Service Principal Authentication Attempt from New Country

Severity: medium
Time window: 14d
Group by: Location, ServicePrincipalName
Author: Pete Bryan
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'Detects when there is a Service Principal login attempt from a country that has not seen a successful login in the previous 14 days. Threat actors may attempt to authenticate with credentials from compromised accounts - monitoring attempts from anomalous locations may help identify these attempts. Authentication attempts should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate and if there is other similar activity. Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Initial Access	`T1078.004` Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts

Rules detecting the same action

Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.

Authentication Attempt from New Country (Kusto)
Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications For User (Splunk)
Azure AD High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip (Splunk)
Azure AD Multi-Source Failed Authentications Spike (Splunk)
Azure AD Multiple Users Failing To Authenticate From Ip (Splunk)
Azure AD Unusual Number of Failed Authentications From Ip (Splunk)
Entra ID Sign-in Brute Force Attempted (Microsoft 365) (Elastic)
Entra ID User Sign-in Brute Force Attempted (Elastic)

Rule body kusto

id: 1baaaf00-655f-4de9-8ff8-312e902cda71
name: Service Principal Authentication Attempt from New Country
description: |
  'Detects when there is a Service Principal login attempt from a country that has not seen a successful login in the previous 14 days.
    Threat actors may attempt to authenticate with credentials from compromised accounts - monitoring attempts from anomalous locations may help identify these attempts.
    Authentication attempts should be investigated to ensure the activity was legitimate and if there is other similar activity.
    Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-failed-unusual-sign-ins'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
      - AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 14d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1078.004
tags:
  - AADSecOpsGuide
query: |
  let known_locations = (
    AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs
    | where TimeGenerated between(ago(14d)..ago(1d))
    | where ResultType == 0
    | summarize by Location);
    AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
    | where ResultType != 50126
    | where Location !in (known_locations)
    | extend City = tostring(parse_json(LocationDetails).city)
    | extend State = tostring(parse_json(LocationDetails).state)
    | extend Place = strcat(City, " - ", State)
    | extend Result = strcat(tostring(ResultType), " - ", ResultDescription)
    | summarize FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated), make_set(Result), make_set(IPAddress), make_set(Place) by ServicePrincipalName, Location
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: ServicePrincipalName
version: 1.0.1
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Pete Bryan
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
        domains: [ "Security - Others", "Identity" ]

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `known_locations`

let known_locations = (
  AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs
  | where TimeGenerated between(ago(14d)..ago(1d))
  | where ResultType == 0
  | summarize by Location);

Stage 1: `source`

AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs

Stage 2: `where`

| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)

Stage 3: `where`

| where ResultType != 50126

Stage 4: `where`

| where Location !in (known_locations)

References known_locations (defined above).

Stage 5: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

| extend City = tostring(parse_json(LocationDetails).city)
| extend State = tostring(parse_json(LocationDetails).state)
| extend Place = strcat(City, " - ", State)
| extend Result = strcat(tostring(ResultType), " - ", ResultDescription)

Stage 6: `summarize`

| summarize FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated), make_set(Result), make_set(IPAddress), make_set(Place) by ServicePrincipalName, Location

Exclusions

Top-level NOT(...) conjuncts: predicates this rule actively suppresses.

Field	Kind	Excluded values
`Location`	eq	`known_locations`

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ResultType`	ne	`50126` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`FirstSeen`	`summarize`
`LastSeen`	`summarize`
`Location`	`summarize`
`ServicePrincipalName`	`summarize`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Service Principal Authentication Attempt from New Country

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `known_locations`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 6: `summarize`

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Service Principal Authentication Attempt from New Country

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: known_locations

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: extend (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 6: summarize

Exclusions

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `known_locations`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 6: `summarize`