Suspicious AWS console logins by credential access alerts

Severity: medium
Time window: 1m
Group by: AccountObjectId, AlertName, AlertSeverity, AlertTime, AlertTimeGenerated, EntityIp, ProductName, ProviderName, SourceIpAddress, Tactics, Techniques
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'This query aims to detect instances of successful AWS console logins that align with high-severity credential access or Initial Access alerts generated by Defender Products. Specifically, it focuses on scenarios where the successful login takes place within a 60-minute timeframe of the high-severity alert. The login is considered relevant if it originates from an IP address associated with potential attackers.'

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Initial Access	`T1078` Valid Accounts

Rule body kusto

id: b51fe620-62ad-4ed2-9d40-5c97c0a8231f
name: Suspicious AWS console logins by credential access alerts
description: |
  'This query aims to detect instances of successful AWS console logins that align with high-severity credential access or Initial Access alerts generated by Defender Products.
   Specifically, it focuses on scenarios where the successful login takes place within a 60-minute timeframe of the high-severity alert. The login is considered relevant if it originates from an IP address associated with potential attackers.'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: OfficeATP
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityAlert
  - connectorId: AWS
    dataTypes:
      - AWSCloudTrail
  - connectorId: MicrosoftDefenderAdvancedThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityAlert
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectoryIdentityProtection
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityAlert (IPC)
  - connectorId: BehaviorAnalytics
    dataTypes:
      - IdentityInfo
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityAlert
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - InitialAccess
  - CredentialAccess
relevantTechniques:
  - T1078
query: |
  SecurityAlert 
  // Filtering alerts based on Microsoft product names
    | where ProductName in ("Microsoft 365 Defender", "Azure Active Directory", "Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection", "Microsoft Cloud App Security","Azure Active Directory Identity Protection", "Microsoft Defender ATP")
  // Narrowing down alerts to specific tactics
    | where Tactics in("CredentialAccess", "InitialAccess")
  // Focusing on high-severity alerts
    | where AlertSeverity == "High"
  // Parsing and extending the 'Entities' column as JSON objects
    | extend Entities = parse_json(Entities) 
  // Exploring IP entities within the alert entities
    | mv-apply Entity = Entities on 
        ( 
        where Entity.Type == 'ip' 
        | extend EntityIp = tostring(Entity.Address) 
        ) 
  // Exploring account entities within the alert entities
    | mv-apply Entity = Entities on 
        ( 
        where Entity.Type == 'account' 
        | extend AccountObjectId = tostring(Entity.AadUserId)
        )
  // Filtering out alerts with missing IP or account information
    | where isnotempty(EntityIp) and isnotempty(AccountObjectId)
  // Summarizing relevant fields for further analysis
    | summarize 
        by 
        AlertName,
        ProductName,
        ProviderName,
        AlertSeverity,
        EntityIp,
        Tactics,
        Techniques,
        AlertTime= bin(TimeGenerated, 1min),
        AccountObjectId,
        AlertTimeGenerated=TimeGenerated
  // Joining with IdentityInfo to obtain additional account details
    | join kind=inner (
        IdentityInfo
        | where TimeGenerated >= ago(1d)
        | distinct AccountObjectId, AccountUPN=tolower(AccountUPN)
        )
        on AccountObjectId 
        |extend Name = tostring(split(AccountUPN,'@')[0]), UPNSuffix =tostring(split(AccountUPN,'@')[1])
  // Joining with AWSCloudTrail data to correlate AWS console logins
    | join kind=inner (
        AWSCloudTrail
        | where EventName == "ConsoleLogin"
        | extend CTUPN= tolower(tostring(tolower(split(UserIdentityArn, "/", 2)[0])))
        | extend ActionType= tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)  
        | where ActionType == "Success"
        | extend AWSTime= bin(TimeGenerated, 1min)
        | project
            EventName,
            EventSource,
            EventTypeName,
            RecipientAccountId,
            ResponseElements,
            SessionMfaAuthenticated,
            SourceIpAddress,
            TimeGenerated,
            UserAgent,
            UserIdentityArn,
            UserIdentityType,
            CTUPN,
            AWSTime,
            UserIdentityUserName
        )
        on $left.EntityIp == $right.SourceIpAddress 
  // Filtering login event after the Alert generation time
    | where AlertTimeGenerated >= AWSTime
  // Calculating the time difference between alert generation and AWS login
    | extend timediff = datetime_diff('minute', AlertTimeGenerated, TimeGenerated) 
  // Filtering alerts with a time difference of up to 60 minutes
    | where timediff between ((-60)..(60))
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: AccountUPN
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: Name
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: UPNSuffix
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SourceIpAddress
customDetails:
  AWSUSerUPN: CTUPN
  AzureUserUPN: AccountUPN
  ComonIp: SourceIpAddress
  UserAgent: UserAgent
kind: Scheduled
version: 1.0.1

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

SecurityAlert

Stage 2: `where`

| where ProductName in ("Microsoft 365 Defender", "Azure Active Directory", "Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection", "Microsoft Cloud App Security","Azure Active Directory Identity Protection", "Microsoft Defender ATP")

Stage 3: `where`

| where Tactics in("CredentialAccess", "InitialAccess")

Stage 4: `where`

| where AlertSeverity == "High"

Stage 5: `extend`

| extend Entities = parse_json(Entities)

Stage 6: `kusto:mv-apply`

| mv-apply Entity = Entities on 
      ( 
      where Entity.Type == 'ip' 
      | extend EntityIp = tostring(Entity.Address) 
      )

Stage 7: `kusto:mv-apply`

| mv-apply Entity = Entities on 
      ( 
      where Entity.Type == 'account' 
      | extend AccountObjectId = tostring(Entity.AadUserId)
      )

Stage 8: `where`

| where isnotempty(EntityIp) and isnotempty(AccountObjectId)

Stage 9: `summarize`

| summarize 
      by 
      AlertName,
      ProductName,
      ProviderName,
      AlertSeverity,
      EntityIp,
      Tactics,
      Techniques,
      AlertTime= bin(TimeGenerated, 1min),
      AccountObjectId,
      AlertTimeGenerated=TimeGenerated

Stage 10: `join`

| join kind=inner (
      IdentityInfo
      | where TimeGenerated >= ago(1d)
      | distinct AccountObjectId, AccountUPN=tolower(AccountUPN)
      )
      on AccountObjectId

Stage 11: `extend`

| extend Name = tostring(split(AccountUPN,'@')[0]), UPNSuffix =tostring(split(AccountUPN,'@')[1])

Stage 12: `join`

| join kind=inner (
      AWSCloudTrail
      | where EventName == "ConsoleLogin"
      | extend CTUPN= tolower(tostring(tolower(split(UserIdentityArn, "/", 2)[0])))
      | extend ActionType= tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).ConsoleLogin)  
      | where ActionType == "Success"
      | extend AWSTime= bin(TimeGenerated, 1min)
      | project
          EventName,
          EventSource,
          EventTypeName,
          RecipientAccountId,
          ResponseElements,
          SessionMfaAuthenticated,
          SourceIpAddress,
          TimeGenerated,
          UserAgent,
          UserIdentityArn,
          UserIdentityType,
          CTUPN,
          AWSTime,
          UserIdentityUserName
      )
      on $left.EntityIp == $right.SourceIpAddress

Stage 13: `where`

| where AlertTimeGenerated >= AWSTime

Stage 14: `extend`

| extend timediff = datetime_diff('minute', AlertTimeGenerated, TimeGenerated)

Stage 15: `where`

| where timediff between ((-60)..(60))

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`AccountObjectId`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`ActionType`	eq	`Success` transforms: `cased`
`AlertSeverity`	eq	`High` transforms: `cased`
`AlertTimeGenerated`	ge	`AWSTime` transforms: `cased`
`EntityIp`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`EventName`	eq	`ConsoleLogin` transforms: `cased`
`ProductName`	in	`Azure Active Directory` transforms: `cased` `Azure Active Directory Identity Protection` transforms: `cased` `Microsoft 365 Defender` transforms: `cased` `Microsoft Cloud App Security` transforms: `cased` `Microsoft Defender ATP` transforms: `cased` `Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection` transforms: `cased`
`Tactics`	in	`CredentialAccess` transforms: `cased` `InitialAccess` transforms: `cased`
`Type`	eq	`account` transforms: `cased` `ip` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`AccountObjectId`	`summarize`
`AlertName`	`summarize`
`AlertSeverity`	`summarize`
`AlertTime`	`summarize`
`AlertTimeGenerated`	`summarize`
`EntityIp`	`summarize`
`ProductName`	`summarize`
`ProviderName`	`summarize`
`Tactics`	`summarize`
`Techniques`	`summarize`
`Name`	`extend`
`UPNSuffix`	`extend`
`timediff`	`extend`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

Suspicious AWS console logins by credential access alerts

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `kusto:mv-apply`

Stage 7: `kusto:mv-apply`

Stage 8: `where`

Stage 9: `summarize`

Stage 10: `join`

Stage 11: `extend`

Stage 12: `join`

Stage 13: `where`

Stage 14: `extend`

Stage 15: `where`

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

Suspicious AWS console logins by credential access alerts

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: where

Stage 5: extend

Stage 6: kusto:mv-apply

Stage 7: kusto:mv-apply

Stage 8: where

Stage 9: summarize

Stage 10: join

Stage 11: extend

Stage 12: join

Stage 13: where

Stage 14: extend

Stage 15: where

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `where`

Stage 5: `extend`

Stage 6: `kusto:mv-apply`

Stage 7: `kusto:mv-apply`

Stage 8: `where`

Stage 9: `summarize`

Stage 10: `join`

Stage 11: `extend`

Stage 12: `join`

Stage 13: `where`

Stage 14: `extend`

Stage 15: `where`