AWSCloudTrail - Suspicious AWS EC2 Compute Resource Deployments

Severity: medium
Time window: 1d
Group by: AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, RecipientAccountId, SourceIpAddress, UserAgent, UserIdentityArn
Source: github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel

'This detection focused on Suspicious deployment of AWS EC2 resource (virtual machine) scale sets was detected. This behavior might indicate that the threat actor is deploying computing resources for cryptocurrency mining activities.This detection centers around identifying suspicious instances of AWS EC2 resource deployment, particularly scale sets. Such behavior raises concerns of potential threat actor involvement, potentially indicative of efforts to deploy computing resources for the purpose of cryptocurrency mining activities.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Tactic	Techniques
Impact	`T1496` Resource Hijacking

Rules detecting the same action

Other rules on this platform that filter on the same API call or operation.

AWSCloudTrail - Unauthorized EC2 Instance Setup Attempt (Kusto)

Rule body kusto

id: 9e457dc4-81f0-4d25-bc37-a5fa4a17946a
name: AWSCloudTrail - Suspicious AWS EC2 Compute Resource Deployments
description: |
  'This detection focused on Suspicious deployment of AWS EC2 resource (virtual machine) scale sets was detected. This behavior might indicate that the threat actor is deploying computing resources for cryptocurrency mining activities.This detection centers around identifying suspicious instances of AWS EC2 resource deployment, particularly scale sets. Such behavior raises concerns of potential threat actor involvement, potentially indicative of efforts to deploy computing resources for the purpose of cryptocurrency mining activities.
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AWS
    dataTypes:
      - AWSCloudTrail
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  -  Impact
relevantTechniques:
  - T1496
query: |
  // Retrieve AWS CloudTrail events generated within the last day
  AWSCloudTrail
  // Filter events related to instance creation
  | where EventName =~ "RunInstances"
  // Exclude events with error messages
  | where isempty(ErrorMessage)
  // Extract the event source type
  | extend EventSourceSplit = split(EventSource, ".")
  | extend Type = tostring(EventSourceSplit[0])
  // Extract instance-related details from the event data
  | extend instance = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).instanceType),platform = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).instancesSet.items[0].platform)
  // Determine the operating system platform
  | extend OSplatform = iff(isempty(platform), tostring("Linux"), platform),CPU = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).instancesSet.items[0].cpuOptions),core = toint(parse_json(ResponseElements).instancesSet.items[0].cpuOptions.coreCount),corThread = toint(parse_json(ResponseElements).instancesSet.items[0].cpuOptions.threadsPerCore),InstanceId = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).instancesSet.items[0].instanceId)
  // Filter out instances with empty core values
  | where isnotempty(core)
  // Calculate the total compute based on core and thread counts
  | extend totalCorecompute = core * corThread
  | extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
  | extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
  | extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
  | extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
    AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")
  // Summarize relevant information for analysis
  | summarize Start= min(TimeGenerated),
    end=   max(TimeGenerated),
    totalgpu= sum(totalCorecompute)
    by SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserAgent
  // Filter results based on total GPU compute and time duration
  | where totalgpu > 800
  | where datetime_diff('hour', end, Start) < 8
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
      - identifier: CloudAppAccountId
        columnName: RecipientAccountId
  - entityType: IP
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Address
        columnName: SourceIpAddress
customDetails:
    UserAgent: UserAgent
    AWSUser: UserIdentityArn
    SourceIpAddress: SourceIpAddress
    TotalCoreCount: totalgpu
alertDetailsOverride:
  alertDisplayNameFormat: Suspicious EC2 deployment - {{totalgpu}} cores deployed by {{AccountName}}
  alertDescriptionFormat: User {{AccountName}} deployed {{totalgpu}} total CPU cores across EC2 instances from {{SourceIpAddress}} within an 8-hour window, suggesting potential cryptocurrency mining activity.
kind: Scheduled
version: 1.0.2

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

AWSCloudTrail

Stage 2: `where`

| where EventName =~ "RunInstances"

Stage 3: `where`

| where isempty(ErrorMessage)

Stage 4: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

| extend EventSourceSplit = split(EventSource, ".")
| extend Type = tostring(EventSourceSplit[0])
| extend instance = tostring(parse_json(RequestParameters).instanceType),platform = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).instancesSet.items[0].platform)
| extend OSplatform = iff(isempty(platform), tostring("Linux"), platform),CPU = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).instancesSet.items[0].cpuOptions),core = toint(parse_json(ResponseElements).instancesSet.items[0].cpuOptions.coreCount),corThread = toint(parse_json(ResponseElements).instancesSet.items[0].cpuOptions.threadsPerCore),InstanceId = tostring(parse_json(ResponseElements).instancesSet.items[0].instanceId)

Stage 5: `where`

| where isnotempty(core)

Stage 6: `extend` (5 consecutive steps)

| extend totalCorecompute = core * corThread
| extend UserIdentityArn = iif(isempty(UserIdentityArn), tostring(parse_json(Resources)[0].ARN), UserIdentityArn)
| extend UserName = tostring(split(UserIdentityArn, '/')[-1])
| extend AccountName = case( UserIdentityPrincipalid == "Anonymous", "Anonymous", isempty(UserIdentityUserName), UserName, UserIdentityUserName)
| extend AccountName = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 0)[0]), AccountName),
  AccountUPNSuffix = iif(AccountName contains "@", tostring(split(AccountName, '@', 1)[0]), "")

Stage 7: `summarize`

| summarize Start= min(TimeGenerated),
  end=   max(TimeGenerated),
  totalgpu= sum(totalCorecompute)
  by SourceIpAddress, RecipientAccountId, AccountName, AccountUPNSuffix, UserIdentityArn, UserAgent

Threshold: gt 800

Stage 8: `where`

| where totalgpu > 800

Stage 9: `where` where end - Start < 8h

| where datetime_diff('hour', end, Start) < 8

Indicators

Each row is a field, operator, and value that the rule matches. The corpus column counts how many other rules in the catalog look for the same combination: high numbers point to widely-used, community-vetted indicators. Blank or 1 shows that the indicator is specific to this rule.

Field	Kind	Values
`ErrorMessage`	is_null	(no value, null check)
`EventName`	eq	`RunInstances`
`core`	is_not_null	(no value, null check)
`totalgpu`	gt	`800` transforms: `cased`

Output fields

Fields the rule emits when it matches. Chronicle authors list these in the outcome block; they appear on the detection and $risk_score drives alerting. Sentinel / Defender XDR rules build them up through project / summarize / extend stages. Sentinel maps these into alert fields via entityMappings and customDetails; Defender XDR custom detections surface them as alert fields directly.

Field	Source
`AccountName`	`summarize`
`AccountUPNSuffix`	`summarize`
`RecipientAccountId`	`summarize`
`SourceIpAddress`	`summarize`
`Start`	`summarize`
`UserAgent`	`summarize`
`UserIdentityArn`	`summarize`
`end`	`summarize`
`totalgpu`	`summarize`

`j` / `k`	Scroll down / up
`d` / `u`	Half-page down / up
`gg` / `G`	Top / bottom
`h` / `l`	History back / forward
`f`	Follow link (`Shift` = new tab)
`/`	Focus search
`?`	Toggle this help
`↑` / `↓`	Navigate search results
`Enter`	Open highlighted result
`Esc`	Close results / dialog

`type:`	`events` / `rules` / `providers`
`vendor:`	`sigma` / `elastic` / `splunk` / `kusto` / `chronicle` (vendor name alone also works: `sigma:`, `kql:`, `secops:`…)
`tactic:`	TA-id, slug, or name: `credential_access`, `TA0006`
`technique:`	technique or sub-technique ID: `T1003`, `T1003.001` (alias `tech:`)
`severity:`	`critical` / `high` / `medium` / `low` / `informational` (alias `sev:`)
`risk_score`	Numeric comparison on the Elastic risk score (0 to 100): `risk_score>50`, `risk_score<=20`, `risk_score=99` (alias `risk`; Elastic rules only)
`stages:`	Rules with exactly N pipeline stages
`correlation:`	`single_event` / `sequence` / `alternatives` / `alternatives_cross_log` / `all_required` / `correlated`
`with:`	Co-occurrence event-id; stacks (`with:4624 with:4769`) to require all, while a comma list in one occurrence (`with:4624,4769`) is an either-or group. Implies multi-event
`like:`	Structural neighbors of a rule slug (equivalents + subsumption stricter / broader): `like:comsvcs_lsass_memory_dump-splunk-sysmon`
`groupby:`	Entity-grouping substring match against `group_by_keys`: `groupby:user`, `groupby:host`
`uses:`	Rules whose predicate tree touches the field (any kind, any value): `uses:CommandLine`
`excludes:`	Rules with top-level `not()` clauses on the field (FP whitelists): `excludes:ParentImage`
`field:` / `value:`	Predicate search; narrows rule cards to those with a matching leaf and drives the indicator tier. Unquoted = substring, wildcards allowed (`value:mimikatz`)
`indicator:`	Shorthand for `field:F value:V`: `indicator:Image=*\powershell.exe`
`kind:`	Filter by predicate kind. Narrows rule cards to those carrying a matching predicate leaf (`vendor:elastic kind:cidr_match`) and drives the indicator tier: `contains` / `starts_with` / `ends_with` / `regex` / `cidr` / `eq` / `in` … (operator aliases `op:`/`match:`)
`has:` / `no:`	`sample`, `field`, `notes`, `refs`, `trace`, `thirdparty`, `rule`, `pattern`, `timewindow`, `threshold`, `newterms`, `sigma`/`elastic`/`splunk`/`kusto`/`chronicle`
`-op:val`	Exclude matches; works on most operators but not `type:`/`like:`/`has:`/`no:` (use `no:<flag>` to exclude a rule flag): `tactic:execution -vendor:splunk`. Standalone `-kind:`/`-field:`/`-value:` drop every rule carrying a matching predicate leaf (`type:rules -kind:is_null`)
`field:"…"` / `value:"…"`	Quoted value = anchored exact match (also allows spaces): `value:"net user"`
`a,b`	Comma = OR inside one operator (`vendor:sigma,elastic`, `severity:high,critical`); repeating a facet merges the same way. `field:`/`value:` never split (literal commas)
`vendors:` / `stage:`	Singular and plural spellings fold to the canonical operator and value: `tactics:` = `tactic:`, `type:event` = `type:events`, `correlation:sequences` = `correlation:sequence`, `has:thresholds` = `has:threshold`
`"quoted phrase"`	Exact-match a multi-word phrase (free text)

AWSCloudTrail - Suspicious AWS EC2 Compute Resource Deployments

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `extend` (5 consecutive steps)

Stage 7: `summarize`

Stage 8: `where`

Stage 9: `where` where end - Start < 8h

Indicators

Output fields

Keyboard shortcuts

Search operators

AWSCloudTrail - Suspicious AWS EC2 Compute Resource Deployments

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

Rules detecting the same action

Rule body kusto

Stages and Predicates

Stage 1: source

Stage 2: where

Stage 3: where

Stage 4: extend (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 5: where

Stage 6: extend (5 consecutive steps)

Stage 7: summarize

Stage 8: where

Stage 9: where where end - Start < 8h

Indicators

Output fields

Stage 1: `source`

Stage 2: `where`

Stage 3: `where`

Stage 4: `extend` (4 consecutive steps)

Stage 5: `where`

Stage 6: `extend` (5 consecutive steps)

Stage 7: `summarize`

Stage 8: `where`

Stage 9: `where` where end - Start < 8h