess) and NewSd has_any (ReadAccess)) , 'System permission has been changed to read from full access', (OldSd has_any (FullAccess) and NewSd has_any (DenyAccess)), 'System account has been given denied permission', 'None')
| extend Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))
| extend ProcessName = tostring(EventData.ProcessName)
| extend ProcessId = tostring(EventData.ProcessId)
| extend Activity= "4670 - Permissions on an object were changed."
| extend HandleId = tostring(EventData.HandleId)
| extend  SubjectLogonId = tostring(EventData.SubjectLogonId)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account,  ProcessName, ProcessId, ObjectName, EventData, Activity, HandleId, SubjectLogonId, OldSd, NewSd , Reason

Leg 4: WindowsEvent

WindowsEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 4688 and EventData has_any (filename) and EventData has_any (servicelist) and EventData has_any (parameters)
| extend NewProcessName = tostring(EventData.NewProcessName)
| extend ProcessName = tostring(split(NewProcessName, '\\')[-1])
| where ProcessName in~ (filename)
| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)
| where CommandLine has_any (servicelist) and CommandLine has_any (parameters)
| extend  Account =  strcat(tostring(EventData.SubjectDomainName),"\\", tostring(EventData.SubjectUserName))
| extend  AccountDomain = tostring(EventData.AccountDomain)
| extend  Activity="4688 - A new process has been created."
| extend  EventSourceName=Provider
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, AccountDomain, ProcessName, ProcessNameFullPath = NewProcessName, EventID, Activity, CommandLine, EventSourceName, Type

Leg 5: DeviceProcessEvents

DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(timeframe)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (filename)
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any(servicelist) and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any (parameters)
| extend Account = iff(isnotempty(InitiatingProcessAccountUpn), InitiatingProcessAccountUpn, InitiatingProcessAccountName), Computer = DeviceName
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, AccountDomain, ProcessName = InitiatingProcessFileName, ProcessNameFullPath = FolderPath, Activity = ActionType, CommandLine = InitiatingProcessCommandLine, Type, InitiatingProcessParentFileName

Applied to the combined result

| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[1])
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)

Indicators

These rows show field, operator, and value matches.

FieldKindValuesSearch
CommandLinematch
  • /deny=S-1-5-18 transforms: term
  • /deny=SYSTEM transforms: term
  • /grant=S-1-5-18=r transforms: term
  • /grant=SYSTEM=r transforms: term
  • Services\AATPSensor transforms: term
  • Services\AATPSensorUpdater transforms: term
  • Services\DiagTrack transforms: term
  • Services\HealthService transforms: term
  • Services\MsSecFlt transforms: term
  • Services\Sense transforms: term
  • Services\SgrmAgent transforms: term
  • Services\SgrmBroker transforms: term
  • Services\WinDefend transforms: term
  • Services\mpssvc transforms: term
  • n1:SYSTEM;ta:remtrst;w:dacl transforms: term
  • n:SYSTEM;p:READ transforms: term
field:"CommandLine" kind:match
EventDatamatch
  • /deny=S-1-5-18 transforms: term
  • /deny=SYSTEM transforms: term
  • /grant=S-1-5-18=r transforms: term
  • /grant=SYSTEM=r transforms: term
  • Key transforms: term
  • Services\AATPSensor transforms: term
  • Services\AATPSensorUpdater transforms: term
  • Services\DiagTrack transforms: term
  • Services\HealthService transforms: term
  • Services\MsSecFlt transforms: term
  • Services\Sense transforms: term
  • Services\SgrmAgent transforms: term
  • Services\SgrmBroker transforms: term
  • Services\WinDefend transforms: term
  • Services\mpssvc transforms: term
  • SetACL.exe transforms: term
  • n1:SYSTEM;ta:remtrst;w:dacl transforms: term
  • n:SYSTEM;p:READ transforms: term
  • subinacl.exe transforms: term
field:"EventData" kind:match
EventIDeq
  • 4670
  • 4688 corpus 317 (splunk 283, kusto 33, elastic 1)
field:"EventID" kind:eq
InitiatingProcessCommandLinematch
  • /deny=S-1-5-18 transforms: term
  • /deny=SYSTEM transforms: term
  • /grant=S-1-5-18=r transforms: term
  • /grant=SYSTEM=r transforms: term
  • Services\AATPSensor transforms: term
  • Services\AATPSensorUpdater transforms: term
  • Services\DiagTrack transforms: term
  • Services\HealthService transforms: term
  • Services\MsSecFlt transforms: term
  • Services\Sense transforms: term
  • Services\SgrmAgent transforms: term
  • Services\SgrmBroker transforms: term
  • Services\WinDefend transforms: term
  • Services\mpssvc transforms: term
  • n1:SYSTEM;ta:remtrst;w:dacl transforms: term
  • n:SYSTEM;p:READ transforms: term
field:"CommandLine" kind:match
InitiatingProcessFileNamein
  • SetACL.exe
  • subinacl.exe
field:"parent_process_name" kind:in
ObjectNamematch
  • Services\AATPSensor transforms: term
  • Services\AATPSensorUpdater transforms: term
  • Services\DiagTrack transforms: term
  • Services\HealthService transforms: term
  • Services\MsSecFlt transforms: term
  • Services\Sense transforms: term
  • Services\SgrmAgent transforms: term
  • Services\SgrmBroker transforms: term
  • Services\WinDefend transforms: term
  • Services\mpssvc transforms: term
field:"ObjectName" kind:match
ObjectTypeeq
  • Key corpus 4 (kusto 4)
field:"ObjectType" kind:eq value:"Key"
ProcessNamein
  • SetACL.exe
  • subinacl.exe
field:"process_name" kind:in

Output fields

These fields are emitted when the rule matches.

FieldSource
Accountproject
AccountDomainproject
Activityproject
CommandLineproject
Computerproject
InitiatingProcessParentFileNameproject
ProcessNameproject
ProcessNameFullPathproject
TimeGeneratedproject
Typeproject
AccountNTDomainextend
AccountNameextend
DomainIndexextend
HostNameextend
HostNameDomainextend