Successful AWS Console Login from IP Address Observed Conducting Password Spray

Severity: medium
Time window: 1m
Group by: AccountObjectId, AlertName, AlertSeverity, AlertTime, AlertTimeGenerated, EntityIp, ProductName, ProviderName, SourceIpAddress, Tactics, Techniques
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'This query aims to detect instances of successful AWS console login events followed by multiple failed app logons alerts generated by Microsoft Cloud App Security or password spray alerts generated by Defender Products. Specifically, it focuses on scenarios where the successful login takes place within a 60-minute timeframe of the high-severity alert. The login is considered relevant if it originates from an IP address associated with potential attackers.'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Initial Access	`T1078` Valid Accounts
Credential Access	`T1110` Brute Force

Rules detecting the same action

Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.

AWS Console Login (Panther)
AWS Console Login Failed During MFA Challenge (Splunk)
AWS ConsoleLogin Failed Authentication (Sigma)
AWS CreateLoginProfile (Splunk)
AWS Credential Access Failed Login (Splunk)
AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications For User (Splunk)
AWS High Number Of Failed Authentications From Ip (Splunk)
AWS Multiple Failed MFA Requests For User (Splunk)

Rule body kusto

id: 188db479-d50a-4a9c-a041-644bae347d1f
name: Successful AWS Console Login from IP Address Observed Conducting Password Spray
description: |
  'This query aims to detect instances of successful AWS console login events followed by multiple failed app logons alerts generated by Microsoft Cloud App Security or password spray alerts generated by Defender Products.
   Specifically, it focuses on scenarios where the successful login takes place within a 60-minute timeframe of the high-severity alert. 
   The login is considered relevant if it originates from an IP address associated with potential attackers.'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AWS
    dataTypes:
      - AWSCloudTrail
  - connectorId: MicrosoftDefenderAdvancedThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityAlert
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectoryIdentityProtection
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityAlert (IPC)
  - connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
    dataTypes:
      - IdentityInfo
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityAlert
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
  - CredentialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1110
  - T1078
query: |
  SecurityAlert 
  // Filtering alerts based on Microsoft product names and Relevent alert names
    | where ProductName in ( "Microsoft Cloud App Security","Azure Active Directory Identity Protection")
    |where AlertName in ("Multiple failed user log on attempts to an app","Password Spray")
  // Parsing and extending the 'Entities' column as JSON objects
    | extend Entities = parse_json(Entities) 
  // Exploring IP entities within the alert entities
    | mv-apply Entity = Entities on 
        ( 
        where Entity.Type == 'ip' 
        | extend EntityIp = tostring(Entity.Address) 
        ) 
  // Exploring account entities within the alert entities
    | mv-apply Entity = Entities on 
        ( 
        where Entity.Type == 'account' 
        | extend AccountObjectId = tostring(Entity.AadUserId)
        )
  // Filtering out alerts with missing IP or account information
    | where isnotempty(EntityIp) and isnotempty(AccountObjectId)
  // Summarizing relevant fields for further analysis
    | summarize 
        by 
        AlertName,
        ProductName,
        ProviderName,
        AlertSeverity,
        EntityIp,
        Tactics,
        Techniques,
        AlertTime= bin(TimeGenerated, 1min),
        AccountObjectId,
        AlertTimeGenerated=TimeGenerated
  // Joining with IdentityInfo to obtain additional account details
    | join kind=inner (
        IdentityInfo
        | where TimeGenerated >= ago(1d)
        | distinct AccountObjectId, AccountUPN=tolower(AccountUPN)
        )
        on AccountObjectId 
        |extend Name = tostring(split(AccountUPN,'@')[0]), UPNSuffix =tostring(split(AccountUPN,'@')[1])
  // Joining with AWSCloudTrail data to correlate AWS console logins
    | join kind=inner (
        AWSCloudTrail
        | where EventName == "ConsoleLogin"
        | extend CTUPN= tolower(tostring(tolower(split(UserIdentityArn, "/", 2)[0])))
        | extend ActionType= tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)  
        | where ActionType == "Success"
        | extend AWSTime= bin(TimeGenerated, 1min)
        | project
            EventName,
            EventSource,
            EventTypeName,
            RecipientAccountId,
            ResponseElements,
            SessionMfaAuthenticated,
            SourceIpAddress,
            TimeGenerated,
            UserAgent,
            UserIdentityArn,
            UserIdentityType,
            CTUPN,
            AWSTime,
            UserIdentityUserName
        )
        on $left.EntityIp == $right.SourceIpAddress 
  // Filtering login event after the Alert generation time
    | where AlertTimeGenerated between ((AWSTime - 1h)..(AWSTime + 1h))
  // Calculating the time difference between alert generation and AWS login
    | extend timediff = datetime_diff('minute', AlertTimeGenerated, TimeGenerated) 
  // Filtering alerts with a time difference of up to 60 minutes
    | where timediff <= 60
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: AccountUPN
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Name
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: UPNSuffix
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SourceIpAddress
customDetails:
   AWSUser: UserIdentityArn
   UserAgent: UserAgent
   AWSUserUPN: CTUPN
kind: Scheduled
version: 1.0.1

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

SecurityAlert

Stage 2: `where`

| where ProductName in ( "Microsoft Cloud App Security","Azure Active Directory Identity Protection")

Stage 3: `where`

| where AlertName in ("Multiple failed user log on attempts to an app","Password Spray")

Stage 4: `extend`

| extend Entities = parse_json(Entities)

Stage 5: `kusto:mv-apply`

| mv-apply Entity = Entities on 
      ( 
      where Entity.Type == 'ip' 
      | extend EntityIp = tostring(Entity.Address) 
      )

Stage 6: `kusto:mv-apply`

| mv-apply Entity = Entities on 
      ( 
      where Entity.Type == 'account' 
      | extend AccountObjectId = tostring(Entity.AadUserId)
      )

Stage 7: `where`

| where isnotempty(EntityIp) and isnotempty(AccountObjectId)

Stage 8: `summarize`

| summarize 
      by 
      AlertName,
      ProductName,
      ProviderName,
      AlertSeverity,
      EntityIp,
      Tactics,
      Techniques,
      AlertTime= bin(TimeGenerated, 1min),
      AccountObjectId,
      AlertTimeGenerated=TimeGenerated

Stage 9: `join`

| join kind=inner (
      IdentityInfo
      | where TimeGenerated >= ago(1d)
      | distinct AccountObjectId, AccountUPN=tolower(AccountUPN)
      )
      on AccountObjectId

Stage 10: `extend`

| extend Name = tostring(split(AccountUPN,'@')[0]), UPNSuffix =tostring(split(AccountUPN,'@')[1])

Stage 11: `join`

| join kind=inner (
      AWSCloudTrail
      | where EventName == "ConsoleLogin"
      | extend CTUPN= tolower(tostring(tolower(split(UserIdentityArn, "/", 2)[0])))
      | extend ActionType= tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)  
      | where ActionType == "Success"
      | extend AWSTime= bin(TimeGenerated, 1min)
      | project
          EventName,
          EventSource,
          EventTypeName,
          RecipientAccountId,
          ResponseElements,
          SessionMfaAuthenticated,
          SourceIpAddress,
          TimeGenerated,
          UserAgent,
          UserIdentityArn,
          UserIdentityType,
          CTUPN,
          AWSTime,
          UserIdentityUserName
      )
      on $left.EntityIp == $right.SourceIpAddress

Stage 12: `where`

| where AlertTimeGenerated between ((AWSTime - 1h)..(AWSTime + 1h))

Stage 13: `extend`

| extend timediff = datetime_diff('minute', AlertTimeGenerated, TimeGenerated)

Stage 14: `where`

| where timediff <= 60

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`AccountObjectId`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`ActionType`	eq	`Success` transforms: `cased`
`AlertName`	in	`Multiple failed user log on attempts to an app` transforms: `cased` `Password Spray` transforms: `cased`
`EntityIp`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`EventName`	eq	`ConsoleLogin` transforms: `cased`
`ProductName`	in	`Azure Active Directory Identity Protection` transforms: `cased` `Microsoft Cloud App Security` transforms: `cased`
`Type`	eq	`account` transforms: `cased` `ip` transforms: `cased`
`timediff`	le	`60` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`AccountObjectId`	`summarize`
`AlertName`	`summarize`
`AlertSeverity`	`summarize`
`AlertTime`	`summarize`
`AlertTimeGenerated`	`summarize`
`EntityIp`	`summarize`
`ProductName`	`summarize`
`ProviderName`	`summarize`
`Tactics`	`summarize`
`Techniques`	`summarize`
`Name`	`extend`
`UPNSuffix`	`extend`
`timediff`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Successful AWS Console Login from IP Address Observed Conducting Password Spray

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `extend`

Stage 5: `kusto:mv-apply`

Stage 6: `kusto:mv-apply`

Stage 7: `where`

Stage 8: `summarize`

Stage 9: `join`

Stage 10: `extend`

Stage 11: `join`

Stage 12: `where`

Stage 13: `extend`

Stage 14: `where`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Successful AWS Console Login from IP Address Observed Conducting Password Spray

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: extend

Stage 5: kusto:mv-apply

Stage 6: kusto:mv-apply

Stage 7: where

Stage 8: summarize

Stage 9: join

Stage 10: extend

Stage 11: join

Stage 12: where

Stage 13: extend

Stage 14: where

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `extend`

Stage 5: `kusto:mv-apply`

Stage 6: `kusto:mv-apply`

Stage 7: `where`

Stage 8: `summarize`

Stage 9: `join`

Stage 10: `extend`

Stage 11: `join`

Stage 12: `where`

Stage 13: `extend`

Stage 14: `where`