Detection rules › Kusto
TEARDROP memory-only dropper
Identifies SolarWinds TEARDROP memory-only dropper IOCs in Window's defender Exploit Guard activity References: - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html - https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/71ffdd4cab4b6acd5cbcd1a0691ff82f
MITRE ATT&CK coverage
| Tactic | Techniques |
|---|---|
| Execution | T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter |
| Persistence | T1543 Create or Modify System Process |
| Stealth | T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information |
Event coverage
| Provider | ActionType | Title |
|---|---|---|
| Defender-DeviceEvents | any | Defender event (any) |
Rule body kusto
id: 738702fd-0a66-42c7-8586-e30f0583f8fe
name: TEARDROP memory-only dropper
description: |
Identifies SolarWinds TEARDROP memory-only dropper IOCs in Window's defender Exploit Guard activity
References:
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html
- https://gist.github.com/olafhartong/71ffdd4cab4b6acd5cbcd1a0691ff82f
severity: High
status: Available
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
dataTypes:
- DeviceEvents
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- Execution
- Persistence
- DefenseEvasion
relevantTechniques:
- T1543
- T1059
- T1027
tags:
- Sunburst
- Solorigate
- NOBELIUM
query: |
DeviceEvents
| where ActionType has "ExploitGuardNonMicrosoftSignedBlocked"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has "svchost.exe" and FileName has "NetSetupSvc.dll"
| extend HashAlgorithm = "SHA1"
| extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)
entityMappings:
- entityType: Host
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: DeviceName
- identifier: HostName
columnName: HostName
- identifier: DnsDomain
columnName: HostNameDomain
- entityType: Account
fieldMappings:
- identifier: FullName
columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountUpn
- identifier: Name
columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountName
- identifier: UPNSuffix
columnName: InitiatingProcessAccountDomain
- entityType: FileHash
fieldMappings:
- identifier: Algorithm
columnName: HashAlgorithm
- identifier: Value
columnName: InitiatingProcessSHA1
version: 1.0.6
kind: Scheduled
Stages and Predicates
Stage 1: source
DeviceEvents
Stage 2: where
| where ActionType has "ExploitGuardNonMicrosoftSignedBlocked"
Stage 3: where
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has "svchost.exe" and FileName has "NetSetupSvc.dll"
Stage 4: extend (3 consecutive steps)
| extend HashAlgorithm = "SHA1"
| extend HostName = tostring(split(DeviceName, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DeviceName, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DeviceName, DomainIndex + 1), DeviceName)
Indicators
Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.
| Field | Kind | Values |
|---|---|---|
ActionType | match |
|
FileName | match |
|
InitiatingProcessFileName | match |
|
Output fields
Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
HashAlgorithm | extend |
DomainIndex | extend |
HostName | extend |
HostNameDomain | extend |