AWSCloudTrail - Suspicious AWS CLI Command Execution

Severity: medium
Time window: 1m
Group by: AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, RecipientAccountId, SessionMfaAuthenticated, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityUserName
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'This detection focuses on identifying potentially suspicious activities involving the execution of AWS Command Line Interface (CLI) commands, particularly focusing on reconnaissance operations.'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Reconnaissance	`T1589.002` Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses, `T1589.003` Gather Victim Identity Information: Employee Names, `T1590` Gather Victim Network Information, `T1591` Gather Victim Org Information, `T1592.004` Gather Victim Host Information: Client Configurations, `T1595` Active Scanning, `T1596` Search Open Technical Databases

Rule body kusto

id: 8c2dc344-9352-4ca1-8863-b1b7a5e09e59
name: AWSCloudTrail - Suspicious AWS CLI Command Execution
description: |
  'This detection focuses on identifying potentially suspicious activities involving the execution of AWS Command Line Interface (CLI) commands, particularly focusing on reconnaissance operations.'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AWS
    dataTypes:
      - AWSCloudTrail
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - Reconnaissance
relevantTechniques:
  - T1595
  - T1592.004
  - T1589.002
  - T1589.003
  - T1590
  - T1591
  - T1596
query: |
  let SuspiciousCommands= pack_array('iam.list-users', 'iam.list-groups', 'ec2.describe-vpcs', 'ec2.describe-subnets', 'route53.list-hosted-zones', 'kms.list-keys', 'kms.list-aliases', 'ecs.list-clusters', 'ecs.list-services', 'iam.list-roles', 'iam.get-user''iam.list-access-keys', 'ec2.describe-security-groups', 'ec2.describe-network-acls', 'ec2.describe-network-interfaces', 'ec2.describe-route-tables', 'ec2.describe-internet-gateways', 'ec2.describe-vpc-peering-connections', 'ec2.describe-network-interfaces', 'ec2.describe-network-interfaces', 'ec2.describe-transit-gateway-vpc-attachment', 'ec2.describe-vpc');
  // Retrieve AWS CloudTrail events
  AWSCloudTrail 
  // Filter events with UserAgent starting with "aws-cli"
  | where UserAgent startswith "aws-cli" 
  // Extract the command from the UserAgent using string splitting
  | extend command = tostring(split(UserAgent, "off command/", 1)[0])  
  // Filter events based on predefined suspicious command list
  | where command has_any (SuspiciousCommands)  
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  // Summarize relevant information for further analysis
  | summarize 
      CommadCount = dcount(command), 
      EventCount = dcount(EventName), 
      commands = make_list(command), 
      Events = make_list(EventName) 
      by 
      bin(TimeGenerated, 1min), 
      RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, 
      UserIdentityUserName, 
      SourceIpAddress, 
      SessionMfaAuthenticated 
  // Filter out results with a sufficient count of unique suspicious commands in 1 min time window
  | where CommadCount >= 8
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
      - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
        columnName: RecipientAccountId
customDetails:
   SuspiciousCommand: commands
   AWSUser: UserIdentityUserName
   AWSUserIp: SourceIpAddress
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: Suspicious AWS CLI reconnaissance by {{AccountName}} - {{CommadCount}} commands
  alertDescriptionFormat: User {{AccountName}} executed {{CommadCount}} suspicious AWS CLI reconnaissance commands from {{SourceIpAddress}} within 1 minute window.
kind: Scheduled
version: 1.0.2

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `SuspiciousCommands`

let SuspiciousCommands = pack_array('iam.list-users', 'iam.list-groups', 'ec2.describe-vpcs', 'ec2.describe-subnets', 'route53.list-hosted-zones', 'kms.list-keys', 'kms.list-aliases', 'ecs.list-clusters', 'ecs.list-services', 'iam.list-roles', 'iam.get-user''iam.list-access-keys', 'ec2.describe-security-groups', 'ec2.describe-network-acls', 'ec2.describe-network-interfaces', 'ec2.describe-route-tables', 'ec2.describe-internet-gateways', 'ec2.describe-vpc-peering-connections', 'ec2.describe-network-interfaces', 'ec2.describe-network-interfaces', 'ec2.describe-transit-gateway-vpc-attachment', 'ec2.describe-vpc');

Stage 1: `source`

AWSCloudTrail

Stage 2: `where`

| where UserAgent startswith "aws-cli"

Stage 3: `extend`

| extend command = tostring(split(UserAgent, "off command/", 1)[0])

Stage 4: `where`

| where command has_any (SuspiciousCommands)

References SuspiciousCommands (defined above).

Stage 5: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")

Stage 6: `summarize`

| summarize 
    CommadCount = dcount(command), 
    EventCount = dcount(EventName), 
    commands = make_list(command), 
    Events = make_list(EventName) 
    by 
    bin(TimeGenerated, 1min), 
    RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, 
    UserIdentityUserName, 
    SourceIpAddress, 
    SessionMfaAuthenticated

Threshold: ge 8

Stage 7: `where`

| where CommadCount >= 8

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`CommadCount`	ge	`8` transforms: `cased`
`UserAgent`	starts_with	`aws-cli`
`command`	match	`SuspiciousCommands`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`AccountName`	`summarize`
`AccountUPNSuffix`	`summarize`
`CommadCount`	`summarize`
`EventCount`	`summarize`
`Events`	`summarize`
`RecipientAccountId`	`summarize`
`SessionMfaAuthenticated`	`summarize`
`SourceIpAddress`	`summarize`
`UserIdentityUserName`	`summarize`
`commands`	`summarize`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

AWSCloudTrail - Suspicious AWS CLI Command Execution

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: `SuspiciousCommands`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 6: `summarize`

Stage 7: `where`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

AWSCloudTrail - Suspicious AWS CLI Command Execution

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Let binding: SuspiciousCommands

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: extend

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: extend (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 6: summarize

Stage 7: where

Indicators

Output fields

Let binding: `SuspiciousCommands`

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `extend`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 6: `summarize`

Stage 7: `where`